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Abstract
In  the  last  thirty  years,  primarily  feminist  scholars  have  drawn
attention  to  and  re-evaluated  the  philosophy  of  Simone  de
Beauvoir (1908–1986). Her philosophical practice has been
described  as  non-systematic,  and  her  literary  writing  has  been
viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This
dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir’s
philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to
express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir’s
philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity,
paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern
traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also
clarifies  Beauvoir’s  main  reason  to  turn  to  literature  in  order  to
express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific
mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality
of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture
of  life.  In  addition,  the  thesis  gives  examples  of  how  Beauvoir’s
literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of
subjectivity. I use the expression ‘poetics of subjectivity’ to refer to
the systematic relation between Beauvoir’s existential and pheno-
menological  notion  of  subjectivity  and  her  literary  works,  and  to
her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in
the novel.
The  thesis  is  divided  into  five  chapters,  of  which  the  first
three investigate Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence at the inter-
section of the modern traditions of thought that began with René
Descartes’ and Søren Kierkegaard’s intuitions about subjectivity.
Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir’s notion of ambiguity, as compared
to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of
Beauvoir’s  philosophy  through  a  study  of  her  response  to  early
French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in
the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My
analysis shows that Edmund Husserl’s distinction between
different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir’s
understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she
uses.  Chapter  4  is  a  study  of  Beauvoir’s  reflections  on  the
expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her
philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the
autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter
5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete
subjectivity; Beauvoir’s conceptual study of femininity in The
Second Sex and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel
She Came to Stay. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir’s
original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the
becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental
insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as
imaginatively.
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. . . . at every moment I encounter the fact that the
others’ discourse being the origin of mine, as well as
an unforeseeable future, gives it a continuing sense
of its own limits. Here, one has the impression of
experiencing a new rationality, in which a
relationship to the unknown and to the unthought is
at every moment reintroduced.
Michèle Le Doeuff, The Philosophical Imaginary, p. 128
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Introduction
In this work I will investigate the relation between Simone de
Beauvoir’s phenomenological philosophy of existence and her
literary writing. More precisely, I will clarify her philosophical
reasons  and  motivations  for  turning  to  literature  as  a  mode  to
express subjectivity. Literature has a crucial function in Beauvoir’s
philosophy, because in her view, it enables us to better understand
the paradoxical condition of human existence. By this she means
the fact that our singular lives are at once unique, something that is
impossible to share, and universal, something that all human
beings share. As a specific mode of communication, literature is
able to express this paradox, by making the universality of human
existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of
life.  My  aim  is  not  to  defend  Beauvoir’s  views  on  existence  and
expressivity, but to provide a detailed philosophical reconstruction
of how she understands their interdependence. Such an explicative
project is necessarily prior to any critical evaluation of her position.
 Beauvoir herself dedicated a considerable part of her writings
to  explain  why  and  how  literature  can  mediate  the  subjective
aspects of existence, by which she understood its singularity,
ambiguity and temporality. Taking these philosophical and
technical explanations into account, I will argue that it is plausible
to  talk  about  a  ‘poetics  of  subjectivity’  in  her  work.  In  using  the
notion of ‘poetics’, I do not refer to a theory of literature, but wish
to evoke a tradition of philosophical poetics, originating in
Aristotle’s definition of poetry. Contrary to Plato, who censures
and finally exiles the poets from his ideal state, Aristotle defines
the proper place of poetry and underlines its affinity with
philosophy, in comparison to history: whereas the historian
describes what has been or happened, the poet’s role is to describe
what “might happen, i.e., what is possible as being probable or
necessary” (Ross, 1924, De Poetica, 1451a-b). As an art imitating
what might be, furthermore, poetry is more philosophical than
history, because its statements are of the nature of universals,
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whereas  the  statements  of  the  historian  are  of  the  nature  of
singulars.1
 Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence challenges this ancient view.
In two of her most significant essays on literature and metaphysics,
Beauvoir defends the philosophical possibilities of literature on the
grounds that literature is able to communicate the universal by
expressing singularity and contingency. This does not place
literature on the side of history, but questions the philosophical
habit  of  separating  the  singular  and  the  universal  into  two
different realms of experience. By stressing the idea of the ‘singular
universal’, Beauvoir claims that human existence must be viewed
from the perspective of the singular and the universal, or from the
perspective of temporality and eternity, in Søren Kierkegaard’s
terms.
 Aristotle’s Poetics is  often  referred  to  as  the  first  systematic
study of literary discourse, although this work is actually about the
art of imitation (mimêmis). Aristotle studies the mode in which the
art of poetry imitates, or represents, in language, and describes two
representational genres in particular, epic and drama (tragedy) (cf.
Jonathan Barnes 1995). Among the modern definitions of poetics,
one  of  the  most  elaborate  appeared  in  linguistics  under  the
influence of structuralist methodology in the 1960s. In the words of
Tzvetan Todorov, poetics is a science that studies the general laws
of which the particular literary work is at once a manifestation,
product and instance (Todorov 1981, 3, 6, 11).2 Poetics, as the study
of the structure and elements of literary discourse, is here
distinguished from exegesis and interpretation, where the focus is
on the literary work. Reflection on literature existed before the
1960s,  Todorov  acknowledges,  but  systematic  descriptions  re-
1 By a universal statement Aristotle means “one as to what such and such
a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do”, and by a singular
“one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him” (Ross, 1924, De
Poetica,  1451b).  That  poetry  uses  proper  names  does  not  change  its
philosophical status, in Aristotle’s view, but rather makes its statements
more convincing.
2 Cf. Todorov (1982), where he distinguishes three different contemporary
meanings of the word ‘poetics’: poetics as a synonym for a theory of
literature, poetics meaning a ‘theory of poetry’, as opposed to a theory of
prose, and poetics in the sense of “’a system of devices characteristic of the
work of a writer’” (Todorov 1982, 1-3). For a specific discussion of lingu-
istic poetics and the novel, see Jonathan Culler (1975, 189-238).
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mained in the background.3 From the French context he mentions
Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussions of literature and politics, and
Maurice Blanchot’s studies of the writer’s “meta-physical choice”,
as the source from which writing begins.
 Beauvoir’s reflections on literature––of which there is no
mentioning in Todorov’s introduction––on the one hand belongs to
the typically French branch of modern poetics, often expressed by
the writers themselves, and on the other hand provides us with a
systematic account of the relation between philosophical ideas and
literary discourse. Beauvoir’s poetics echoes Aristotle’s, in the
sense that it rearticulates the problem of representation in relation
to the necessities and possibilities of human existence, but it also
anticipates the modern definition of poetry, in its concern with the
formal elements of literature. The central theme of Beauvoir’s
philosophical poetics––as distinguished from linguistic poetics––is
subjectivity. The expression ‘poetics of subjectivity’ refers both to
the systematic relation between Beauvoir’s existential and
phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works,
and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language,
especially in the novel.4
 My investigation has two principal and related aims, and the
one lays the ground for the other. Most fundamentally, I intend to
explicate the central concepts of Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence
3 German romanticism was crucial for the development of modern poetics,
with its emphasis on the unity of philosophy and literature, and the
autonomy  of  the  literary  work,  but  it  was  only  with  twentieth  century
linguistics that poetics became the systematic study of the “literariness” of
literary discourse, or “the abstract property that constitutes the singularity
of the literary phenomenon” (Todorov 1981, xxv-xxvi, 7).
4 There are thus interesting affinities between Beauvoir’s philosophical
poetics and those of Wilhelm Dilthey and Roman Ingarden. As one of the
forerunners to Husserlian phenomenology, Dilthey thinks that the poet, as
well as the philosopher, should approach ‘lived experiences’ in a
disinterested mode, which for Dilthey means in a mode liberated from the
personal and the contingent (Dilthey, SW 5, 227). Ingarden’s poetics
develops from Husserlian phenomenology and studies what constitutes
the essential or invariable being of the literary work (Ingarden 1973 [1930];
cf. Eugene H. Falk 1981). In a comparative perspective, Heidegger’s
phenomenological articulation of the poetic experience as the essence of
language deepens this tradition of modern poetics. For an attentive
interpretation of the latter, see Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback (2003).
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and  discuss  their  background  in  the  modern  traditions  of  exist-
entialist and phenomenological philosophy. The crucial theoretical
question here concerns the relation between the concepts
‘existence’ and ‘subjectivity’, which coexist in Beauvoir’s thought
and are sometimes used interchangeably. I articulate an apparent
tension between the two concepts by starting from Beauvoir’s
fundamental claim that French existentialism is a philosophy of
ambiguity in the tradition of Kierkegaard. Beauvoir’s discussion of
René Descartes’ evidence of existence, however, motivates a
consideration of the convergence of Kierkegaardian and Cartesian
thought in her understanding of singularity and subjectivity. It
also  motivates  a  closer  study  of  her  phenomenological  reinter-
pretation of the problem of subjectivity from the perspective of
ambiguity.  My  second  aim,  growing  out  of  the  first,  is  to  clarify
Beauvoir’s philosophical reasons and motivations for turning to
literature as a mode to express subjectivity, or human existence, as
both singular and universal.
 Whereas  the  primary  goal  related  to  this  twofold  aim  is  to
explicate Beauvoir’s understanding of existence, through an
investigation of the meaning of ambiguity and subjectivity, a
secondary goal is to study her methodological conceptions of how
to express subjectivity or the ambiguously lived aspects of
existence. In my interpretation of these conceptions, I begin from
Beauvoir’s view of her own philosophical work, which she divides
into two kinds of texts: essays and novels. For her, these two kinds
of  texts  are  not  merely  two  modes  of  self-expression;  they  also
reflect two different orders of experience. Whereas the essays
reflect ethical choices and intellectual certitudes, the novels are
attempts to express or recapture life’s transcendental contra-
dictions in  their  many nuances  and ambiguities.  In  her  essays on
literature and philosophy, as well as in her autobiographical
reflections on writing, Beauvoir discusses the techniques of
expressing this ambiguous experience, which she also calls
‘metaphysical experience’.
 Taking Beauvoir’s ‘poetics of subjectivity’ seriously, that is,
accepting her claim that literature is a privileged mode of
expressing human existence, motivates the third and ultimate aim
of this study, which is to take into account three of Beauvoir’s most
significant literary works in the explication of her notion of subject-
ivity. Thus, the primary source of my discussion of Beauvoir’s
notion of temporality is her autobiographical reflections on how to
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express  her  own  past.  Furthermore,  I  use  Beauvoir’s  autobio-
graphical account of her mother’s death to study the philosophical
problem concerning the inexpressivity of experience. Finally, I
argue that Beauvoir’s novel She Came to Stay (L’Invitée, 1943)
should be interpreted as a literary description of the ambiguity and
complexity of feminine subjective becoming, which Beauvoir later
studies and describes in her investigations of sexual difference in
The Second Sex (Le deuxième sexe, 1949).
 In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn
attention to Beauvoir’s unique mode of practicing philosophy.
Most fundamentally, her work has been re-evaluated as
philosophical. This re-evaluation has often been accomplished
through disentangling her work from the work of Sartre, to which
Beauvoir’s thinking has traditionally either been reduced or
compared. When it comes to the methodological aspects of
Beauvoir’s  thinking,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  her  concept  of
philosophising is non-systematic in a Kierkegaardian sense, and
her literary work has been viewed as part of her non-systematic
mode of philosophising.5 Whereas most researchers agree on this
general characterisation of Beauvoir’s thought, the secondary
literature suggests different directions when it comes to a more
precise  understanding  of  how  her  literary  work  should  be  inter-
preted and related to her essays and her non-fictional work.
 To the most influential feminist studies of Beauvoir’s work
belongs Toril Moi’s (1994) genealogical reading of Simone de
Beauvoir as an ‘emblematic intellectual woman’ of the twentieth
century.  Moi  studies  Simone  de  Beauvoir,  the  person,  as  the
intertextual network of her fictional, philosophical, auto-
biographical and epistolary texts (Moi 1994, 4). Commentaries and
other cultural expressions about Beauvoir are also part of this
network. In Moi’s sociologically, psychoanalytically and philo-
sophically informed reading, they contribute to produce the “the
images and ideas we recognize as ‘Simone de Beauvoir’”, and
condition our perception of her own texts (Moi 1994, 4).
5 By non-systematic philosophy, Kierkegaard understands a mode of
thinking that emerges from the experience of the paradox of existence.
This  mode  of  thinking  is  subjective  and  becoming,  rather  than  objective
and final, and can only be communicated indirectly. I discuss Kierke-
gaard’s  critique  of  the  philosophical  system  in  Chapter  1  and  his
distinction between indirect and direct communication in Chapter 4.
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 Moi’s detailed interpretations of particular texts are nuanced
and challenging, but the main reason for mentioning her study
here  is  that  her  method  provides  an  illuminative  contrast  to  my
own. What is crucial in Moi’s Foucault-inspired study is the
collapse of the distinctions between ‘life’ and ‘text’, or the complete
overlap of what she takes as the question of subjectivity; “Beauvoir
perceived  as  a  speaking  subject”,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
question of textuality; “Beauvoir perceived as a body of texts”, on
the  other  hand  (Moi  1994,  5,  7).  In  other  words,  conversations,
philosophical treatises, gossip, novels, and educational institutions
are all considered as elements belonging to the discursive network
that made, produced or constructed “the text we know as ‘Simone
de Beauvoir’” (Moi 1994, 5-6).
 My approach differs from Moi’s in the fundamental sense that I
take a “step back”, historically as well as philosophically, from the
poststructuralist assumptions about subjectivity and textuality
inherent in her theory, and interpret Beauvoir’s own under-
standing of subjectivity in terms of the existential and pheno-
menological conceptualisations of the human condition. On the
one hand, my study thereby belongs among the interpretations
which emphasise the existential and phenomenological aspects of
Beauvoir’s work that began in the late 1970s, with critical articles
by Michèle Le Doeuff (1979) and Margaret A. Simons (1981), and
has then continued with more extensive studies.6 On the other
hand,  I  also  locate  Beauvoir  at  the  intersection  of  the  modern
traditions of thought that originate with Descartes’ and
Kierkegaard’s different intuitions about subjectivity: Cartesian
radicalism and the determination of human existence as
paradoxical. Both Descartes and Kierkegaard emphasise the
importance  of  the  method  of  philosophising,  and  I  argue  that
Beauvoir’s ‘poetics of subjectivity’ is her original embrace of these
two strands of philosophical practice. Therefore, I relate Beauvoir’s
work to the phenomenological and existential Cartesianism, i.e.,
the intellectual milieu in which she developed her own philo-
sophical conceptions.
6 The  most  important  of  which  include:  Le  Doeuff  (1989);  Sonia  Kruks
(1990); Eva Lundgren-Gothlin (1996 [1991]); Debra Bergoffen (1996); Kate
& Edward Fullbrook (1998); Jo-Ann Pilardi (1999); Ursula Tidd (1999);
Kristana Arp (2001); Eleanor Holveck (2002); Sara Heinämaa (2003), and
Michel Kail (2006).
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 Beauvoir’s general mode of combining phenomenology and
philosophy  of  existence  is  not  unique  in  the  French  context  to
which she belonged. As I will argue, the philosophical attitude that
she  takes  towards  existence  is  shared  by  Sartre  and  Maurice
Merleau-Ponty––with whom she was in dialogue––and is
ultimately indebted to Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s
understandings  of  subjectivity  and  human  existence.  In  order  to
capture Beauvoir’s specific notion of subjectivity, however, one
needs to do detailed interpretative work. Beauvoir did not write
systematic philosophy in a traditional sense; she was not interested
in creating a philosophical theory, but in studying the experiential
material on which such theories depend. She did, however
comment systematically on others’ philosophical theories. In
addition to her own philosophical essays and literary writings,
these commentaries are crucial as sources for my interpretation of
Beauvoir’s precise understanding of subjectivity.
 In relation to existing research, this interpretation is first of all a
response to the feminist studies that emphasise the methodological
connection between Beauvoir’s philosophy and her literary
writing. I will mention one groundbreaking study here, and detail
other relevant interpretations through topical discussions in the
chapters.
 In their critical introduction to Beauvoir’s philosophy, Kate and
Edward Fullbrook (1998) define what they consider to be her
original contribution to existential philosophy: the so-called
‘literary-philosophical method’ (1998, 44). By this they understand
a mode of philosophising that rejects and works against
universalistic and abstract descriptions of human existence, and
that  needs  literary  forms  of  writing  in  order  to  express  the
singularity and concreteness of lived experience (Fullbrook &
Fullbrook 1999, 37-44).7 Furthermore, they underline the “unity” of
literature and philosophy in Beauvoir’s thought.
 I agree with the general perspective taken by the Fullbrooks:
Beauvoir’s conception of the singularity of human existence
motivates her to investigate philosophical problems by means of
novels  and  autobiography,  which  allow  for  the  expression  of  the
central characteristics of lived experience; concreteness, tempo-
7 Cf. Holveck (2002), who stresses what she takes to be a fundamental
distinction in Beauvoir’s thought between systematic, abstract philosophy
and philosophy of lived experience (Holveck 2002, 16-18).
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rality, contingency, ambiguity and even contradiction. The detailed
analyses of particular literary works are also convincing. However,
my understanding of Beauvoir’s position as an existential and
phenomenological thinker differs considerably and in crucial
respects  from  theirs.  The  basic  difference  concerns  the  concept  of
method. I will emphasise that Beauvoir works philosophically in a
conceptual framework in which ‘method’ had a specific and far-
reaching meaning. In the frame of French existential phenomeno-
logy, it referred––as a philosophical idea––to the pheno-
menological epoché and the reductions, introduced by Husserl and
assumed and executed by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. I will argue
in this study, that the shift of attitude suggested by the
phenomenological or transcendental reduction was not merely
known  to  Beauvoir,  but  must  be  considered  as  operative  in  her
understanding of existence: her fictional and autobiographical
writings do not primarily describe empirical or factual life, but
ultimately make manifest a level of experience where the
‘metaphysical’ meaning of subjectivity is revealed. In order to
reserve the notion of  method for  the radical  shift  of  attitude from
empirical life to this metaphysical level of experience, I choose to
talk of a ‘poetics of subjectivity’ in Beauvoir’s works, rather than a
‘literary-philosophical method’.8
I begin by giving an interpretation of Beauvoir’s understanding
of ambiguity as the condition and determination of existence in
Chapter 1.  In  this  interpretation  I  operate  on  two  levels.  On  the
first level, I explicate Beauvoir’s ethical understanding of
ambiguity and its different manifestations as she discusses them in
The Ethics of Ambiguity (Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, 1947) and in
Pyrrhus and Cineas (Pyrrhus et Cinéas,  1944). On the second level, I
locate Beauvoir’s understanding of ambiguity within a wider
8 Beauvoir was not the only French existential thinker who wrote
literature. In a popularly written article from 1947, she claims that striving
to  reach  outside  academic  circles  is  intrinsic  to  existentialism  as  a
philosophy: while resting on a tradition of philosophical problems and
concepts, the proponents of existential thought also wants to be a “living
attitude” towards the problems of its contemporary world (Beauvoir 2004
[1947], 324). Therefore, it can be expressed both in theoretical treatises and
through novels and plays (cf. Merleau-Ponty, SNS, 26-40 [51-81]); Sartre
2001 [1948]). For classical discussions on phenomenology, existentialism
and fictional writing, see also, e.g., Herbert Spiegelberg (1982, 442-444)
and James Edie (1984).
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tradition of thinkers concerned with existence. The most important
of these are Descartes and Kierkegaard. The thematic focus in the
first chapter is on the singular and dynamic aspects of existence, or
on  what  Kierkegaard  calls  the  ‘becoming’  of  singular  existence.
The fact that existence is singular does not mean that Beauvoir’s
philosophy of existence is a form of solipsism. As determined by
ambiguity, existence is necessarily intersubjective. Beauvoir con-
ceptualises intersubjectivity in her ethical framework as the
relation of dependence between the self and the other, both
characterised most fundamentally as freedoms or possibilities that
can be extended in action and creation. The concept of becoming
calls attention to the temporality of the self’s engagements, as well
as to the temporality of the relation between the self and the other.
Bergson’s concept of élan vital, Heidegger’s existential analysis of
projecting and Kierkegaard’s notion of the paradox of existence help
to illuminate and clarify Beauvoir’s conception of the becoming
and openendedness of human existence. Yet her many explicit and
implicit references to phenomenological conceptualisations of
subjectivity also motivate a detailed investigation of the Husserlian
side of her philosophy of existence. The question here concerns the
living self and its philosophical status: is the self just one ex-
perienced and constituted reality, or is it a fundamental structure
of experiencing and constitution? Beauvoir’s view of this crucial
question has not been clarified in earlier studies, and I will argue
that  an  adequate  answer  needs  to  take  her  literary  work  into
consideration, and should take a stand on her reception of the
different interpretations of transcendental subjectivity in the works
of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. This is the topic of Chapters 2 and 3.
In  these  two  chapters  I  discuss  subjectivity  in  detail,  by
studying Beauvoir’s interpretation of classical phenomenological
concepts, primarily through her commentaries on the early French
receptions of Husserl’s phenomenology. The main issue in
Chapter 2 concerns the ‘mineness’ of subjectivity in the frame of
phenomenology. This issue has to be approached through an
explication of the transcendental and eidetic reductions, since
phenomenological philosophy is defined by its methods. I then
construct an argument for the view that Beauvoir’s understanding
of subjectivity owes more to Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of
Husserlian  transcendental  subjectivity  than  to  Sartre’s.  I  take  my
point of departure from an equivocal passage in Beauvoir’s second
autobiographical volume, Prime of Life (La force de l’âge, 1960),
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where she on the one hand seems to affirm the phenomenological
concept of ‘the transcendental ego’, but on the other hand seems to
come close to Sartre’s critique of this very notion.
Several scholars have interpreted the autobiographical passage
in line with Sartre’s early critique of Husserl (see, e.g.,  Tidd 1999,
2001; Pilardi 1999).9 My interpretation is different. I will argue that
it is far from evident that Beauvoir follows Sartre in his critique of
the transcendental ego. First of all, due to the limited systematic
textual evidence we have, it is impossible to provide a final answer
to the question concerning Beauvoir’s position on the transcend-
ental ego. Still, my close reading of Beauvoir’s commentary texts
shows  that  her  reading  of  Sartre  is  more  nuanced  than  often
assumed:  in  her  interpretation  of  Sartre’s  mature  philosophy  of
existence, Beauvoir downplays the dualism of his ontology and
stresses the embodied nature of consciousness and the
intersubjective nature of the world.10 Finally, it is obvious from her
9 Heinämaa (2003a) provides an alternative interpretation by arguing, first,
that Beauvoir’s stand in the question regarding the self is not reducible to
positions already explicated in the phenomenological tradition, and,
second, that there is no evidence that Beauvoir accepted Sartre’s egological
critique of Husserl (Heinämaa 2003a, 58). Heinämaa’s own reading
suggests that Beauvoir’s notion of self should be traced through the
concept of the living body (Heinämaa 2003a, 61). I fundamentally agree
with Heinämaa, but whereas she investigates Beauvoir’s elaboration of
selfhood through the concept of the living body, I focus on the meaning of
Beauvoir’s explicit reference to the transcendental ego. Contrary to all
phenomenologically oriented interpretations, Le Doeuff (1998 [1989])
argues that Beauvoir’s stress on the necessity of “concrete means” for
subjective freedom, especially in The Second Sex, led her away from the
“phenomenological subject” that Sartre inherited from Husserl (Le Doeuff
1998, 99-100, 108 [115-117, 125]), and that Beauvoir’s thought is in fact
closer to Hegel’s phenomenology than to Husserl’s (Le Doeuff & Ulrika
Björk, 2003, 359-360). I argue in the final chapter of this study that
elements from both “phenomenologies” combine in The Second Sex.
10 By taking into account Beauvoir’s stress on the non-dualist elements of
Sartre’s mature ontology, my interpretation differs from Monika Langer’s
(2003), where the emphasis is on the difference between Sartre’s dualist
and Beauvoir’s and Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist conceptions of
ambiguity. I agree with Langer’s main argument, however, that Beauvoir’s
concept of ambiguity is not derivative of Sartre’s. In addition, Langer’s
exceptional interpretation of the similarities between Beauvoir’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of ambiguity has been a source of inspiration
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systematic and non-systematic texts that Beauvoir was familiar
with more than one interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental
subjectivity. The most important source for this claim is a short but
significant review that Beauvoir wrote in 1945 of Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception (La phénoménologie de la perception),
published  in  the  same  year.  In  this  review  she  underlines  the
importance of the phenomenological reduction and of the
discovery  of  intentionality  on  the  level  of  perception  and  sense-
experience. Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserlian intentio-
nality and transcendental subjectivity differs from Sartre’s partly
because it is based on Husserl’s later manuscripts. I end the second
chapter  by  reviewing  the  development  of  Husserl’s  notion  of
transcendental subjectivity.
In Chapter 3 I complete my argument about the transcendental
ego and continue my interpretation of Beauvoir’s understanding of
subjectivity, by studying the phenomenological conceptions of the
intentionality  and temporality  of  subjective life.  In  other  words,  I
discuss in detail one topic to which Beauvoir draws attention in
her review of Phenomenology of Perception: the field of sensible and
temporal experience underlying all higher acts of perception,
cognition and volition, or the ‘authentic existence’ that is made
accessible in the transcendental reduction. It is clear from Merleau-
Ponty’s explications that this level of existence, which he views as
Husserl’s main contribution to the idea of intentionality, is
subjective, though not in any active sense. In order to clarify this, I
first present the main characteristics of the so-called intentionality
of acts. My subsequent explication of Merleau-Ponty’s description
of sense-experience and the subjectivity of a deeper level of
operative intentionality provides an alternative, both to the notion
of  ‘transcendental  ego’  that  Sartre  criticises,  and  to  Sartre’s  own
idea of an impersonal, self-transparent consciousness. The cogito of
operative intentionality is prepersonal, but yet subjectively lived;
temporal, but not yet clearly distinguished into a past, present and
future.
Towards  the  end  of Chapter 3,  I  arrive  at  the  claim  that
Beauvoir operates with this latter interpretation of transcendental
subjectivity in her autobiographical reflections on how to express
for  me.  Like  my  own  discussion  of  subjectivity  in  Chapter  3,  Langer’s
study of ambiguity articulates the philosophical implications of Beauvoir’s
review of Phenomenology of Perception.
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her experience of the past. The phenomenological distinction
between objective and subjective time is fundamental to these
reflections, as is the Husserlian idea of a ‘living present’, which is
close  to  the notion of  becoming.  A shift  of  attitude to  the form of
these reflections make apparent that Beauvoir’s nuanced auto-
biographical description of the past contrasts with her more
schematic conceptualisation of the future in Ethics,  and calls  for  a
consideration of the expressivity of existence.
 Chapter 4 addresses  the  topic  of  expressivity  from  the  per-
spective of Beauvoir’s distinction between conceptual and literary
expression.11 The background to this distinction is found in
Kierkegaard’s critique of the philosophical system, and his
argument that conceptual language cannot express subjectivity.
What is crucial to the frame of my study, however, is not the origin
of the distinction, but Beauvoir’s own articulation of it. Literary ex-
pression, according to the position I reconstruct, is able to describe
and  mediate  the  subjective  aspects  of  existence  in  a  way  that
conceptual language cannot. Whereas conceptual language can
only communicate  what  is  universal,  and thereby fails  to  account
for the ambiguity of existence, literary expression is able to express
the universal in its singular, temporal and contingent mani-
festations.  As  said  already,  I  do  not  intend  to  defend  Beauvoir’s
views on language or expressivity, but to explicate and interpret a
philosophical poetics that has not yet been systematically studied.
 Beauvoir  develops  her  views  on  literary  expression  in  a
discussion  of  the  so-called  ‘metaphysical  novel’  and  in  a  com-
parison between the novel and autobiography, as two modes of
indirect communication. These discussions, which I explicate in
detail, represent the conceptual, abstract side of Beauvoir’s poetics
11 My  aim  in  this  chapter  is  thus  close  to  Holveck’s  (2002)  in Simone de
Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience. Literature and Metaphysics, where
she explicates Beauvoir’s position on literature and philosophy (see
especially Holveck 2002, chapter 2). The main differences between
Holveck’s explication and own concern the focus and frame of inter-
pretation. Holveck concentrates on the relation between philosophy and
literature, and studies the influence on Beauvoir’s position of Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, Jean Baruzi, Sartre and Paul Nizan. My interpretation is
framed by Beauvoir’s understanding of existence. I focus on the tension
between experience and expression rather than on a possible opposition
between philosophy and literature, and on expressivity rather than
“ordinary language” (Holveck 2002, 7, 20-29).
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of  subjectivity.  The  concrete  side  of  her  poetics  is  found  in  her
autobiographical discussion of the techniques she uses in specific
novels, and in the novels themselves. In the fifth and last chapter
of  this  thesis,  I  turn to  this  concrete  side of  Beauvoir’s poetics  by
studying her novel She Came to Stay. My interpretation of this
particular novel functions here as a case study in relation to
Beauvoir’s general claims about the metaphysical novel.
 The more specific aim of Chapter 5 is to exemplify two modes
of expressing and investigating subjectivity: Beauvoir’s conceptual
and schematic description of feminine becoming in The Second Sex
and her literary description of the main character’s (Françoise)
subjective becoming in She Came to Stay. This methodological
discussion also provides a continued and deepened interpretation
of subjective becoming in Beauvoir’s thought. The schematic de-
scription of femininity in The Second Sex and  the  literary
description of subjective becoming in She Came to Stay both
introduce the topic of sexual difference. But whereas sexual
difference is the explicit and central theme of The Second Sex, it is
only operatively present in She Came to Stay. In order to articulate
and make apparent the operative-thematic difference and relation
between the descriptions of subjective becoming in Beauvoir’s
novel and in her study of femininity and sexual difference, I draw
attention to her existential use of the concept of narcissism. The
concept of narcissism accounts for the logic of three “inauthentic”,
or existentially unjustified, feminine attitudes in The Second Sex:
‘the  narcissist’,  ‘the  woman  in  love’  and  ‘the  mystic’.  But  it  also
functions as  the key to  an interpretation of She Came to Stay from
the  perspective  of  sexual  difference.  In  a  sexually  neutral  inter-
pretation of the metaphysical drama of She Came to Stay, Françoise
may seem to reach a more authentic level of selfhood or
subjectivity by killing Xavière, another central character in the
novel. However, since Françoise’s love of Pierre remains a solitary
rather than intersubjective mode of justifying existence, that is,
since she is  still  in  the existential  attitude of  ‘the woman in love’,
her becoming is not truly subjective in an ethical sense.
 My  conclusions  relate  the  results  of  the  principal  aims  of  my
investigation of subjectivity and expressivity in Beauvoir’s
philosophy: the twofold aim of explicating the central concepts of
Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence and subjectivity, and clarifying
her reasons for turning to literature in order to express subjectivity
as both singular and universal, respectively, and the additional
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aim of studying how Beauvoir’s literary works contribute to a
wider  and  possibly  more  nuanced  understanding  of  the  ex-
periences and structures of subjectivity. This discussion draws on
the insights gained from my methodological choice of framing the
study of Beauvoir’s ‘poetics of subjectivity’ historically in the
traditions of Kierkegaardian philosophy of existence and
Husserlian phenomenology.
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1. Existence and ambiguity
Simone de Beauvoir fundamentally understands existentialism as a
philosophy of ambiguity. This is made most explicit in The Ethics of
Ambiguity (hereafter Ethics)  where  she  locates  the  origin  of
existential thought in Kierkegaard’s work and identifies Jean-Paul
Sartre as the philosopher of ambiguity of her own generation:
From the very beginning, existentialism defined itself as a philosophy
of ambiguity. It was by affirming the irreducible character of
ambiguity that Kierkegaard opposed himself to Hegel, and it is by
ambiguity that, in our own generation, Sartre, in Being and Nothingness,
fundamentally defined man [. . .] (EA, 9-10).12
Not only in the above affirmation of ambiguity, but throughout her
writings Beauvoir returns to Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegelian
philosophy,  and  often  makes  Hegel  the  target  of  her  own
objections against ‘system building’ philosophy, or against any
philosophical thinking that fails to recognise the absolute value of
singular existence or subjectivity.13
 In Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Afsluttende uvitenskabelig
efterskrift, 1846), Kierkegaard explains why one cannot found a
philosophical system on existence.14 System  and  finality  cor-
12 “L’existentialisme s’est défini dès l’abord comme une philosophie de
l’ambiguïté; c’est en affirmant le caractère irréductible de l’ambigu?té que
Kierkegaard s’est opposé à Hegel; et de nos jours, c’est par l’ambigu?té que
dans L’Être et le Néant Sartre définit fondamentalement l’homme [. . .]”
(MA, 14). I strive to use a non-sexist language in the present study, but do
not alter possibly sexist modes of expression in direct quotations.
13 See, e.g., EA, 158; MA, 196 and PL, 564-565; FA, 537-538. Heinämaa
(2003a) draws attention to Beauvoir’s non-systematic understanding of
philosophy,  arguing  that  there  are  two  primary  sources  of  influence  for
the non-systematic aspect of Beauvoir’s philosophy: the philosophy of
Kierkegaard, and that of the German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl.
The  influence  of  Husserl  on  Beauvoir’s  thought  is  to  a  large  extent
dependent upon Merleau-Ponty’s study of embodiment (Heinämaa 2003a,
26-51, 69-75).
14 The  author  of  this  text  is  actually  one  of  Kierkegaard’s  open  pseudo-
nyms, Johannes Climacus, and Kierkegaard himself is only mentioned as
responsible for the publication of the work. Walter Lowrie, the editor of
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respond to one another, according to him, and existence is
precisely the opposite of finality: “Existence [Tilværelse] separates,
and holds the various moments of existence discretely apart; the
systematic thought consists of the finality which brings them
together” (CUP, 107 [114]). Truth, for Kierkegaard, must therefore
be sought in the subjective thinker, rather than the objective.
Beauvoir’s own critique of Hegelian philosophy in Ethics stresses
the reality of individual existence, and its significance for the
recognition between individuals with respect to what is at once
identical and different in them, or at once universal and singular.
This critique is an important step towards understanding the role
of ambiguity in Beauvoir’s own conception of existence.15
1.1 The truth of singular existence
The problem with the Hegelian system, according to Beauvoir’s
critique,  is  first  of  all  that  it  reduces  the individual  to  an abstract
moment in the history of absolute spirit [Geist], and presents
existence as a mere passage towards a future totality (EA, 104).16
the English translation of Concluding Unscientific Postscript, claims that
Johannes Climacus was Kierkegaard’s most personal pseudonym, and the
one who was most like him religiously (Lowrie 1941, xvi).
15 The meaning of ambiguity in Beauvoir’s philosophy is a central topic in
the contemporary research (see e.g., Bergoffen 1991, 1999; Arp 2001; Bauer
2001; Heinämaa 2003a, 2003b; Schott 2003; Langer 2003; Gothlin 2006;
Keltner 2006). In her recent “beginner’s introduction” to Beauvoir’s
thought, Stella Sandford (2006) emphasises the experience of paradox
underlying Beauvoir’s ontological and political discussion of ambiguity,
thus drawing on existentialist interpretations. I share the general
phenomenological and existential starting points with Bergoffen, Arp,
Heinämaa, Langer, Gothlin, and Sandford. Furthermore, while I explicate
the crucial ethical meaning of ambiguity in Beauvoir’s thought, my focus
is not her implicit or explicit political philosophy (cf. Schott and Keltner).
My interpretation differs from earlier studies primarily in that I  trace the
concept of ambiguity to the convergence of Descartes’ and Kierkegaard’s
notions of subjectivity in Beauvoir’s thought. For an alternative, Hegelian,
interpretation of ambiguity in Beauvoir’s philosophy, see Bauer 2001.
16 I have translated l’Esprit into  ‘Spirit’  instead  of  ‘Mind’,  as  in  the
published English text. The French original reads: “Chez Hegel l’individu
n’est qu’un moment abstrait de l’Histoire de l’Esprit absolu” (MA, 129).
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By  identifying  the  real  [réel]  and  the  rational  [rationnel], this
philosophy also empties the human world of its sensible thickness
[épaisseur sensible]  in  a  way that  has  consequences  for  the relation
between the self and the other (EA, 104; MA, 129). The essential
moment of Hegelian ethics, according to Beauvoir, is the moment
when two separate consciousnesses recognise one another (EA,
104;  MA,  130).  What  the  other  consciousness  recognises  in  me  in
the  Hegelian  framework,  however,  is  the  universal  truth  of
selfhood, that is, what is identical in us, and singularity can only
appear as contingent (EA, 104; MA, 130).
 It is a fact since Descartes, in Beauvoir’s view, that subjectivity
radically  signifies  separation  (EA,  105;  MA,  130).  I  can  doubt  the
existence of everything that is presented to me by or through my
senses, including other minds and bodies, but not the existence of
myself as the one who doubts that things external to my thoughts
might not really exist. Descartes expresses this clearly in the
second of his Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de prima
philosophia, 1641). Having methodologically supposed that “there is
absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no
bodies”, and even assumed the deliberate deception of a malicious
demon, the meditator finds that his own existence remains
absolutely certain: “[. . .] I must finally conclude that the pro-
position I  am,  I  exist [Ego sum, ego existo]  is  necessarily  true,
whenever it is put forward by me or merely conceived in my
mind” (Descartes 1996, 17 [AT VII, 25]).17 In  Beauvoir’s view,  the
separateness of each individual does not mean that he or she is not
17 AT refers to the standard twelve-volume edition of Descartes’ works by
Ch.  Adams  and  P.  Tannery  (Oevres de Descartes, revised ed., Paris:
Vrin/C.N.R.S., 1964-1976). It is important to distinguish between the
thinker in the Mediations and its author, according to Bernhard Williams
(1996) in his introductory essay to the revised English edition of the text:
“Although we are conscious, in reading the Meditations,  that  they  were
written by a particular person, René Descartes, and at a particular time,
about 1640, the ‘I’ that appears throughout them from the first sentence on
does not specifically represent that person: it represents anyone who will
step into the position it marks, the position of the thinker who is prepared
to reconsider and recast his or her beliefs, as Descartes supposed we
might,  from ground up” (Williams  1996,  vii,  see  also  p.  x).  Hence,  when
the  author  writes  “I  am  here  quite  alone”  in  the  first  meditation,  this  is
already the thinker performing the method of doubt (cf. Descartes 1996, 12
[AT VII, 18]).
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at the same time bound to others, but only confirms the ambiguity
of the human condition. She again refers to Descartes when
defending existential ethics against charges of solipsism: the cogito
“expresses both the most singular experience and the most
objective truth” (EA, 17, translation modified).18 In a reflection on
her own experience as a writer, moreover, published thirty years
after Ethics, Beauvoir (1979) returns to the truth of Descartes’
discovery of existence, but now from the explicit perspective of the
singular universal: in the intuition “I think, therefore I am” [je
pense, donc je suis], she writes, an absolutely singular existential
truth universalises itself (EE, 456).19 By  intuition  [intuitus],
Descartes means the simple and clear perceptions of the intellect,
or the unprejudiced ‘native intelligence’ of each individual
(Descartes 1985, 14 [AT X, 368]). Intuition is distinguished from
“the fluctuating testimony of the senses”, as well as from “the
deceptive judgement of the imagination”, and is the conception of
“a clear and attentive mind” that cannot be doubted (Descartes
1985, 14 [AT X, 368]).20
 As we will see in the succeeding sections of this chapter,
Kierkegaard’s discovery of the truth of subjectivity is very different
from Descartes’: the subjective thinker in Concluding Unscientific
Postscript does not experience the universal singularity of
existence, and the separateness that it implies, in intellectual
intuition, but in the inwardness [inderlighed] of personal decision,
and in the impossibility of communicating this inwardness in a
manner  that  would  make  it  objectively  understandable  to  others
(CUP, 33, 68 [38-39, 73-74]).
18 “le Cogito cartésien exprime à la fois l’expérience la plus singulière et la
vérité la plus objective” (MA, 23, italics in original).
19 Cf. the beginning of Beauvoir’s description of ’the philosopher’, as
compared to ’the scientist’ and ’the writer’, in her examination of old age:
”[H]e is himself a man [un homme], all man: what he has to say is himself
in his universality.  When Descartes says: ’I think . . .’ it is Universal Man
who thinks in him” (Beauvoir 1972, 440-441 [1970, 182]).
20 In Rules for the Direction of our Native Intelligence [Regulae ad Directionem
Ingenii, 1620-c. 28], which Descartes began writing, but never completed,
ten years before the Meditations,  intuition  is  also  viewed  as  one  of  two
paths, alongside deduction, to certain knowledge. For a detailed
explication of Descartes’ notion of intuition and its scholastic background,
see Lilli Alanen 2003, 13-17. See also John Cottingham 1996, xxiii-xxiv.
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 Although Beauvoir elaborates the concept of the singular
universal in several texts, with different emphasis depending on
the problem at hand, it is possible to distinguish four rather
distinct significations of this concept. These significations are also
connected with one another. Fundamentally, the singular universal
implies that the truth of human existence can only be known
[connu]  in  and  through  one’s  own  experience  of  reality.  In  “Mon
expérience d’écrivain” (1966, hereafter “Mon expérience”), an
essay where Beauvoir specifically discusses the singular universal
and writing, she distinguishes the experience of existence, which is
“non-knowledge” [non-savoir],  from  a  form  of  knowledge  [savoir]
that abstracts from the intimate, lived and singular experience (EE,
441, 448). That existence cannot be known abstractly does not mean
that it does not have a meaning that can be communicated. This, in
fact, leads us to the second signification of the singular universal,
according to which a literary work can take the role of the singular
universal. In Beauvoir’s view, the truth of human existence as
singularly lived can only be communicated to others in a medium
that preserves its meaning [sens] as well as what she calls its non-
meaning [non-sens],  that  is,  what  from  the  perspective  of  the
universal appear as contingent and insignificant details of a
particular life (EE, 442). The literary work is such a mediator par
excellence,  in  Beauvoir’s  view.  Yet  not  just  any  literary  work  can
functions as a mediator between ‘me’, the singular individual, and
the universal meaning that I want to communicate. Whereas
philosophers have traditionally focused on tragedy, Beauvoir’s
primary concern is with the philosophical possibilities of the novel
and the autobiography. One significant difference between tragedy
and the novel, from the perspective of Beauvoir’s poetics, concerns
their implied philosophical conceptions of human freedom:
whereas  tragedy  rests  on  the  ancient  notion  of  fate,  the  novel
expresses the modern idea of selfhood and individual choice.21
21 Though precise definitions of the novel vary, it is generally agreed that
it appeared as a genre in the eighteenth century, and often narrates real
life, the ordinary, and its own time, rather than the heroic and fabulous (as
in  the  romance).  For  definitions  of  the  novel  from  the  perspective  of
literary theory, see, e.g., Andrew Michael Roberts (ed.) 1993, 1-20. Cf.
Jonathan Culler 1975, 189-238. Françoise Dastur (2000) provides a
philosophically grounded explication of the development of tragedy
conceived of as a khatarsis (as in Aristotle) to an understanding of tragedy
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 The two final meanings of the singular universal are closely
related. Both are founded on the difference between the novel and
autobiography, and concern, first, the possibility of the latter to
express a historical universality through the singular perspective
of the autobiographical ‘I’: the autobiographical description [récit]
departs from a singular life but makes present the flavour [goût] of
an epoch through the flavour of this particular life (EE, 449, 450).
The second meaning concerns the universal meaning of sexual
identity and difference: when Beauvoir uses ‘I’ in her autobio-
graphy, this ‘I’ is specifically a woman, just like the use of ‘I’ by a
male author means that the ‘I’ is specifically a man (cf. EE, 450).
Any individual is invited to identify with the singular perspective
of the autobiographer, and by implication share the “sexed” uni-
versality or generality that underlies each singular feminine or
masculine existence. Beauvoir articulates the latter idea in The
Second Sex.
 When Beauvoir develops the concept of the singular universal,
she critically elaborates on an idea that is present already in
Hegel’s identification of the real with what appears, implying that
essences can only appear in and through what exists. In Pyrrhus
and Cineas, an essay in which several of the ethical and ontological
themes in Ethics are anticipated, Beauvoir affirms Hegel’s claim
that there is no real interiority hidden behind appearance:
“[a]ppearance hides nothing; it expresses”, she writes, and “[i]n-
teriority is not different from exteriority; appearance is itself
reality” (PCE, 97).22 In  Beauvoir’s  interpretation,  this  also  means
that individuality is more than a moment of a universal becoming.
If  this  moment  exists  in  appearance  it  must  be  real,  according  to
her: “[w]hatever the truth of the sun and of man in the heart of the
all, the appearance of the sun for man exists in an irreducible
manner” (PCE, 101).23 As she also expresses by this insistence on
singularity, it is impossible to escape one’s own presence [présence],
or that of the singular world surrounding this presence (PCE, 101-
as  a  speculative  theory  of  “the  very  process  of  life  and becoming” in  its
creative and destructive aspects (Dastur 2000, 78).
22 “l’apparence ne cache rien, elle exprime; l’intériorité n’est pas différent
de l’éxtériorité; l’apparence est elle-même la réalité” (PC, 219).
23 “Quelle  que  soit  la  vérité  du  soleil  et  de  l’homme  au  sein  du  tout,
l’apparence du soleil pour l’homme existe d’une manière irréductible”
(PC, 228).
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102; PC, 28). Again, we are led back to the evidence of individual
existence. Beauvoir, however, distinguishes herself from both
Descartes and Kierkegaard when it comes to a more precise
understanding of subjectivity as presence (and non-presence) to
oneself.
 Beauvoir shares the fundamental claim about the separateness
of  each  subject  in  relation  to  all  others.  Yet  this  separateness
concerns neither the difficulty to directly communicate the
inwardness of subjectivity, in which singularity is experienced, nor
the methodological denial of all existence external to subjective
experience, but the concrete intersubjective experience itself, that
is, the way in which the subjectivity of the other is encountered as
a  real  limit  to  my  own  subjectivity.  In  other  words,  the  reality  of
my own presence to myself and to the world depends on my
experience of the other.
 The concrete discovery of other consciousnesses, as Beauvoir
calls this philosophical problem, is the theme of her first published
novel, She Came to Stay. As she explains in her autobiography and
in “Mon expérience”, this novel enabled her to express and
investigate her personal experience of the concrete encounter with
the  other  as  a  ‘singular  universal’  problem  of  existence  (see,  e.g.,
PL, 381–382; FA, 360-361; EE, 440–441). In Ethics, as well as in
Pyrrhus and Cineas, Beauvoir conceptualises the concrete inter-
dependence between the self and the other as one of several
manifestations of the ambiguity of existence. In what follows, I will
outline Beauvoir’s notion of ambiguity by studying how it
manifests itself in these conceptual descriptions of the self and the
other.24
24 My aim here is not to provide an exhaustive interpretation of Beauvoir’s
ethics. What is crucial for my purposes is that singularity and, as we will
see, the relation between the self and the other have ontological and
ethical significance already in Pyrrhus and Cineas. For a recent more
detailed study of Ethics, see Arp 2001. Arp convincingly argues that Ethics
is Beauvoir’s decisive ethical text, since her ethical thought culminates in
this text, and only Ethics, as compared to Beauvoir’s other moral writings,
provides the theoretical foundation needed for an ethical theory (Arp
2001, 2, 46, and chapter 4). For further studies of Beauvoir’s ethics, see
also, e.g., Bergoffen 1996; Fullbrook & Fullbrook 1999, and Pilardi 1999.
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1.2 The ethical meaning of ambiguity: intersubjectivity and
becoming
Before turning to Beauvoir’s ethical explication of ambiguity, it is
illuminating to first consider the general philosophical and
linguistic meaning of this concept.25 The word ambiguity originates
from the Latin ambiguitas in ancient philosophy, where it signified
the double meaning of a word or a sentence (Kohlenberger, 1971,
201-202). Ambiguities caused controversies, and one was supposed
to either avoid them or clarify their different meanings. Ambiguity
is closely related to, and sometimes synonymous with, the Greek
amphibolia, meaning doubt and uncertainty of mind, but also a state
of  being  attacked  on  both  sides  (Liddell  &  Scott,  1968,  90).
Ambiguity and amphibolia have often been used interchangeably
in the Western philosophical tradition, as referring to linguistic or
conceptual equivocations and confusions. Only in French
existential and phenomenological thought did the concept receive
specific philosophical meaning with Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity
and with Merleau-Ponty’s “philosophy of ambiguity” (cf. de
Waelhens 1983 [1961]; Waldenfels 1983).
 On  a  closer  reading  of Ethics,  however,  it  becomes  clear  that
even here, the concept of ambiguity has more than one meaning.
To begin with it is mainly on Sartre’s ontology that Beauvoir draws
when she gives an account of the ambiguity of the human
condition. The fundamental aim in Being and Nothingness (L’être et
le néant, 1943), which represents Sartre’s mature philosophical
thought, is to reconcile objective being and subjective freedom, or
the mode of being of things, which Sartre here calls the ‘in-itself’
[en-soi], and consciousness, defined as essentially self-reflective
and ‘for-itself’ [pour-soi]. The in-itself or ‘being’ is inert, opaque and
transcendent to consciousness, which is immediate, absolute and
transparent to itself and in this sense a ‘nothingness’. The two
modes  of  being  are  reconciled  in  the  idea  that  consciousness  can
only  appear  to  itself,  or  know  itself,  in  the  world  of  things  and
other consciousnesses, that is, in relation to what it is not.26
25 For a related etymological consideration see Langer 2003, 89. See also
Arp (2001, 47-50), who finds the origin to Beauvoir’s understanding of the
ambiguity of existence in the Greek tradition of thought.
26 Roland Breeur (2003) provides an illuminative analysis of absolute
freedom and freedom as an expression of a subject in the Sartrean frame,
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 One crucial idea in Ethics is that the human being is “a being
who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being”
(EA, 11, italics in original).27 It could even be said that this Sartrean
phrase  is  at  the  core  of  Beauvoir’s  ethics:  considered  in  terms  of
consciousness and freedom, rather than determinate being, the
human being inauthentically desires to become something definite,
while also remaining free. But human freedom also means that one
can decide to want the desire for an impossible being. This
decision  is  ethical  and  expresses  human  existence  in  its  authen-
ticity.28 As  Arp  (2001)  has  argued,  Beauvoir  thus  moves  beyond
Sartrean existentialism by making an original distinction between
an  ontological  and  a  moral  freedom.  The  latter  is  “the  conscious
affirmation  of  one’s  ontological  freedom”,  and  depends  on  the
moral freedom of others (Arp 2001, 2-3, 54-55).
 Similar to Kierkegaard’s inward decision, the decision in
Beauvoir’s ethics is not a matter of rational deliberation, but
involves existence in its totality, and is described as a conversion or,
in phenomenological terms, a shift of attitude from  the  objects  of
one’s wishes and desires, towards these subjective wishes and
desires  themselves  (EA,  14;  MA,  19-20).  In  the  new  ethical  or
authentic attitude, one understands and accepts that the desire or
striving for  being is  at  once definite,  in  the sense that  it  is  always
my own and must  be  founded by me,  and indefinite,  in  the sense
that it keeps setting new ends for itself, and that the decision,
therefore, always must be taken anew. Since there is no authority
the singular individual can rely on in the ethical realisation of her
ontological freedom, it implies uncertainty and risk.
 On an ontological level too, existence manifests itself in several
different ambiguities. In a description that remains close to Sartre’s
perspective, Beauvoir understands the tragedy of the human
condition  as  the  paradox  of  being  aware  of  oneself  as  freedom,
while at the same time experiencing the facticity of the human
condition:
and the related distinction between self-consciousness and self-
knowledge.
27 “un être qui se fait manque d’être afin qu’il y ait de l’être” (MA, 16, italics
in original).
28 Cf. BN, 795-798 [720-722].
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‘Rational animal’, ‘thinking reed’, he [sic] escapes from his natural
condition without, however, freeing himself from it. He is still a part of
this world of which he is a consciousness. He asserts himself as a pure
internality against which no external power can take hold, and he also
experiences himself as a thing crushed by the dark weight of other
things (EA, 7).29
In  addition  to  the  experience  of  being  conscious  of  oneself  as
embodied, even thinglike, as in the above quote, existence also
manifests itself in the experience of being infinite and finite and of
being at once separate from and bound to other human beings (EA,
9;  MA, 14).  As irreducible  unities,  these  three ambiguities  are  not
only comparable to one another, but also interrelated. First, as
Beauvoir writes, “[t]he me-others relationship is as indissoluble as
the subject-object relationship” (EA, 72).30 Second, the original
spontaneity or desire to disclose being, that is, the ontological
freedom of consciousness, is preserved only if the concrete
situation opens up new possibilities. This it can only do if the
freedom that I am allows others to extend it beyond myself, and if I
am, inversely, allowed to extend the other as freedom or
possibility beyond him or herself (cf. EA, 60; MA, 77). Engaged
freedom  or  subjectivity,  therefore,  is  at  once  a  realisation  of  the
ontological freedom, and transcendence towards others: in order to
realise itself, my desire for being must express itself as an appeal to
the other  (EA,  67;  MA, 67).  To “will  that  there  be being”––even if
this is a desire towards an impossible being––is ultimately to want
the realisation of an intersubjectively meaningful world, or “to will
that  there  be  men  by  and  for  whom  the  world  is  endowed  with
human significations” (EA, 71).31
 One difference between the ways in which the relation between
the  self  and  the  other  is  thematised  in Ethics as  compared  to
29 “’Animal  raisonnable’,  ‘Roseau  pensant’,  il  s’évade  de  sa  condition
naturelle sans cependant s’en affranchir; ce monde dont il est conscience, il
en fait encore partie; il s’affirme comme pure intériorité, contre laquelle
aucune puissance extérieure ne saurait avoir de prise, et il s’éprouve aussi
comme une chose écrasée par le poids obscure des autres choses” (MA,
11).
30 “le rapport moi-autrui est aussi indissoluble que le rapport sujet-objet”
(MA, 92).
31 “Vouloir qu’il y ait de l’être, c’est aussi vouloir qu’il existe des hommes
par qui le monde soit doué de significations humaines” (MA, 90).
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Pyrrhus and Cineas, is that the idea of the other as a limit to the self
tends  to  be  more  stressed  in  the  earlier  essay.  Conceived  of  in
relation to ‘my’ subjective experience of non-being, in Pyrrhus and
Cineas the  other  is  described  as  appearing  more  real  to  me  than
myself, as given in contrast to the negativity I experience all left to
myself. As I can only appear to myself by spontaneously reaching
out towards something that is different from me, I am dependent
on the world for  my own sense of  reality  and concreteness  (PCE,
101; PC, 227). For Beauvoir, however, the other human being, as
distinguished from things and nature, seems to play a privileged
role in the concrete experience of selfhood, because the other is a
freedom or subjectivity like me: if my actions shall not to fall back
upon themselves, inert and useless, they need the response of
another human freedom.
 This  way  of  articulating  the  dependence  between  the  self  and
the other, touches upon a theme that is central to the
phenomenological tradition of subjectivity. The founder of the
phenolmenological movement, Edmund Husserl, recognised and
articulated how the presence of the other is experienced as an
inaccessibility or limit to myself, that is, as transcendent. In the
fifth of his Cartesian Meditations (Cartesianische Meditationen,1950),
Husserl writes that in the subjective experience of what is other
[Fremdes],  one  gains  access  to  something  that  is  not  originally
accessible (CM, 114 [144]).32 In  a  manner  similar  to  how  my  past
transcends my present, the other human being transcends my own
being (CM, 115 [145]). To have an authentic experience of another
subject, therefore, is exactly to experience that the other eludes me,
or to experience that I cannot master or predict the other in the
way I can with things (cf. Zahavi, 2001, 153; 2003, 113-114).33
 Beauvoir’s discussion of intersubjectivity involves elements
from the classical phenomenological elucidation of this theme, but
she also diverges from the classical approach. The difference
32 Cartesian Meditations was first published in French in 1931 as Méditations
cartésiennes. Introduction à la phénoménologie (tr. Gabrielle Pfeiffer and
Emmanuel Levinas).
33 There are, of course, limits to the analogy between my experience of the
other and temporal experience. The most crucial difference concerns their
mode of givenness: whereas the other’s experiences can never be given to
me as my own, I  have once lived through my past experiences originally
or as mine.
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between Beauvoir’s approach to intersubjectivity as compared to
Husserl’s, is not primarily that Beauvoir’s main concern would be
ethical, whereas Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions would
be epistemologically and ontologically motivated. While Beau-
voir’s emphasis is certainly on describing how the real encounter
between the self and the other must be in order to preserve human
freedom, she is also interested in the transcendental and necessary
structures and limits of (inter)subjective life. In other words, the
ontological and ethical dimensions of existence are impossible to
separate in Beauvoir’s thought. Moreover, Husserl sometimes
describes the phenomenological turn to experience as having
ethical implications.34
 But neither can Beauvoir’s interest in intersubjective existence
be reduced to the phenomenological problem of empathy, as this
has been understood within the wider context of phenomenology,
that is, as “a thematic encounter with a concrete other” (Zahavi 2001,
153-154, italics in original; cf. Edith Stein 1989 [1917] and Nathalie
Depraz 2001, 172-174). The empathic approach, according to
Zahavi, takes the nature of intersubjectivity to be first and foremost
a thematic exchange between individuals, where one tries to grasp
the emotions or the experiences of the other, whereas inter-
subjectivity  should  in  fact  have  a  place  “in  the  very  intentional
relation to the world” (Zahavi 2001, 155, italics mine). In this
approach, which is Husserl’s, there is interdependence between
the self, others and the perceived world: the perspective givenness
and openness of objects, or the way in which they can and must be
experienced in profiles, refer me to other subjects and to an
intersubjective world.
 Beauvoir’s approach to intersubjectivity, or the problem of
other  consciousnesses,  as  she calls  it,  must  first  be  understood on
the model of the ambiguous givenness of perceptual objects, that is,
of their way of revealing themselves in a blending of presence and
absence, and of disclosing me to a world of other subjects to which
I  am  at  once  present  and  detached.  Yet  in  addition  to  this,  the
existential aspect of intersubjectivity concerns how the concrete
experience of others radically challenges and changes the way the
world appears in my subjective experience. For Beauvoir, the other
34 In the opening to Cartesian Meditations, for instance, Husserl
understands the reduction as a gesture of radical self-responsibility (CM,
2-3 [44-45]).
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is crucial to my becoming subjective in a full, ethical sense. This is
where the difference between Beauvoir’s existential pheno-
menological and classical phenomenological approaches to inter-
subjectivity in terms of intentionality and empathy is to be located.
In  the  last  chapter  of  this  thesis,  I  will  show  how  Beauvoir
thematises the concrete “event”––even scandal––of intersubject-
ivity in She Came to Stay. I now continue by considering the ethical
meaning of ambiguity in Pyrrhus and Cineas as compared to Ethics.
 When Beauvoir thematises the givenness of the world and
others in Pyrrhus and Cineas, she claims that there “exists no ready-
made attachment between the world and me” (PCE, 92).35 By this
she means that the world can only become meaningful as my
world through the acts in which I reach toward it. This is true even
of the past: “In order for the past to be mine, I must make it mine
again each instant by taking it toward my future” (PCE, 93).36
Beauvoir also suggests, however, that though one’s relationship
with the world is  first  open or  undecided,  decisions do not  come
about arbitrarily (PCE, 94; PC, 212). This means, on the one hand,
that the future contains the past on which it is founded: though my
relationships with the world are not given, “[w]hat I surpass is
always my past and the object such that it exists within that past”
(PCE, 94, italics mine).37 On the other  hand,  in  light  of  a  new fact
one can suddenly become aware of engagements that have been
lived in the past without being thought: even if unthought-of,
these engagements nevertheless existed (PCE, 94; PC, 212). A
temporal  sense  is  thereby  given  to  Beauvoir’s  notion  of  the
ambiguity of human existence: if the spontaneous movement of
consciousness is personal and can yet surprise and change one’s
reflective awareness, intersubjective existence must be understood
in terms of becoming.
 Ambiguity is not explicitly thematised in Pyrrhus and Cineas,
and the word is only mentioned in a discussion of the ambiguity of
human  action  (see,  e.g.,  PCE,  99;  PC,  223).  The  ambiguities  that
Beauvoir later articulates in Ethics, however––of  existing  as
embodied  and  conscious,  as  finite  and  infinite,  and  as  bound  to
35 ”Il n’existe entre le monde et moi aucune attache toute faite” (PC, 208).
36 ”Pour que ce passé soit mien, il faut qu’à chaque instant je le fasse mien
à nouveau en l’emportant vers mon avenir” (PC, 211).
37 ”Ce que je dépasse, c’est toujours mon passé et l’objet tel qu’il existe au
sein de ce passé” (PC, 212).
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and separate from others––underlie her analysis of freedom
already in Pyrrhus and Cineas.  The  first  part  of  this  essay  is  a
description of the different ways in which the ethical bond
between oneself and others fails when one fails to recognise the
necessity of concrete action for freedom. The second part is a
description of the nature and possibilities of the bond between the
self and the other in generosity, communication, and action. I will
not explicate the content of Pyrrhus and Cineas in detail here, but
instead concentrate on how ambiguity is implicitly present in the
different descriptions of freedom.
 To begin with, here, as in Ethics, subjectivity is itself ambiguous:
the  ethical  relation  between  the  self  and  the  other  fails  if  one
identifies too much with thinglike existence and views oneself as a
“simple given” [simple donné] in nature (PCE, 92; PC, 208). Such
inert existence––characterised by separation and solitude––is
opposed to the élan of  spontaneity,  according to  which the self  is
not  given,  but  a  desiring,  loving,  wanting  and  acting  movement
[mouvement] towards the world and towards others (PCE, 92, 94;
PC, 208, 210). Moreover, this original spontaneity is not blind, but
has  as  its  constant  possibility  a  “second-order”  spontaneity  or
reflection [réflexion],  directed towards the first desire, love, will or
action (cf. PCE, 139-140; PC, 313-314). Reflection cannot stop the
élan of the original spontaneity of existence, but is always directed
towards its actual and possible realisations (PCE, 91; PC, 203).
Therefore, the dialogue between Pyrrhus and Cineas, which opens
Beauvoir’s essay, will forever start over.38
Élan,  in  this  context,  should  be  understood  as  a  creative
movement or force, essential to life and therefore also to human
existence, as in the English translation of élan into ‘impetus’. In
ordinary  language,  impetus  means  either  a  driving  force  or
impulse, or, more specifically, the force or energy by which a body
moves.39 The philosophical concept élan vital, however, was
worked  out  by  Henri  Bergson.  The  specific  significance  of  Berg-
38 This dialogue has been interpreted as a conversation between the man
of  action  (Pyrrhus)  and the  cynic  (Cineas)  about  the  rationality  of  action
(see, e.g., Bergoffen 1997, 47-48; 2004, 81-82, and Sandford 2006, 9-20). My
interpretation here differs by suggesting that the dialogue is also an
allegorical description of intentionality. I explicate the phenomenological
concept of intentionality in Chapter 3.
39 See The Oxford Modern English Dictionary, Julia Swannell (ed.) 1992, 532.
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son’s thought for Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence is still largely
unexplored,  but  it  is  evident  that  she  often  adopts  and  develops
further his concepts. She also frequently refers to them in her diary
from 1927 (Simons 2001, 29-32; cf. Simons 2003). Beauvoir’s
reference to the concept élan vital is one case in which it is
particularly  instructive  to  turn  to  Bergson’s  own  work,  since  the
meaning of this concept for his understanding of the dynamic
aspect  of  all  forms  of  life  illuminates  Beauvoir’s  notion  of  the
becoming of consciousness and of human existence.
 In Creative Evolution (L’Évolution Créatrice, 1907), where Bergson
introduces the term élan vital, it means an “original impetus of life”
[élan originel de la vie], passing from one generation of seeds
[germes]  to  the  next,  through  the  developed  organisms  which
bridge the interval between the generations, or “an internal push
that  has  carried life,  by more and more complex forms,  to  higher
and higher destinies” (Bergson 1983, 87, 102 [95, 111]). As carried
by this élan or impetus, life does not proceed by the association and
addition of  elements,  but  by “dissociation and division” [dissociation
et dédoublement] (1983, 89 [97], italics in original). In the frame of
Bergson’s philosophy of evolution and creation, this perspective
enables him to describe life in terms of a “tendency”, the essence of
which  is  “to  develop  in  the  form  of  a  sheaf,  creating,  by  its  very
growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided”
(Bergson 1983, 99 [108]). We can observe this mode of change in
ourselves, according to Bergson, if we consider the evolution of the
tendency we call our character. Each of us will find that our “child-
personality”, though indivisible, united in itself diverse persons.
These persons can remain blended in childhood because they are
in  their  nascent  state,  or  in  a  state  of  indecision.  However,  in  the
course of growth, they become incompatible, and as each of us can
only live one life, we are forced to make a choice. In reality this
choice is not one: we choose continuously, and continuously
abandon many things. The lives we come to live are therefore
scattered with “the remains of  all  that  we began to  be,  of  all  that
we might have become [devenir]” (Bergson 1983, 100 [109]). In
comparison  to  the  evolution  of  our  own  character,  nature  is  not
bound to make such sacrifices, but preserves the different
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tendencies and “creates with them diverging series of species that
will evolve separately” (Bergson 1983, 100 [109]).40
 In retrospect, Gilles Deleuze (1988 [1966]) interprets élan vital as
the final of three major stages in Bergson’s philosophy, following
upon  duration  [durée]  and  memory  [mémoire] (Deleuze 1988, 13
[1]). As interrelated, these three concepts all denote lived realities
and  experiences,  and  involve  a  progression.  Duration,  first,
essentially defines a so-called virtual multiplicity, or what differs
in nature (Deleuze 1988, 112-113 [119]). Memory then appears as
“the coexistence of all the degrees of difference in this multiplicity” or
virtuality (1988, 113 [119], italics in original). Élan vital, finally, is
the name of the actualisation of this virtuality according to “the
lines of differentiation that correspond to the degrees” (1988, 113
[119], italics in original). Thus, élan vital is always a case of a
virtuality or multiplicity in the process of being actualised; “a
simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process
of dividing up”, and essential to life itself, which appears as
“merged into the very movement of differentiation” (Deleuze 1988,
94 [96]).
In the last volume of her autobiography, Beauvoir questions
aspects of Bergson’s understanding of life as an actualising
movement of differentiation and division, and instead gives her
own original description of the becoming of a personality.
According to Beauvoir, Bergson’s view implies that “in realising
ourselves we lose most of our possibilities” (ASD, 29, translation
modified).41 Her  own  view,  as  she  explicitly  states,  is  different.
Considering her own life as a concrete example, she writes:
40 For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  ambiguous  meaning  of élan vital in
Bergson’s philosophy, see also John Mullarkey (1999). According to him,
élan vital is often used as an equivalent of life, spirit, and consciousness
(Mullarkey 1999, 80). The real difficulty related to the concept of élan vital,
however, concerns the interdependence between life and matter: “Life,
being dissociative in the actual biological forms it takes, must divide itself
if it is to create in any concrete, material reality. [. . .] And yet it is also said
that what is creative about life are its acts of division; there never is a pure
creativity without material division. In opposing the creativity of life,
matter also ensures that creativity” (Mullarkey 1999, 81).
41 ”qu’en nous réalisant nous perdons la plupart de nos possibilités” (TCF,
46).
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Certainly  when  I  was  twelve  I  was  tempted  by  palaeontology,
astronomy, history, and every fresh branch of learning I chanced upon;
but they all formed part of the larger project of discovering the world,
a project that I followed steadily (ASD, 29).42
From the beginning she was “amorphous” [informes] rather than
“manifold” [multiple], Beauvoir concludes. Expressed differently,
the  development  of  a  personality  is  a  continuous  shaping  or
forming of something formless, rather than a process of differ-
entiation and division. The original character is not lost in this
becoming, but defined: the little girl of three years she once was,
Beauvoir  illustrates,  lived on,  grew calmer,  in  the girl  of  ten,  that
child in the woman of twenty, and so on, and she also recognises
herself through life’s changes (ASD, 29-30; TCF, 46-47). Her
freedom, Beauvoir moreover claims, was used to maintain the
particular realisations of an original project [projet originel], firmly
established  in  childhood  (ASD,  30;  TCF,  46).  This  does  not  mean
that  her  life  can  be  reduced  to  the  realisation  of  this  original
project: the force of changing circumstances makes it rather an
ambiguous product and expression [l’expression] of the world in
which it developed (ASD, 30; TCF, 47).
Although Beauvoir disagrees with Bergson’s understanding of
the becoming of a personality, élan is  still  crucial  for  her  under-
standing of the spontaneity of human existence. When Beauvoir
repeatedly returns to the theme of the self’s non-coincidence with
itself and the world in Ethics,  this  must  be  understood  as  non-
coincidence of the reflective aspect of the self with the spontaneous
movement or élan of  life.  To  be  a  self,  in  other  words,  is  to  be
constitutively detached from oneself and from the world, as is
illustrated by an image: “I should like to be the landscape which I
am contemplating, I should like this sky, this quiet water to think
themselves  within  me,  that  it  might  be  I  whom  they  express  in
flesh and bone, and I remain at a distance” (EA, 12).43 Beauvoir’s
main point in her essay is that the distance that one experiences in
42 ”Oui, à douze ans j’étais tentée par la paléontologie, l’astronomie,
l’histoire, par chaque nouvelle discipline que je découvrais: mais elles
faisaient toutes partie d’un projet” (TCF, 46).
43 “Je  voudrais  être  le  paysage  que  je  contemple,  je  voudrais  que  ce  ciel,
cette eau calme se pensent en moi, que ce soit moi qu’ils expriment en
chair et en os, et je demeure à distance [. . .]” (MA, 17-18).
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relation to oneself and to the world contains the possibility for an
ethical life, granted that one accepts and affirms the ontological
condition of never being able to become the being that one is not.
Only then is it possible to discover a desire that is more original
than  the  striving  for  being  (EA,  13;  MD,  48).  As  I  understand
Beauvoir, this is the élan of the first-order movement or desire to
disclose [dévoilement]  being.  It  is  discovered as  a  desire  to  engage
oneself, or to realise one’s ontological freedom, in concrete and
particular projects that are never definite, but remain open to the
future (EA, 23-24; MD, 31).
1.3 Existence and subjectivity
The theme of ‘projecting’, which is central to the last part of Ethics,
and also explicitly referred to in Pyrrhus and Cineas, echoes Martin
Heidegger’s interpretation of the ontological structures of human
existence in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927).44 Again  it  is
necessary  to  trace  the  meaning  of  a  concept,  but  this  time  within
the tradition of phenomenology. An explication of the main
characteristics  of  Heidegger’s  description  of  human  existence  as
projecting  is  helpful  in  order  to  further  understand  how  the
temporal  ambiguity  of  human  freedom,  in  Beauvoir’s  view,  is  at
once finite and infinite, or always my freedom and an
indeterminate possibility.
 One decisive characteristic of the human mode of being,
according to Heidegger’s interpretation, is that it is a kind of being
for which its own being is an issue (Heidegger 1962, 67-68, 225, 236
[42, 181, 191-192]). Heidegger calls this mode of being Dasein,
which literally means “being there”, but is sometimes translated
into “openness”.45 Dasein, as the human mode of being, is an issue
44 Beauvoir explicitely refers to Heidegger when writing that the human
being is “constitutively oriented toward something other than himself; he
is what he is only through relationships with something other than
himself” [constitutivement orienté vers autre chose que lui-même: il n’est
soi que par relation avec autre chose que soi] (PCE, 98 [219-220]). This
Heideggarian theme is also central in the phenomenologies of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg’s historical description of the
phenomenological movement in France (Spiegelberg 1982, 434, 436-440).
45 See, e.g., Thomas Sheehan’s (2001) discussion of Heidegger’s lecture
“What is Metaphysics?” (“Was ist Metaphysik?”, 1929). Sheehan bases his
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for itself in that it on its most fundamental level understands itself
as possibility, or projects itself towards its own potentiality to be.
This primordial understanding is distinguished from under-
standing as one kind of cognition among others (Heidegger 1962,
182 [142-143]). The latter is, for instance, to be distinguished from
explaining, and even from intuiting and thinking, which
Heidegger considers derivatives of the primary or existential
understanding [Verstehen] (1962, 182, 187 [142-143, 147]). That
Dasein is  a  project  [Entwurf] means that though it always
understands itself within a familiar world, and this familiarity,
inversely,  is  constitutive  for  its  understanding,  it also appears to
itself as unknown in the sense of being always ahead of or beyond
itself (Heidegger 1962, 119, 236 [86, 192]). Again, this does not
mean that Dasein behaves  in  a  certain  way  towards  other  entities
which it is not, but that it is ahead of itself as what it is ‘not yet’.
 Projecting as being towards oneself as possibility, Heidegger
underlines, has nothing to do with “comporting oneself towards a
plan that has been thought out”, but means rather that Dasein, as
long as it is, understands itself in terms of possibilities (Heidegger
1962, 185 [146]). Such understanding does not grasp what it
projects  thematically,  since  that  would  take  away  from  the
projected its very character of possibility, but understanding
throws before itself “the possibility as possibility” and “lets it be as
such” (1962, 185 [145], italics in original). As projecting, therefore,
Dasein is, on the one hand, constantly more than it factually and
actually is, and, on the other hand, never more than what it is,
since its potentiality to be belongs to it (1962, 185-186 [145]).
Paradoxically,  though  this  is  not  a  word  used  frequently  by
Heidegger, the human mode of being reveals itself most genuinely,
whether authentically or inauthentically, as a potentiality for its
own end, that is, for death as an impossible, but yet certain,
possibility (Heidegger 1962, 299-311 [255-267]).
 Eva Gothlin (1996 [1991], 2001, 2003) has made a strong case for
a Heideggarian reading of what is now generally considered Beau-
voir’s ‘existential phenomenology’. Gothlin stresses Beauvoir’s
interpretation of the concept of ‘being-with’ [Mitsein] in The Second
Sex (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996, 219-222), and shows how the concept
translation of Dasein on Heidegger’s indication in Letter on Humanism (Brief
über den Humanismus, 1946) that the ‘Da’ in Dasein means “openness”, “the
open” or “free” [Offenheit, das Offene, Freie].
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of  ‘disclosure’ [dévoilement], primarily, but also those of ‘facticity’,
‘thrownness’, ‘situation’, and ‘authenticity’, function in Beauvoir’s
thinking as a whole (Gothlin 2001, 2003).46 Disclosure, Gothlin
(2003) argues, is a key concept in Ethics, because it describes
human being most fundamentally as “a being that ‘discloses
being’” (Gothlin 2003, 49; cf. Arp 2001, 64-68). As such, disclosure
is not only more significant than the distinction between being-in-
itself and being-for-itself; ontologically, it is also more primordial
than the human lack of being, and its corresponding desire to be.
 I  agree  with  Gothlin  on  the  significance  of  the  concept  of
disclosure in Beauvoir’s understanding of human being, and,
indeed, on the necessity of being-with, or the interdependence
between  human  beings,  for  human  disclosure.  However,  it  is  not
clear  to  me  that  Beauvoir  thereby  follows  Heidegger  in  his  break
with Cartesianism, as Gothlin also argues, and is closer to the
phenomenology of Heidegger than to that of Husserl, Sartre or
Merleau-Ponty.47 It is not that Beauvoir’s thinking, as we have
seen, would be directly opposed to Heidegger’s, but that her
relation to the different philosophies of existence and phenomeno-
logy is more complex than a simple choice between Heideggarian
and Husserlian phenomenology suggests. In fact, there is a general
tension in Beauvoir’s thought, not between the philosophy of
existence and phenomenology, but between an existential pheno-
menology oriented towards understanding human being in its
total experience of the world as a totality, and an existential
phenomenology that owes its basic concepts to psychological
descriptions of human being.
46 Cf. Nancy Bauer (2006). In her interpretation of the Heideggarian notion
of Mitsein in Beauvoir’s philosophy, Bauer argues that the main function
of this concept in The Second Sex is  “not  to  exalt  some  notion  of  human
community but rather to further Heidegger’s central project of laying out a
challenge  to  the  Cartesian  epistemological  tradition  and  its  threat  of
solipsism” (Bauer 2006, 67). Bauer develops this basic claim in light of her
own Hegelian reading of Beauvoir’s philosophy of sexual difference (cf.
Bauer 2001).
47 According to Gothlin (2003), the fact that Beauvoir’s existential
phenomenology is interpretative, rather than descriptive, and deals with
ontology, brings her closer to Heidegger’s development of Husserl’s
phenomenology (2003, 47). I only partly agree with Gothlin here, since this
question ultimately depends on what one means with ‘description’, and
on the status of ontology within Husserlian phenomenology.
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 Heidegger’s critique of the subjectivist tradition that Beauvoir
must  also  be  associated  with,  has  to  do  with  the  way  in  which
human being as subject, according to Heidegger, has been
understood on the basis of a substance, or a bearer of certain traits,
like an entity in the world, rather than a possibility to be
(Heidegger 1962, 365-370 [317-323]). That Dasein, in Heidegger’s
interpretation of being, understands and refers to itself as ‘I’,
without necessarily having to utter this word, does not mean that
it  posits  itself  as  a  subject  in  the  sense  of  a  substance,  but  that
Dasein is in each case ‘mine’: something with which Dasein is
constitutively occupied, and something that it has to be in the
mode of ‘my own’ (Heidegger 1962, 68, 366 [42-43, 318]).
 In  my  view,  the  primary  reason  for  Beauvoir’s  use  of
expressions  like  ‘man’,  ‘subject’  and  ‘self’  is  not  due  to
anthropological and existentialist interpretations in the early
French reception of Heidegger, as Gothlin suggests (Gothlin 2003,
46). Ultimately, Beauvoir’s use of these concepts must be inter-
preted as an affirmation of Descartes’ cogito and of Kierkegaard’s
insistence on the truth of subjectivity, as we have seen, and with
reference to the transcendental descriptions of subjective life that
have their origin in Husserl’s phenomenology. As I will show in
the following chapters, Beauvoir’s ‘poetics of subjectivity’ is both
developed on the basis of these descriptions, and contributes
originally to them.
 To  locate  Beauvoir’s  thought  in  a  modern  tradition  of
philosophy of  subjectivity  does  not  mean that  there  is  no attempt
to move away from a dualist understanding of human existence in
her work. In the introduction to Ethics, Beauvoir expresses a severe
critique against a metaphysical tradition that remains unable to
accept the “tragic ambiguity” [tragique ambigu?té]  of  the  human
condition, by denying one side of the dualism––matter or mind––
by merging them within one single substance, or by establishing a
hierarchy between body and soul, death and life (EA, 7-8; MA, 12).
To stress ambiguity means to insist on the inseparability of the two
sides  of  the  paradox.  Before  investigating  how  Beauvoir’s
existential philosophy relates to the phenomenological tradition, it
remains  to  examine  what  follows  of  her  locating  the  origin  of
ambiguity in the thought of Kierkegaard. Such an analysis will not
only enable a distinction between ambiguity and paradox, but will
also suggest a new meaning to Beauvoir’s notion of becoming.
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1.4 The paradox of existence
In 1947, the same year as Ethics was published, Beauvoir (2004
[1947]) wrote a short article in response to the question “What is
existentialism?” for the weekly newspaper France-Amérique,
published in the United States. This article is not written in a
scholarly manner, but it nevertheless illuminates Beauvoir’s view
of the French philosophy that she had become publicly associated
with from the 1940s.48 One  of  her  central  claims  is  that
existentialism can neither be summarised in a couple of sentences,
nor reduced to a political movement, fashion, or lifestyle.
Existentialism is first of all a philosophy, she states, and as such is
comparable to any classical philosophy in the sense that its full
meaning can only be understood from within the philosophical
tradition itself. In order to understand the affinity between
ambiguity and paradox in Beauvoir’s thematisation of existence,
therefore, one needs to understand the modern problem of
existence as ontological alienation and despair, to which French
existentialism is also an answer. I will locate Beauvoir’s
understanding of ambiguity in the tradition of modern philosophy
of existence, as explicated by Hannah Arendt (2002 [1946]), and
then discuss Beauvoir’s response to Kierkegaard’s understanding
of existence as paradox.
 In  her  critical  reflection  on  the  origin  and  central  ideas  of
Existenz philosophy,  Arendt  traces  the  German  word Existenz to
the later writings of F.J.W. Schelling and what she describes as his
rebellion against a philosophy of “pure thought”, or a philosophy
where being and thought are identical (Arendt 2002 [1946], 345,
347). After Schelling, in Arendt’s view, ‘existing’ is used always in
opposition  to  the  merely  thought  of  or  contemplated:  “as  the
concrete in opposition to the mere abstract; as the individual in
contrast to the mere universal” (Arendt 2002 [1946], 349). Having
thought  since  the  time  of  Plato  only  in  concepts,  philosophy  as
expressed by all thinkers of existence becomes mistrustful of the
48 Beauvoir  comments  on  her  relation  to  existentialism  in  her  auto-
biography as well, saying that she had written her novels before having
encountered the term ‘existentialist’, and that her inspiration came from
her experience [expérience], rather than from a system [système]  (FCIE,  38
[60]).  Both she and Sartre,  she adds, eventually made use of the term for
their own purposes.
55
concept itself. Among the thinkers of existence Arendt includes
Schelling, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, as well as Bergson and
Husserl.
 Arendt distinguishes philosophy of Existenz from exist-
entialism, which she takes to be “a French literary movement of the
last decade” (Arendt 2002 [1946], 345). At the same time she
recognises the appearance of the novel in the nineteenth century as
reflecting the destruction of the ancient notion of being and with it
the conception of fate on which tragedy had rested. Schelling’s
response to the difficulties concerning subjective freedom and
objective necessity, according to Arendt, was a “positive
philosophy”. Schelling sought refuge in the divine for the sake of
making the human being at home again in a reality which had
become unfamiliar, and in which individuals, as freedoms, could
no longer recognise themselves (Arendt 2002 [1946], 351).49 With
Kierkegaard, who knew Schelling’s later philosophy through
lectures, a modern, “negative”Existenz philosophy of despair was
born: when Kierkegaard opposed “the single person” to the
Hegelian system, his starting point was “the forlornness of the
individual in the completely explained world”, to which he is in
permanent contradiction (Arendt 2002 [1946], 351). The individual
is in contradiction because the factual and contingent character of
individual existing––that I am I and  no  one  else,  and  that  I am
rather than am not––“can neither be foreseen by reason, nor
resolved into something purely thinkable” (Arendt 2002 [1946],
351, italics in original).
 Kierkegaard  provides  a  direct  description  of  subjectivity,  or
individual existence, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, already
cited above. Ultimately, Kierkegaard’s perspective is rooted in his
view of Christianity as spirit, inwardness, subjectivity and a
passionate need for personal decision, rather than what he opposes
to inwardness and subjectivity: contemplation, indifference and
objectivity (CUP, 33, 51 [38-39, 56]). A speculative approach to
Christianity, according to Kierkegaard, reduces it to a historical
phenomenon, even a system, and assumes it as given, whereas
Christianity as subjectivity is exactly not given, but a trans-
formation or actualisation of inwardness (CUP, 51 [56]). Moreover,
49 Arendt  implicitly  refers  to On Human Freedom (Über das Wesen der
menschlichen Freiheit, 1809), which Schelling himself considered his turn to
a positive philosophy.
56
while objective thought is indifferent to existence, the existing
individual is essentially interested in his own thinking (CUP, 67
[73]). Subjective thought, however, is a different kind of reflection
as compared to objective thought: as belonging to the existing
individual, who is “constantly in process of coming to be”,
subjective thought does not translate everything into objective
results, but “puts everything in process” (CUP, 68 [73]). Since this
is true of every individual existence, the thought of inwardness
imposes a double reflection on the subjective thinker: “In thinking,
he thinks the universal; but as existing in this thought and as
assimilating it in his inwardness, he becomes more and more
subjectively isolated” (CUP, 68 [73-74]). Not only subjective
thinking is a process of ‘coming to be’. In Kierkegaard’s explication
of the nature of the existential situation, existence is described as ”a
constant process of becoming [Vorden]”, within which the negative
is constantly and everywhere present (CUP, 75 [81]). Kierkegaard’s
understanding of becoming is closely connected to Hegel’s, to
which he refers with some reservation:
Now everyone is familiar with the dialectic of becoming, through
Hegel. Whatever is in process of becoming is in a state of alternation
between being and non-being (a somewhat obscure determination,
however, inasmuch as being must also constitute the continuity
necessary to the alternation);  later it  is  described as a synthesis of the
negative and the positive (CUP, 74 [80]).
The  constant  process  of  becoming,  Kierkegaard  explains,  is  not  a
striving towards a goal in a finite sense, that is, “that he would be
finished when he had reached this goal” (CUP, 84 [90]). Rather, the
striving  is  precisely  this  thinker’s  own  existence  (CUP,  84  [90]).
Kierkegaard compares existence with eros or  love  [Elskov,
Kjerlighed] in the Symposium. As a striving, eros is,  like existence, a
synthesis of the infinite and the finite:
According to Plato, Wealth and Poverty conceived Eros, whose nature
partook  of  both.  But  what  is  existence?  Existence  is  the  child  that  is
born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is
therefore a constant striving (CUP, 85 [91]).
However,  the  primary  frame  for  Kierkegaard’s  understanding  of
human striving must,  again,  be  sought  in  Christianity,  and,  more
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precisely, in its “constant use of time and the historical in relation
to the eternal” (CUP, 88 [94]).50 The way in which the eternal
comes  into  being  in  time  is  ‘the  paradox  of  Christianity’,  and  the
religious means, strictly, for Kierkegaard “becoming aware of the
paradox and holding the paradox fast every moment” (CUP, 162
[167-168]). A paradox, as understood by Kierkegaard, is not a
transitory form of the relation of the religious to the existing
subject,  but  is  “essentially  conditioned  by  the  fact  that  man  is  in
existence”,  that  is,  by the fact  that  he belongs both to  time and to
eternity (CUP, 162 [168]). If the paradox were to be removed by an
explanation, existence would also be taken away, and the paradox
is to be understood as a determination of existence.
 A brief consideration of the meaning of the paradox in the
philosophical tradition illuminates Kierkegaard’s point here. In
comparison with ambiguity, the paradox has had an even stronger
philosophical bearing in Western thought. In general, the paradox
is a reasoning of which the conclusion contradicts the premises, or
which justifies two contradictory conclusions, and which often has
some  truth  to  it.  The  first  collection  of  paradoxes  is  found  in
Physics, where Aristotle relates the paradoxes of Zenon, and
considers as their aim the destruction of the conceptions of physics
in order to make evident their contradictions or discrepancy with
“more evident facts” (Godart-Wendling, 1990, 1848). In Greek,
‘paradox’ is a compound of two words: para, meaning either with,
in several senses (e.g., beside, near, together, along, past, or
beyond), or against, and doxa, which is often translated as opinion,
conjecture or popular repute, but can also mean expectation
(Liddell & Scott, 1968, 1302, 444). The word paradoxos means
something contrary to expectation, or incredible (Liddell & Scott,
1968, 1309). It thus has the connotations of the marvellous and the
wondrous, and is as such close to atopos, which not only means
non-spatial, but also extraordinary, strange, absurd and out of
place (Liddell & Scott, 1968, 272). Paradoxos, finally, also has some
affinity with adoxos, which means without doxa or expectation, and,
50 Concluding Unscientific Postscript contains several references to Fear and
Trembling,  which  claims  to  show,  by  the  example  of  Abraham’s
unexplainable faith in God, that “all Christianity is rooted in the
paradoxical, whether one accepts it as a believer, or rejects it precisely
because it is paradoxical” (CUP, 96 [102-103]).
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hence, what is unexpected and improbable (Liddell & Scott, 1968,
24).
 These Greek connotations receive a new meaning in the frame
of Kierkegaard’s thought: when the eternal is considered from the
perspective of the temporal, in the paradox of Christianity, a
different  and,  to  say the least,  unexpected understanding of  truth
also  comes  into  view.  Being,  when  it  is  not  understood  as
existence, but as abstracted from concrete empirical being in
thought, corresponds to objective truth, according to Kierkegaard
(CUP, 169-170 [174-175]). As soon as this being comes to be
empirically concrete, truth itself is “put in process of becoming”,
and must be determined as subjective (CUP, 170 [175]). Inversely,
this means that the truth of subjectivity must be lived, experienced
or incarnated, rather than merely thought.
 Though the frame of  Beauvoir’s philosophy of  existence is  not
religious, Kierkegaard’s insistence on the paradox as a determin-
ation of existence is echoed in her understanding of the human
condition.51 That man [l’homme] is defined by ambiguity means in
this perspective that the individual is only by not being: at once a
negativity [négativité], and, because of it, a positive desire or will to
be,  he  or  she  can  only  be  as  becoming,  or  by  accepting  the
fundamental tension between non-being and being that he or she
is, and that is existence. Moreover, from the perspective of
subjectivity as becoming, rather than being, it is interesting to note
that Beauvoir opens Ethics by  quoting  Montaigne  and  the  Latin
poets he refers to in his reflections on the relation between life and
death in Essays. At first, these quotes appear to be empty linguistic
equivocations, or “bad ambiguities”.52 “The first hour that gave us
life, took away also an hour”, Montaigne writes, and “[a]s we are
born, we die, and the end commences with the beginning”
(Montaigne, 1952 [1580], 34). If one turns to Montaigne’s commen-
tary on these quotes, however, they appear rather as paradoxes, or
51 For  a  study  of  the  constitutive  meaning  of  paradox  in  Simone  de
Beauvoir’s political philosophy, see Kail 2006, especially pp. 82-95.
52 Cf.  Waldenfels  (1983,  174)  discussion  of  Merelau-Ponty’s  distinction
between a “good” and a “bad” ambiguity. Whereas the good ambiguity is
descriptive and conceptual, referring both to how the world gives itself in
perceptual experience and, on a meta-theoretical level, to a way of
existence, the bad ambiguity designates mere equivocations, detached
from the striving for further clarification.
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contradictions that are philosophically meaningful: being in life at
the same time means being in death or dying, he writes, since it is
only after life that we are in fact dead (Montaigne 1952 [1580], 34).
It is also because we can only live at the expense of life that living
is  a  dying,  and  that  “[t]he  continuous  work  of  our  life  [.  .  .]  is  to
build death”, as this phrase is rendered in Beauvoir’s text (EA, 7).53
Not only is the movement of life, in Montaigne’s perspective, a
movement towards death as the limit of life, but this movement is
itself a dying. Beauvoir continues this reflection with the help of
the  paradox.  The  dependence  of  living  on  dying  is  a  condition
shared by all living beings, she first states; all life makes itself by
unmaking itself (IEA, 289 [337]).54 What  is  unique  for  human
existence  is  that  in  humans,  life  thinks  and  knows  itself  as  para-
doxical:  human  beings  do  not  merely  passively  undergo  life  as  a
movement towards death, but are constantly aware of this
fundamental condition.
 The paradox of the human condition appears already in Pyrrhus
and Cineas as a way to conceptualise the contradictory meaning of
the particular  ends toward which man is  a  project:  every end can
be surpassed, according Beauvoir, but it is also the project that
defines the end as an end (PCE, 113; PC, 253). Or again: “In order
to surpass  an end,  it  must  first  have been projected as  something
that is not to be surpassed” (PCE, 113).55 This statement leads to a
reflection on finitude [finitude] and death, which again echoes
Montaigne’s distinction between death as a limit to life and death
as intrinsic to the movement of life.
 Beauvoir explicitely disagrees with what she takes Heidegger to
say:  that  “man’s  authentic  project  is  being  for  death  [être pour
mourir], that death is our essential end, that there is no other choice
for man than the flight from or the assumption of this ultimate
53 ”Le continuel ouvrage de notre vie, c’est bastir la mort” (MA, 11). Cf.
Montaigne 1965 [1580], 155.
54 I  here  refer  to  the  English  translation  of  the  original  introduction  to
Ethics, published in Labyrinth in 1946 and reprinted in Les écrits de Simone
de Beauvoir (Francis, Claude & Gontier, Fernande, eds., 1979). This text
includes interesting passages that were excluded in the collection of essays
from 1947 (cf. Weiss 2004).
55 ”pour  dépasser  une  fin,  il  faut  d’abord  l’avoir  projetée  comme  ce  qui
n’est pas à dépasser” (PC, 253).
60
possibility” (PCE, 114).56 According  to  her,  ‘being  for’  makes  no
sense here because one is for nothing but the particular ends that
one  chooses.  To  assume  death  as  the  ultimate  possibility,  or  “to
live in the presence of death” [vivre en présence de la mort] can
only mean to actively live in spite of death,  in  the acts  that  makes
present or presences; life in the presence of death is realised “in the
creation  of  concrete  links”  [dans la creation del liens concrets]
between singular projects (PCE, 114-115; PC, 254-255, italics in
original). In the language of Being and Nothingness, she also writes,
“[t]he nothingness that anguish reveals to me is not the
nothingness  of  my  death”,  but  “the  negativity  at  the  heart  of  my
life  that  allows  me  to  constantly  transcend  all  transcendence”
(PCE, 114).57
 Man’s finitude, Beauvoir thus holds, “is not endured [subie], but
desired [voulue]” (PCE, 113; PC, 253). It is not because we die that
we are finite, but because our transcendence defines itself in
concrete projects. Following Sartre, rather than Heidegger,
Beauvoir here understands the project [le projet] as implying that
man, whose being has no fixed meaning, but who is “without
reason, without end” [sans raison, sans fin], at every moment seeks
to “make himself be” [a se fair être] (PCE, 115; PC, 256). The human
being  “exists  in  the  form  of  projects  that  are  not  projects  toward
death but projects toward singular ends” (PCE, 115).58 As singular,
these projects are also in each moment becoming from somewhere:
my presence reveals a world around me, which defines my
projects as mine, without therefore predetermining their specific
direction and development (cf. PCE, 101-102; PC, 228).
 The limit of our undertaking, furthermore, is internal, not
external  to  it,  but  particular  projects  are  nevertheless  able  to
surpass death: “my death stops my life only once I am dead, and in
the  eyes  of  others”,  Beauvoir  writes,  but  for  the  living  me  [moi
vivant], “[m]y death is not;  my  project  crosses  it  without  meeting
56 ”le projet authentique de l’homme, c’est d’être pour mourir, que la mort
est notre fin essentielle, qu’il n’y a pour l’homme d’autre choix qu’entre la
fuite our l’assomption de cette possibilité ultime” (PC, 254).
57 ”Le néant que me révèle l’angoisse n’est pas le néant de ma mort; c’est,
au coeur de ma vie, la négativité qui me permet de transcender sans cesse
toute trancendence” (PC, 256).
58 ”L’être humain existe sous forme de projets qui sont non projets vers la
mort, mais projets vers des fins singulières” (PC, 256).
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obstacles” (PCE, 114, italics mine).59 Not  viewing  death  as  a
definite limit to life does not mean that one’s particular life will not
come  to  an  absolute  end,  but  rather  than  being  a  sudden  barrier
[barrière], death is inscribed in every moment of one’s life, so that
transcendence “dies of itself, like the sea that runs into a smooth
beach and comes to a stop and goes no further” (PCE, 114).60
 It  is  one  of  my  primary  aims  to  show  that  Beauvoir  turns  to
literary  writing  in  order  to  express  the  fundamental  paradox  of
existence. Contrary to the philosophical essay, which speaks
directly, the indirect communication of the novel and the
autobiography, in Beauvoir’s view, is able to admit the ambi-
guities, nuances and uncertainties of existence (cf. EE, 443-444).
The novel makes manifest how lived experience is detotalised
[détotalisée] in the sense that it is impossible to live all its aspects at
the  same  time:  consciousness  is  always  a  surpassing  of  the
immediate presence, and surrounded by a temporal and
intersubjective horizon that can never be experienced in its
completeness (EE, 443, cf. ASD, 2; TCF, 12). While emphasising the
role of literature in the investigation and expression of our ambi-
guous condition, Beauvoir does not reject conceptual philosophy.
In order to understand the philosophical motivation to her literary
writing it is, on the contrary, necessary to investigate closer the
conceptual side of her philosophy of existence. I will do this in a
discussion of the phenomenological problem of subjectivity, as this
is articulated by Beauvoir in the early French context.
59 ”Ma mort n’arrête ma vie qu’une fois que je suis mort, et pour le regard
d’autrui. Mais pour moi vivant, ma mort n’est pas; mon projet la traverse
sans rencontrer d’obstacle” (PC, 254).
60 ”meurt  d’elle-même,  comme la  mer  qui  vient  battre  une  plage  lisse,  et
qui s’arrête et ne va pas plus loin” (PC, 254).
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2. My lived subjectivity
If  one’s  presence  to  the  world  and  to  others  is  ambiguous  in  the
way that the spontaneous movement of existence and reflection are
two moments of a dynamic or becoming consciousness, this raises
the question in what sense existence is subjective for  Beauvoir.  In
what sense is consciousness as becoming ‘mine’, what is the status
of the ‘I’ or the ego for such dynamic consciousness, and how does
Beauvoir conceive of the body in relation to consciousness as
becoming? These related questions will underlie the following two
chapters,  where  Beauvoir’s  understanding  of  existence  is  studied
in the frame of the early French existential interpretations of
Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of subjectivity.
 The disagreements on the ego, its embodiment and modes of
being  involved  in  the  world,  or  being  in  the  world,  that  my
subsequent explication will reveal are still ongoing in the present-
day  reception  of  Beauvoir’s  philosophy.  In  other  words,  even
where there is agreement on the significance of Husserlian
phenomenology for Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity, there
is still disagreement on in what this significance consists. I
concentrate  on  what  could  be  called  a  Sartrean  reading  of
Beauvoir’s reception of Husserl in the present chapter, and turn to
a Merleau-Pontyan reading in the next.
 The more precise topic of my discussion in the present chapter
concerns the difference between the transcendental ego and the ego
conceived as an object transcendent to consciousness. It is not clear,
in my view, that Beauvoir follows Sartre in his early critique of the
Husserlian transcendental ego. Her relation to Sartre’s conception
of  consciousness  is  more  nuanced,  as  my  reading  of  her
commentary  of  his  ontology  shows.  The  starting  point  of  my
continued discussion of Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity
in  Chapter  3  is  a  distinction  between  two  different  meanings  of
transcendental subjectivity that Beauvoir draws attention to in her
review of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation and application of
Husserlian phenomenology.
 When consulting the sources we have of Beauvoir’s response to
the central concepts of subjectivity within Husserlian pheno-
menology, it is important to remember that her concern was not to
develop her own phenomenological theory of subjectivity, con-
sciousness or the body, nor to systematically interpret Husserl’s
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position.61 Rather,  subjectivity  appears  in  her  work  as  a  field  of
related problems, originating in the experience of existence as
ambiguous and paradoxical. Moreover, the question concerning
concrete existence is seldom raised by Beauvoir in general terms,
but different aspects of existence are investigated from the
perspective of specific ethical or political concerns. What does
subjectivity mean in situations of conflict, or in relations of racial,
sexual or colonial oppression? What does it mean to be a subject in
these  relations,  and  what  kind  of  subjectivity  is  possible  for  a
human being who is made an object, of desire or contempt, or even
turned into an abject, that is, reduced to pure animal being?62
 It is nevertheless possible to discern phenomenological themes
that guide Beauvoir’s investigations, or ideas about subjectivity
that are either assumed or elaborated in these investigations.
Ambiguity and the dynamic character of consciousness (becoming)
are  two  such  guiding  themes.  In  this  chapter  and  the  next,  I  will
discuss two other ideas that are crucial for the way in which
Beauvoir investigates the problem of subjectivity. These are the
phenomenological understanding of consciousness as intentionally
directed, on the one hand, and the idea of a so-called operative or
functioning intentionality, underlying all objectifying experience,
on the other hand. The theme of an operative intentionality both
actualises the question concerning the embodiment of conscious-
ness, and refers back to the question concerning its temporality,
that is, to the notion of consciousness as becoming.
 The dialogues between Beauvoir, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
concern the level of life or existence that the Husserlian reduction
discloses. To be more precise, their communication moves within
an understanding of subjectivity where the possibility of taking a
transcendental reflective attitude towards natural experience,
regardless of its difficulties, is basically accepted. I will therefore
begin by outlining Husserl’s idea of the phenomenological
61 Cf. Le Doeuff (1998 [1989]), who claims that Beauvoir’s philosophy does
not generate system building theories, and that there is no single theory of
the subject in The Second Sex (1998, 88-89, 91, 100 [104-105, 107, 117]).
62 See, e.g., the last part of Ethics, where Beauvoir discusses the absence of
subjectivity in the victims of fascist oppression and humiliation (EA, 100-
102 [125-126]). In The Second Sex Beauvoir  studies  the  various  ways  in
which women have been constituted as objects, or as secondary beings in
relation to men, and women’s possibilities to become subjective.
65
method. I explicate two methodological ideas or steps that are
needed for the understanding of the phenomenological approach
to subjectivity: the transcendental and the eidetic reductions that
Husserl thought enabled one to investigate the essential structures
of experience.
2.1 Two shifts of attitude
In an introductory commentary on the opening of the original
publication of Ethics, Gail Weiss (2004) draws attention to the kind
of  knowledge  that  human  beings  have  about  the  ambiguities  of
existence, and argues that this knowledge does more than inform
us about what distinguishes human beings from other organisms.
In fact, Weiss argues, it “offers us a new way of thinking about
knowledge itself” (Weiss 2004, 282). The knowledge of life and
death that Weiss identifies in Ethics is not the outcome of an
abstract, rational process, but arises out of our experience of being
connected  to  the  world  even  as  we  detach  ourselves  from  it  in
reflection: “it is our very ability to distance ourselves conceptually
from  the  immediacy  of  our  situation  that  reveals  to  us  how
inescapably tied to our situation we are”, and the promise of
reflection, therefore, is not an escape from our situation but “a new
perspective on it” that implies a transformation of the situation
itself (Weiss 2004, 282).
 The  description  of  the  peculiar  kind  of  knowledge  that  Weiss
finds in Ethics could equally well be a description of “the
phenomenological attitude” that Beauvoir identifies in her review
of Merleau-Ponty’s investigation of perceptual experience,
Phenomenology of Perception,  and  which  belongs  to  what  Husserl
calls the phenomenological or transcendental reduction. Beauvoir
does not systematically perform the transcendental reduction in
her works, but the existential problems she discusses presupposes
a shift of attitude from our natural or empirical life, to a level of
subjectivity where the meaning giving structures of empirical life
come into view.
 The transcendental reduction was introduced as a method to
follow  in  order  to  discover  pure  consciousness,  or  as  Husserl
subsequently said, transcendental subjectivity, as a particular field
for phenomenological research (see, e.g., IdI, 63-66, 57-60 [190-192,
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159-161]).63 The opening up of the field of subjective experience in
the reduction is essential to phenomenology as a “rigorous
science”,  or  a  science  that  aims  to  clarify  the  universal  character-
istics and possibilities of cognition. In the attitude that one
achieves when one has performed the reduction, the world and
one’s own experiences are described as subjectively lived, rather
than  as  objectively  there  in  a  factual  or  empirical  sense.  The
phenomenological conception of emotional experiences, which are
central for Beauvoir’s notion of consciousness as becoming,
illustrates this.
 A phenomenological question about emotional experiences is
not a psychological question of what caused a particular feeling, or
how feelings are represented in a particular person’s life or
dreams,  but  a  non-empirical  attempt  to  know  how  the  world
appears emotionally, and what kind of experiences feelings are.
One  can  then  consider  the  structure  of  feelings,  how  they  differ
from or intersect with other kinds of experiences such as
perceptions, imaginations and memories, how feelings change
with the presence and absence of their objects, how feelings change
with time, or what their role is for reflective consciousness, for self-
awareness and for the experience of others.
 In Ideas I,  Husserl  thematises  the  reduction  in  relation  to  the
world in which we naturally live. He describes the reduction in
terms  of  a  modification  or  “putting  out  of  action”  of  our  natural
way of believing in the existence of the world, or our way of
experiencing the world as simply there or “on hand” in natural or
everyday living (IdI, 51, 58 [48, 53]). This fundamental belief in the
63 In a later discussion of the meaning of transcendental phenomenology,
Husserl takes ‘transcendental’ to generally means the modern
philosophical theme of “inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the
formations of knowledge” or “the motif of the knower’s reflecting upon
himself and his knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are
valid for him occur” (Husserl 1970, 97-98 [100-101]). The name of this
source,  he  continues,  is  “I-myself, with all of my actual and possible
knowing life and, ultimately, my concrete life in general” (1970, 98 [101],
italics in original). The radicalness of phenomenology as a transcendental
philosophy is the understanding of oneself as “the subjectivity functioning
as primal source” of all meaning and knowledge (1970, 99 [102]). The
phenomenological epoché is the first step towards such understanding. For
a comparative study of Husserl’s and Kant’s transcendental philosophies,
see David Carr 1999.
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world  is  not  an  articulated  judgment  about  existence,  and  is  not
the  result  of  a  decision.  It  is  just  passively  assumed  throughout
one’s “natural waking life”, as Husserl writes:
That  which  at  any  time  is  perceived,  is  clearly  or  obscurely
presentiated––in short, everything which is, before any thinking, an
object of experiential consciousness issuing, from the natural world––
bears, in its total unity and with respect to all articulated saliencies in
it,  the characteristics “there”, “on hand”; and it  is  essentially possible
to base on this characteristic an explicit (predicative) judgment of
existence agreeing with it. If we state such a judgment, we nevertheless
know  that  in  it  we  have  only  made  thematic  and  conceived  as  a
predicate what already was somehow inherent, as unthematic,
unthought, unpredicated, in the original experiencing or, correlatively,
in the experienced, as the characteristic of something “on hand” (IdI,
57-58 [53]).64
Husserl uses a Greek word, epoché, which literally means
suspension, in order to express the modification of the natural
attitude into the (unnatural) phenomenological or transcendental
attitude. In the epoché, which is the first step of the transcendental
reduction, all belief in the factual existence of the world is
parenthesised; this means not only our belief in what we take to be
real, but also our belief in the existence of the ideal, the imagined,
the remembered, and so on. As will prove particularly important
to Beauvoir, the values we attach to the real, ideal, imagined or
remembered  are  also  “neutralised”  or  put  out  of  play  in  this
general suspension, along with our habitual way of acting in
relation  to  them:  our  finding  things  attractive  or  repulsive,  our
loving, hating or being indifferent, our will to master things and
64 Husserl’s distinction between predicative and pre-predicative ex-
periences is introduced in his so-called “genealogy of logics” (Husserl
1973 [1948], e.g., paragraphs 2 and 15). The central theme of this genealogy
is the origin of predicative judgements,  that is,  affirmative judgements of
objects. Pre-predicative experience is understood as the most original layer
of all experiencing, or the passive, receptive structures of subjectivity that
account for the pregivenness presupposed in all active orientation, like
judging.
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other  beings,  or  our  wish  to  resist  or  just  passively  submit  our-
selves to them.65
 The epoché makes possible a shift of focus from empirical
subjective life and its different worlds––real, ideal or imagined––to
subjective life as it appears to consciousness when it is free or pure
from all claims of existence. The aim with the epoché is not to turn
away  from  the  world,  but  rather  to  be  directed  and  open  to  the
world,  in  the  sense  of  being  attentive  to  the  way  in  which  it
appears  in  experience.  The  shift  of  focus  from  reality  to  the
appearance of reality makes one attentive not only to the actual
and possible differentiations and nuances of the world and all
worldly being, but also to its regularities and necessities.
 For instance, if I begin reflecting on how the world is concretely
there for me, it appears that what I experience is not just what I am
presently preoccupied with––the  piece  of  text  that  I  am  now
writing,  or  the coffee  cup right  next  to  me.  According to  Husserl,
the world is there regardless of whether I am directed attentively
towards it in consideration, thinking, feeling, willing or desiring.
The world spreads out endlessly in space, is endlessly becoming
and has endlessly become in time, and being conscious of it simply
means to intuitively find the world as factually there (IdI, 51 [48]).
Even when things or other beings are not in my immediate field of
perception, that is, when I do not look at them, touch them or
otherwise attend to them, they are actualities in the mode of being
co-present to what is actually perceived. Though I am not directly
looking at them, the window on the other side of the room, and the
pigeon outside, are present with the text and the cup that are in my
immediate field of perceptive attention.
 There is also a horizon to what is co-present in my experience:
“[w]hat  is  now  perceived,  and  what  is  more  or  less  clearly  co-
present and determinate [. . .] are penetrated and surrounded by
an obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality” (IdI, 52
[51], italics in original). As an empty “mist of indeterminateness”
this obscure world horizon is necessarily infinite. This is not only
65 Husserl distinguishes three different classes of experiences: intellectual
(perception, imagination, memory, cognition), axiological (instinct, drive,
feeling, emotion), and practical (movement, action, normative judgment).
All three classes of experience share the structure of intentionality,
according to him. I give a more detailed description of the pheno-
menological understanding of experience in Chapter 3.
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true for  the world as  it  exists  in  the order  of  space,  but  also with
respect  to  its  temporal  order:  “This  world,  on  hand  for  me  now
and manifestly in every waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite
temporal horizon, its known and unknown, immediately living
and lifeless past and future” (IdI, 52 [51]).
 However, in order to be a science, phenomenology needs to
purify  experience  in  two  senses:  first,  by  means  of  directing  the
reflective attention to the non-empirical life of consciousness, and
second,  by means of  investigating this  life  with regard to  what  is
essential to it. Husserl calls this second step or shift of attitude the
eidetic reduction. As an eidetic science transcendental phenol-
menology  is  thus  both  a  science  of  irreal  or  non-real  phenomena
rather than real [real], and a science of essences, rather than of facts
(IdI, xx [4]).
 Each natural experiencing of a singular fact, what Husserl also
calls individual intuition or seeing, carries with it the possibility of
being turned into an eidetic intuition, or into the seeing of an
essence (IdI, 8 [10]). For instance, when I look at the Giacometti
picture above my table, and remember how hot it was on the day I
bought  it,  and  why  I  chose  this  particular  picture,  I  have  an
individual intuition of this picture as a single fact. However, if I
consider  that  the  specific  motive  or  artist  is  not  what  makes  it  a
picture, think about the structural relation between the drawn
picture  and  what  it  pictures  (a  woman),  or  if  it  strikes  me  that  I
might as well have bought a different picture, then my individual
intuition is transformed into an eidetic intuition: I consider the
Giacometti picture––and my own choice––as contingent; as “[i]t is
thus; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise” (IdI, 7 [9]).
 The essence, writes Husserl, is a new sort of object as compared
to the individual existence; it is an eidetic object (IdI, 9 [10-11]). The
intuition  of  an  eidetic  object  has  as  its  basis  the  intuition  of
something individual; it is an appearing, a sightedness of some-
thing individual, but it does not consider it as an actuality (IdI, 10
[11-12]). It is therefore essentially different from the intuition of
individual existences or facts. However, the two kinds of intuition
are also essentially related, since the making present of an essence
is based on the experience of an individual object. In other words,
no experience of facts is possible without the free possibility of
being turned into an eidetic seeing, just as no intuition of essence is
possible “without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a
‘corresponding’ individual and forming a consciousness of an
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example” (IdI, 10 [12]). Imagination, therefore, has a special status
within the eidetic reduction, which Husserl also explicitely
underlines.66
 It is clear that Beauvoir was familiar with the phenomenological
reduction. Not only does she explicitly refer to the phenomeno-
logical attitude in her review of Phenomenology of Perception, and
later compare the epoché to the existential conversion in Ethics. The
introduction to The Second Sex, moreover, is a kind of phenomeno-
logical  reduction,  in  the  sense  that  it  clears  the  ground  for
Beauvoir’s  subsequent  study  of  how  the  meaning  of  femininity,
and of the being of the sexes, is constituted culturally, historically
and in women’s concrete lived experiences. In addition, there is
one crucial but implicit reference to transcendental phenomeno-
logy in the second volume of her autobiography, Prime of Life,
which has intrigued scholars. In this reference, Beauvoir seems to
confirm  Husserl’s  notion  of  the  transcendental  ego.  This  debated
reference will be the starting point of my discussion of Beauvoir’s
phenomenological understanding of subjectivity.
2.2 Beauvoir on the ego
In Prime of Life, Beauvoir makes the following statement about the
being  of  the  subject  and  about  our  knowledge  or  experience  of
subjectivity:
66 According  to  Husserl,  the eidos or pure essence, that is, the essence
considered as irreal within the phenomenological attitude, can be
exemplified  for  intuition  in  the  data  of  experience;  in  perception  or  in
memory,  as  in  my  example  above,  but  also  in  the  data  of  phantasy
[Phantasiegegebenheiten] (IdI, 11 [12]). Proceeding from free fantasy, where
it does not matter for the corresponding essences whether the objects of
imagination have ever been given in actual experience or not, or whether
they will ever be given, is even considered superior as a method of eidetic
variation in comparison with proceeding from actual, perceptive
experiences (IdI, 159-160 [130-131]).
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[T]o this day I still  believe in the theory of “the transcendental
Ego”  [l’Ego transcendental];  the  ego  [moi] is only a probable
object, and anyone saying “I” knows it only in profiles; another
can have a clearer and more correct picture (PL, 444, translation
modified).67
The context of this statement is a reflection on the motivation to
write autobiography. The exposition of her life, Beauvoir says, is
not meant to be an explanation, but rather based on her conviction
that  one  can  never  know  oneself  [se connaître], only tell about
oneself [se raconter] (PL, 444; FA, 419). I will come back to the
assertion concerning self-knowledge and expression in Chapter 4,
and  concentrate  here  on  the  first  part  of  the  quotation,  which
concerns Beauvoir’s notion of the transcendental ego.68
 In the above quotation, Beauvoir first makes a conceptual, or at
least terminological, distinction between the transcendental ego
[l'Ego], the  ego  as  an  object  [moi]  and  I  [Je]. She further suggests,
that from the perspective of the speaking subject, that is, for the
one who says ‘I’ from a first person perspective, the knowledge of
the ego referred to  as  a  worldly object  is  only probable:  someone
else can have a more certain knowledge of me [moi].69
67 “Je crois encore aujourd’hui à la théorie de ‘l’Ego transcendantal’; le moi
n’est qu’un objet probable, et celui qui dit je n’en saisit que des profils ;
autrui peut en avoir une vision plus nette ou plus juste.  Encore une fois,
cet exposé ne se présente aucunement comme une explication” (FA, 419,
italics in original).
68 In the different English translations of Beauvoir’s texts, as in her French
originals,  ‘ego’ is sometimes capitalised, and sometimes not.  For the sake
of consistency, I will write ‘ego’ in lower case, and make clear by the
context if I mean the ego as a transcendental subject or the ego as an object
in the world.
69 Cf.  Beauvoir’s  study of  the  ‘coming of  age’ where  she  makes  a  similar
distinction between the cogito and the empirical or worldy ego (Beauvoir
1977, 324, 325-326 [309, 311]). In a discussion of Kant’s philosophy in the
same work, Beauvoir distinguishes “the mind’s presence to itself,
considered as constituting presence” from “psychological pseudo-
realities”, as “moments in the transcendental constitution of the world and
the  self  [la constitution du monde et du moi]”,  and  the cogito as “activity”
[l’activité] and “determining force” from “the thing” [la chose] (Beauvoir
1977, 443 [421]). For illuminating phenomenological interpretations of this
study, see Suzanne Laba Cataldi (2001) and Sarah Clark Miller (2001).
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 In phenomenological descriptions of how perceptual objects
give themselves in subjective experience, the word ‘profile’
[Abschattung] refers to the insight that objects are never fully given
with all their sides present at the same time, but give themselves in
a continuous blending of presence and absence. More precisely,
the perceptual object only gives itself partially or in perspectives,
with some sides only co-given (or apperceptively given) with the
actually  present  side.  If  I  again look at  the coffee  cup next  to  me,
what  I  actually  see  is  only  one  of  its  profiles;  it’s  front  side.  The
other sides of the cup are given with the side that I actually see, or
indicated by it,  so that the object of my perception is the cup as a
whole. From a phenomenological perspective, therefore, when
using the word ‘profile’, Beauvoir seems to suggest that the
subjective experience of myself as an object is no different in kind
from the experience I  have of  things.  If  I  do not  view myself  in  a
mirror, most of the time I see only the front side of my body, and
never my own face, whereas others simply see other sides of my
corporeal appearance, and even a more total appearance.
 However,  it  is  still  not  clear  what  Beauvoir  means  by  the
transcendental  ego:  is  it  identical  with  the  ego  considered  as  an
object [moi], with the one who says ‘I’, or distinguished from both?
Most scholars have interpreted this particular passage in line with
Sartre’s  critique  of  Husserl’s  transcendental  ego  in The
Transcendence of the Ego (La Transcendence de l’Ego, 1936).70 Before
providing my own interpretation of  the core  of  Sartre’s critique,  I
shall discuss one example of such readings.
 In Simone de Beauvoir. Gender and Testimony Ursula Tidd (1999)
examines Beauvoir’s autobiography and her biographical writing
in  the  context  of  her  notion  of  selfhood  in  texts  from  the  1940s.
Tidd’s approach is influenced by feminist work in philosophy and
in the literary study of autobiography, and by Michel Foucault’s
early  work  on  the  elaboration  of  the  modern  subject  through
discourses  of  truth,  knowledge  and  power.  A  theory  of  a
“temporally situated self as a being-with-the-Other in the world” is
70 Heinämaa (2003a) provides an exceptional reading here, in claiming that
there is no evidence that Beauvoir accepted Sartre’s egological critique of
Husserl (Heinämaa 2003a, 58). Instead, Heinämaa argues that Beauvoir’s
notion  of  self  should  be  traced  through  the  Husserlian  concept  of  the
living body, which she found in the phenomenological work of Merleau-
Ponty (Heinämaa 2003a, 61).
73
elaborated in Pyrrhus and Cineas and Ethics, Tidd argues, to which
Beauvoir’s  later  study  of  subjectivity  in The Second Sex adds an
awareness of gender, sexuality, race, and class (Tidd, 1999, 10). In
the light of these theories of selfhood, Beauvoir’s autobiographical
and biographical writings are considered attempts to construct a
temporally-situated narrative identity in which explicit nego-
tiations with the reader are crucial. In Tidd’s interpretation,
Beauvoir represents herself as a witness and the autobiography as
a testimony.
 Beauvoir’s statement about the transcendental ego, which
follows upon a rejection of psychological determinism, “might
sound like a plea for the ‘talking cure’ of psychoanalysis”, Tidd
remarks, “although they refer to Sartre’s notion of the
transcendental ego, developed in the mid-1930s” (Tidd 1999, 90).
Beauvoir dismisses self-knowledge as impossible, Tidd explains,
because “according to an existentialist notion of selfhood, the self
cannot be an object of knowledge for itself” (1999, 91). In
preference to the self’s own knowledge of itself, in Tidd’s view,
Beauvoir  emphasises  “the  role  of  narrative  in  the  production  of
identity, asserting that it is only possible to relate one’s experiences
of selfhood in collaboration with the reader” (Tidd 1999, 91).71 The
passage on the transcendental ego is thus interpreted in the light of
a theory of narrative and linguistic identity.
 In a later article Tidd (2001) elaborates her interpretation of
Beauvoir’s understanding of the ego within a Husserlian frame.
The transcendental ego to which Beauvoir refers, Tidd claims, is to
be  understood  as  “a  residual  irreducible  ego  after  the  pheno-
menological reduction has taken place” and as “a spontaneous
transcendent unification of our states and actions” (Tidd 2001, 121-
122). As support for this interpretation, she points to her own
translation of Beauvoir’s autobiographical passage: “the self is only
a probable object of which the speaking subject only glimpses an
outline;  another  person  can  have  a  clearer  or  more  accurate
picture” (Tidd 2001, 122). In Tidd’s interpretation, Beauvoir, like
Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego,  takes  issue  here  with  “the
71 Tidd bases her interpretation of Sartre’s position on The Transcendence of
the Ego and on Being and Nothingness. The essential argument of the former
work,  according  to  Tidd,  is  that  the  ego  is  not  an  inhabitant  of
consciousness, but “exists as a recognizable phenomenon for me in the
same way it exists for anyone else” (1999, 201n16).
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solipsism of Husserl’s transcendental ego” (Tidd 2001, 122n).
 Jo-Ann Pilardi (1999) takes a similar view as Tidd, but broadens
the perspective by arguing that the primary sources for Beauvoir’s
conception of the problem concerning the self and the other are the
French existentialist reading of Hegel, where the other is presented
as  a  negative  definition  of  the  self,  and  Sartre’s  reading  of
Husserlian phenomenology, according to which the self as ‘for-
itself’ is contrasted to the self as ‘ego’ (Pilardi 1999, 2). While the
phenomenological idea of intentionality is the axis on which the
existential-phenomenological problem of the self turns, Pilardi
claims,  Sartre’s  analysis  of  the  self  through  a  discussion  of
consciousness and its “by-product”, the ego, necessitated a
distinction between two types of being: being ‘for-itself’ and being
‘in-itself’.
 As I  said in  the beginning of  this  chapter,  it  is  not  clear  to  me
that Beauvoir follows Sartre in his early critique of Husserl’s
transcendental ego. In what follows, I will found this claim in three
interpretative steps. I will first explicate the core of Sartre’s
argument in The Transcendence of the Ego, in which he outlines his
critique of the transcendental subjectivity that Husserl presents in
Ideas I, and his own theory of consciousness. I will then show that
Beauvoir’s understanding of Sartre’s ontology is not limited to the
view  he  presents  in  this  early  text,  but  more  nuanced.  In  her
commentary of  Sartre’s mature philosophy,  Beauvoir’ stresses  the
idea  that  consciousness,  for  Sartre,  must  be  considered  as
embodied. She thereby questions, or at least complicates, a simple
dualist interpretation of his ontology, according to which
consciousness as pure transcendence is distinguished from
concrete, transcendent being. Above all, her commentary shows
that  it  is  impossible  to  base  her  understanding  of  the
transcendental ego merely on Sartre’s position in The Transcendence
of the Ego.
 My  third  interpretative  step  is  to  provide  an  outline  of  the
development of Husserl’s own understanding of transcendental
subjectivity.  The  twofold  aim  of  this  outline  is  to  show  that  the
notion of the transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is not stable,
and to provide tools for my subsequent explication of Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of Husserlian transcendental subjectivity,
which  Beauvoir  welcomes  in  her  review  of Phenomenology of
Perception. Let me now turn to Sartre’s early critique of Husserl.
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 As Tidd points out, in The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre offers a
critique of the Husserlian notion of a supposed transcendental ego
or  subject,  and  presents  his  own  non-egological  theory  of
consciousness.72 What Sartre aims to show is that there is no ‘I’ or
ego behind our conscious experiences, neither as a formal
condition of possibility, nor as a real or material inhabitant of
consciousness [conscience],  but  that  the  ego  is  outside  conscious-
ness. As he writes; the ego “is a being of the world, like the ego of
another” (TE, 31 [13]).
 Sartre starts off from the Kantian consideration of the status of
the cogito,  or  the  “I  think”  [Je Pense], according to which the
transcendental  ‘I’  is  a  problem  of  validity,  and  not  of  actual
existence: “The problem, indeed, is to determine the conditions for
the possibility of experience. One of these conditions is that I can
always  regard  my  perception  or  thought  as mine: nothing more”
(TE, 32 [14], italics in original). Although Kant seems to
acknowledge that there are moments of consciousness without the
‘I’ [Je], he says nothing about the way empirical consciousness is in
fact  constituted,  Sartre  notes.  For  Kant,  he  claims,  transcendental
consciousness is rather understood as “the set of conditions which
are necessary for the existence of an empirical consciousness” (TE,
33 [15]).
 For  Sartre,  however,  the  problem  regarding  the  factual
existence of the cogito remains, and even emerges from the Kantian
problem of validity. The most crucial factual question is
formulated by Sartre as follows: “[I]s the I that we encounter in our
consciousness  made  possible  by  the  synthetic  unity  of  our
representations, or is it the I which in fact unites the representa-
tions  to  each  other?”  (TE,  34  [16],  italics  in  original).  In  order  to
find an answer to this question Sartre turns to Husserlian
phenomenology,  which  according  to  him  is  a  “scientific”  and
descriptive rather than critical study of consciousness. As such,
phenomenology “puts us in the presence of the thing [la chose]” by
way of intuition, and is a science of facts rather than of validity
72 I shall continually use transcendental subject whenever referring to the
transcendental Ego, in order not to confuse it with Sartre’s notion of the
ego or self as an object for consciousness, on the one hand, or with the ‘I’
as the active aspect of the ego that appears as an object for consciousness,
on the other hand. Thus we have three terms: the transcendental subject,
the ego and the ‘I’.
76
(TE, 35 [17], italics in original). This might sound like a complete
misunderstanding of Husserl, who explicitly distinguishes pheno-
menology  from  the  empirical  sciences  of  facts.  However,  facts  in
the Sartrean interpretation must be understood as facts for
transcendental consciousness, which is neither a mere formal
condition, nor an empirical consciousness. Husserl discovers
transcendental consciousness in the reduction, according to Sartre,
and this consciousness is not a set of logical conditions, but “a fact
which  is  absolute”  [un fait absolu] (TE, 35 [18]). It constitutes our
empirical consciousness, that is, “our consciousness ‘in the world’
[dans la monde], our consciousness with its psychic and psycho-
physical me [moi]” (TE, 35-36 [18], italics in original). Sartre agrees
with  this,  as  well  as  with  Husserl’s  view  that  this  psychic  and
psycho-physical ‘me’ is an object transcendent to consciousness,
which “must fall” before the epoché, or be put within parenthesis
according to the reduction (cf. TE, 36 [18]).
 While Sartre thus acknowledges the phenomenological
understanding of transcendental consciousness, he does not,
however, agree with what he calls Husserl’s reversion to “the
classic position of a transcendental I [Je transcendantal]”; to an ‘I’
that is behind each consciousness and thus makes transcendental
consciousness thoroughly personal (TE, 37 [20], italics in original).
In Sartre’s view, consciousness defined as intentionality has no
need for the unity and individuality of a transcendental ‘I’: as
intentional, consciousness unifies itself in the transcendent object
toward which it directs itself.73 Not even when Husserl studied the
immanent “continual flux of consciousness”, in his lectures on the
internal consciousness of time, had he recourse to a synthetic
power of the ‘I’, according to Sartre. Rather, consciousness “unifies
itself, concretely, by a play of ‘transversal’ intentionalities which
are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses” (TE, 39
[22]).74 In other words, by perpetually referring back to itself,
73 As an illustration of this, Sartre gives the example of how consciousness
finds its unity in the ideal object of a mathematical truth: “[t]he unity of a
thousand active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and shall
add two and two make four, is the transcendent object ‘two and two make
four’” (TE, 38 [21]).
74 ‘Retention’ is a technical term in Husserl’s description of the con-
sciousness of time. By retention or primary memory, Husserl means the
immediate, passive awareness of the past, as distinguished from
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consciousness unifies itself in time.
 The individuality of consciousness too stems from the nature of
consciousness in Sartre’s interpretation. Consciousness is limited
only by itself, and constitutes “a synthetic and individual totality
entirely  isolated  from  other  totalities  of  the  same  type”  (TE,  39
[23]).  Instead of  being a  condition,  therefore,  the  ‘I’ can only be a
temporal expression of the “incommunicability and inwardness
[intériorité] of consciousness” (TE, 39-40 [23]). It is consciousness
itself, Sartre concludes, and not a unifying and individualizing
principle in or behind it, that makes possible the unity and
personality of the empirical ‘I’. A transcendental ‘I’ would even
mean the death of consciousness, he claims, because it would “tear
consciousness from itself; it would divide consciousness; it would
slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade” (TE, 40 [23]).
 Before discussing Beauvoir’s interpretation of Sartre’s ontology
in Being and Nothingness,  one  more  distinction  from The
Transcendence of the Ego needs to be clarified. This is the distinction
between unreflective and reflective consciousness, that is, the
cogito.
 Sartre defines consciousness as being consciousness of itself. It
can only be aware of itself, however, in so far as it is consciousness
of  a  transcendent  object.  The  law  of  existence,  for  Sartre,  is  the
spontaneous “clear and lucid” consciousness of being conscious of
an opaque object, which is before consciousness (cf. TE, 40, 42 [24,
25]). In this “consciousness of consciousness”, he underlines,
consciousness  is  not  itself  its  own  object.  Its  object  is  by  nature
outside it,  and is posited and grasped in the same act. Sartre calls
the consciousness that knows itself only as “absolute inwardness”
consciousness of the first degree, or unreflected consciousness
[conscience irréfléchie] (TE, 41 [24]). This consciousness is a non-
substantial absolute, for which “to be” and “to appear” are one
(TE, 42 [25]). The unreflected consciousness is distinguished from
the cogito, which is a reflective operation, or a consciousness of the
second degree, in which the unreflective consciousness appears to
itself as an object, or becomes reflective on itself (TE, 43-44 [26-
28]).While distinguished, therefore, the two consciousnesses also
form  a  unity  characterised  by  intentionality.  However  for  Sartre,
recollection, which is an act or intentional experience directed at an object.
I provide a more detailed explication of intentionality and of the main
ideas of Husserl’s phenomenology of time in Chapter 3.
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contrary to Husserl, the (reflective) consciousness that says “I
think” is not the (unreflective) consciousness that actually thinks:
what is essential in the change of attitude from unreflective to
reflective consciousness is precisely the appearance of the ‘I’ as an
object transcendent to consciousness (TE, 45 [28]). This ‘I’, for
Sartre,  is  the  active  principle  of  the  ego  [moi]  as  an  object  in  the
world.
 It is by no means obvious from the autobiographical passage
quoted initially in this section that Beauvoir follows Sartre in his
critique of  Husserl’s transcendental  subject.  Why would she refer
to  the  ego  or  subject  [l'Ego] if she in fact means a non-egological
consciousness?  And  why  would  she  refer  to  this  subject  as
transcendental if she rather has in mind the ego as ‘I’ [Je], that is, the
active principle of the ego as a transcendent psycho-physical unity?
One possible interpretation is that Beauvoir means the ‘I’ that
remains identical through all spatial and temporal perspectives,
but  for  Husserl  this  would  again  be  a  particular  kind  of
transcendent object. Without  also  considering  other  texts  or
passages  from  Beauvoir’s  work,  it  is  impossible  to  give  a  more
precise interpretation of her statement.
 In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  I  shall  therefore  first  turn  to
Beauvoir’s more extensive commentaries on Sartre’s ontological
position in her autobiography and in “Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-
Sartreanism” (Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme, 1955), an
essay in which Beauvoir interprets Sartre’s mature philosophy, as
compared to his position in The Transcendence of the Ego. After that I
will consider briefly Husserl’s own understanding of the
transcendental subject. This consideration is not meant to be a
complete explication of Husserl’s position, but points to the fact
that his thinking went through significant changes. Most
importantly for my subsequent study of subjectivity in Chapter 3,
transcendental subjectivity is not static, according to Husserl’s later
analyses, but intrinsically genetic. From the perspective of genetic
phenomenology, moreover, it is possible to argue for a different
interpretation of the transcendental ego than the one Sartre
criticises.
 According to the alternative interpretation, the transcendental
subject is understood as a temporalised (and temporalising)
affective meaning giving structure underlying all empirical and
reflective experience. This interpretation leads us in the direction
of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the cogito as always already involved
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in a primary lived-through consciousness, which depends on
perceptual experience. Beauvoir became familiar with the idea of a
genetic or dynamic transcendental subjectivity via Merelau-
Ponty’s study of perceptual experience in Phenomenology of
Perception. In one of his many detailed descriptions, Merleau-Ponty
characterises the lived-through cogito as follows:
[.  .  .]  the  perception  of  our  own body and the  perception  of  external
things provide an experience of non-positing consciousness [conscience
non-thétique], that is, of consciousness not in possession of fully
determinate objects, that of a logic lived through [logique vécue] which
cannot account for itself, and that of an immanent meaning [signification]
that is not clear to itself” [. . .] (PP, 49 [61], italics in original).
As  embodied,  Merleau-Ponty  further  claims,  the cogito is
individual and situated before it conceives of itself as a thinking
subject: “the thinking Ego [l’Ego méditant] can never abolish its
inherence in an individual subject [sujet individuel], which knows
all things in a particular perspective” (PP, 61 [74]).
 My basic argument is not that Beauvoir rejects Sartre’s position
on transcendental subjectivity and accepts Merleau-Ponty’s
position  as  her  own,  but  that  Beauvoir’s  own  understanding  of
subjectivity is clearly oriented towards Merleau-Ponty’s inter-
pretation of transcendental subjectivity as a field of concretely
lived temporality. A careful reading of Beauvoir’s interpretation of
Sartre’s position, moreover, brings to view one topic that is crucial
to her conception of selfhood: in her defence of Sartre’s ontological
position from what she takes to be a distortive political
interpretation by the later Merelau-Ponty, Beauvoir stresses the
idea that consciousness is not a subject constituting a world before
itself, but that consciousness necessarily finds itself in an already
constituted world, where it must also appear to others. In her
interpretation of Sartre’s ontology, Beauvoir refers to this idea with
the concept ‘interworld’ [intermonde].75
75 As Kail  (2006, 30) notes,  this concept is also used by Merleau-Ponty in
Phenomenology of Perception.
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2.3 A defence of Sartre?
Beauvoir famously recollects Sartre’s enthusiasm at his encounter
with phenomenology in 1933. The first translations of Kierkegaard
into French had just  appeared,  Beauvoir  remarks,  but  neither  she
nor Sartre paid any attention to them then. On the other hand, she
continues, Sartre was attracted to what he had heard about
German phenomenology:
Raymond Aron was spending a year at the French Institute in Berlin
and studying Husserl simultaneously with preparing a historical
thesis. When he came to Paris he spoke of Husserl to Sartre. We spent
an evening together at the Bec de Gaz in the Rue Montparnasse. We
ordered the specialty of the house, apricot cocktails; Aron said,
pointing  to  his  glass:  “You  see,  my  dear  fellow,  if  you  are  a
phenomenologist, you can talk about this cocktail and make
philosophy out of it!” Sartre turned pale with emotion at this. Here
was just the thing he had been longing to achieve for years––to
describe objects just as he saw and touched them, and extract
philosophy from the process (PL, 162).76
In a short expressive text on intentionality a few years later, Sartre
(2005 [1939]) gives his own interpretation of the phenomenological
understanding of consciousness: clear “as a strong wind”, it
contains nothing, but is just “a movement of fleeing itself”, and it is
exactly this pure flight from and beyond itself that makes it a
consciousness (Sartre 2005, 258 [10]). Moreover, intentionality
understood as ‘all consciousness being consciousness of
something’, the core of Husserlian intentionality, opens for Sartre a
philosophy of transcendence that is no longer limited to
epistemology: not only can I be conscious of things and other
76 “Raymond Aron passait l’année à Institute français de Berlin et, tout en
préparant une thèse sur l’histoire, il étudiait Husserl. Quand il vint à Paris,
il en parla à Sartre. Nous passâmes ensemble une soirée au Bec de Gaz,
rue Montparnasse; nous commandâmes la spécialité de la maison: des
cocktails à l’abricot. Aron désigna son verre: ‘Tu vois, mon petit camarade,
si tu est phénoménologue, tu peux parler de ce cocktail, et c’est de la
philosophie!’ Sartre en pâlit d’émotion, ou presque; c’etait exactement ce
qu’il souhaitait depuis des années: parler des choses, telles qu’il les
touchait, et que ce fût de la philosophie” (FA, 157).
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beings in the form of knowledge or representation. I can also love,
fear or hate them. Phenomenology as a philosophy of transcend-
ence, for Sartre, throws us out of the study, so to speak, “on to the
highway, in the midst of dangers, under a dazzling light” (Sartre
2005, 259 [11]).
 In her review of Phenomenology of Perception, Beauvoir contrasts
Merleau-Ponty’s position on the mode of being of consciousness to
Sartre’s position in Being and Nothingness. In this quote, she stresses
the dualism inherent in Sartre’s understanding of existence:
While Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, first emphasizes the opposition
of the “for-itself” and the “in-itself”, the nihilating power of mind
[l’esprit] in the face of being and its absolute freedom, Merleau-Ponty,
on the contrary, concentrates on describing the concrete character of
the  subject  that  is  never,  according  to  him,  a  pure  for-itself  (PPMPE,
163, translation modified).77
And again:
It  [my consciousness,  my  remark]  is  not  a  pure  for-itself,  or  to  use
Hegel’s phrase, later used by Sartre, a hole in being, but rather ‘a
hollow, a fold that has been made and can be unmade’ (PPMPE, 163,
cf. PP, 215 [249]).78
Beauvoir, however, does not seem to reduce Sartre’s philosophy to
a static position, but tries to capture it as a substantially developing
or  becoming  thought.  In  a  summary  of  Sartre’s  early  critique  of
Husserl’s transcendental understanding of the subject, Beauvoir
holds that Sartre maintained permanently the distinction between
consciousness and the psychic, the core of which is the ego or the
self as an object transcendent to consciousness. Referring to
77 “Tandis que Sartre dans L’Être et le Néant souligne d’abord l’opposition
du pour soi et de l’en soi, le pouvoir néantisant de l’esprit en face de l’être
et son absolue liberté, Merleau-Ponty s’attache au contraire à décrire le
caractère  concret  du  sujet  qui  n’est  jamais,  selon  lui,  un  pur  pour  soi”
(PPMP, 366).
78 “Elle n’est pas un pur pour soi,  ou, selon le mot de Hegel que Sartre a
repris, un trou dans l’être, mais plutôt ‘un creux, un pli qui s’est fait et qui
peut se défaire’” (PPMP, 367).
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Sartre’s phenomenological description of consciousness in The
Transcendence of the Ego, Beauvoir writes:
Here he outlined––in a Husserlian perspective, but contrary to some of
Husserl’s most recent theories––the relationship between the self [Moi]
and consciousness [la conscience]; he established a distinction, which he
was to maintain permanently, between consciousness and the psychic
[la psychique]. While consciousness is an immediate and evident
presence to itself [présence à soi],  the  psychic  is  a  cluster  of  objects
which can only be grasped in reflection and which, like the object of
perception,  only  give  themselves  in  profile:  hatred,  for  instance,  is  a
transcendence that one apprehends by way of Erlebnissen, and its
existence is therefore merely probable. My Ego [Mon Ego] is itself a
being of the world, like the Ego of any other [l’Ego d’autrui]. [. . .]
 More important for Sartre, this theory––and in his opinion this
theory alone––allowed for  an  escape  from solipsism,  the  psychic,  the
Ego, exist for me [pour moi] in the same objective manner. (PL, 217-218,
translation modified)79
As  in  the  case  with The Second Sex, the English translation of
Beauvoir’s autobiography is misleading when it comes to
philosophical terminology (cf. Simons 1999 [1983], 61-71). In the
above modified translation I have, most importantly, preferred
‘consciousness’ to ‘the conscious mind’, which is the term used in
the published English version. Beauvoir, like Sartre, uses the term
conscience in her original French text. By conscience, Sartre refers to
the German term Bewußtsein,  which  for  him  signifies  both  the
whole of consciousness and each moment of this consciousness
79 “Il y décrivait, dans une perspective husserlienne, mais en opposition
avec certaines des plus récentes théories d’Husserl, le rapport du Moi avec
la conscience; entre la conscience et le psychique il établissait une distinction
qu’il devait toujours maintenir; alors que la conscience est une immédiate
et évidente présence à soi, le psychique est un ensemble d’objets qui ne se
saisissent  que  par  une  opération  réflexive  et  qui,  comme les  objets  de  la
perception,  ne  se  donnent  que  par  profils:  la  haine  par  exemple  est  un
transcendant, qu’on appréhende à travers des erlebnissen et dont
l’existence est seulement probable. Mon Ego est lui-même un être du
monde,  tout  comme l’Ego d’autrui.  [.  .  .]  Ce  qui  lui  importait  davantage
encore c’est que cette théorie, et elle seule estimait-il, permettait
d’échapper  au  solipsisme,  le  psychique,  l’Ego,  existant  pour  moi  de  la
même manière objective” (FA, 210, italics in original).
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(TE, 109n1 [15n]). He explicitly says that he wants to avoid the
expression ‘state of mind’, since this would introduce an unwanted
passivity to consciousness. What is underlined throughout Sartre’s
essay is, firstly, the idea of consciousness as a self-unifying whole,
and, secondly, the intentionality or directedness of consciousness.
 The  problem  with  the  term  ‘the  conscious  mind’,  in  this
perspective, is obviously that it goes against the whole idea of
consciousness as a unified stream of intentional experiences, and
rather  suggests  that  consciousness  is  a  kind  of  “thinghood”  or
substance. Moreover, the former expression also seems to suggest
that there could be an unconscious mind as distinguished from the
conscious. This is certainly not an idea implicated by Sartre’s
description in The Transcendence of the Ego.
 In the essay mentioned earlier, “Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-
Sartreanism”, published just a few years before the above auto-
biographical summary, Beauvoir elaborates on her own inter-
pretation of Sartre’s position, and his assumptions regarding the
nature of consciousness. “Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism”
is a denunciation of what Merleau-Ponty takes to be an acknow-
ledgement of the failure of dialectics in Sartre’s political thinking
and––what seems more alarming to Beauvoir––Merleau-Ponty’s
(mis)interpretation of Sartre’s whole ontology, which is supposed
to underlie this failure. I will neither go into the political debate
between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre here, nor evaluate Beauvoir’s
interpretation of Adventures of the Dialectic (1973 [1955]), from
which she deduces Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation.80 Rather, what
interests  me  is  Beauvoir’s  outline  of  Sartre’s  ontology  as  the
ground for a more correct interpretation of his political philo-
sophy. As the title of the article indicates, Beauvoir distinguishes
“authentic Sartreanism” from “pseudo-Sartreanism”. The latter is
described as a solipsist philosophy of a subject that merges with
consciousness and the world:
[I]ts (consciousness, my remark) transparency is opposed to the opacity
of the being-in-itself, which possesses no signification [signification];
meaning [sens] is imposed on things by a decree of consciousness,
which is motivated ex nihilo. The existence of the other does not break
this tête-à-tête, since the other never appears except under the figure of
80 For a discussion of this debate in the context of Beauvoir’s philosophy of
oppression and freedom, see Kail 2006, pp. 22-40.
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another subject; the relationship between the I [Je]  and  the  other  is
reduced to the look; each subject lives alone at the heart of his or her
own universe, a universe of which that subject is the sole sovereign:
there is no interworld (PSE, 449, italics in original).81
Authentic Sartreanism, to the contrary, is not a philosophy of the
subject, a term that Sartre seldom uses, Beauvoir remarks. She
claims  that  for  Sartre  it  is  always  as  the  Ego  [moi] that we are
subjects, and “the Ego appears to consciousness as a transcendent
in-itself” (PSE, 449).82 Beauvoir quotes from Being and Nothingness,
but in this particular case one can equally well refer to The
Transcendence of the Ego, where Sartre expresses the same non-
egological understanding of consciousness: “This absolute con-
sciousness, when it is purified of the I [Je], no longer has anything
of the subject [sujet]. It is no longer a collection of representations. It
is quite simply a first condition and absolute source of existence”
(TE, 106 [87], italics in original).
 That  the  ‘I’  is  not  in  consciousness,  but  is  construed  with  the
psychic field as an object transcendent to consciousness does not
mean, as we saw, that consciousness is whatever it thinks it is.
Beauvoir underlines this by introducing the distinction Sartre
makes in The Imaginary (L’Imaginaire, 1940) between real and
imaginary feelings, as two irreducible classes of feelings that
cannot coexist.
 In  this  work,  Sartre  aims  at  describing  what  he  calls  the
irrealising function [fonction irréalisent]  of  consciousness  and  its
correlate:  the  imaginary,  or  the  image,  as  the  object  appearing  to
81 “à sa (la conscience, my remark) transparence s’oppose l’opacité de l’être
en soi qui ne possède aucune signification ; le sens est imposé aux choses
par un décret de la conscience se motivant ex-nihilo. L’existence de l’autre
ne brise pas ce tête-à-tête car l’Autre n’apparaît jamais que sous la figure
d’une autre sujet ;  le rapport de Je et l’Autre se réduit au regard ;  chacun
demeure seul au coeur de son propre univers sur lequel il règne en
souverain : il n’y a pas d’intermonde” (PS, 2073).
82 “ ‘l’Ego apparaît à la conscience comme un en soi transcendant’ (PS,
2073; cf. BN 156, 226 [147, 209]. In my interpretation of Beauvoir’s article, I
follow the decisions made by Veronique Zaytzeff to translate Moi as “the
Ego”, Je as  “the  I”,  and soi as “the self”. Furthermore, signification is
translated as signification and sens as “meaning” (Beauvoir PSE, 490,
translator’s note).
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imagining consciousness (IM, 3, 4 [11, 13]).83 The difference
between the real and the irreal object is the basis for Sartre’s
distinction between genuine and imaginary feelings (IM, 145
[187]). Imaginary feelings are not themselves irreal, but can only
appear in the face of irreal objects, and “the appearance of the real
is  enough  to  make  them  flee  at  once,  as  the  sun  dissipates  the
shadows of the night” (IM, 145 [187]). The difference between
having real and imaginary feelings, however, implies more than
the  preference  of  the  irreal  object  to  the  real,  according  to  Sartre,
or––as  in  another  of  his  examples––the preference of ‘Annie as
desired’ as compared to ‘Annie as she stands here before me’.
Imaginary  love,  as  compared  to  real  love,  means  to  prefer  to  the
unforeseeable real “the imaginary state with all that it brings with
it”: solidity, expectedness, repetition, etc. (IM, 147 [189]).84 This
preference is conceptualised as a flight from reality in two senses:
one flees the content of the real; poverty, disappointed love,
business failure in Sartre’s examples, and one flees the form of the
real;
[. . .] its character of presence, the type of reaction that it demands of us,
the  subordination  of  our  conduct  to  the  object,  the  inexhaustibility  of
perceptions, their independence, the very way that our feelings have of
developing (IM, 147 [189], italics in original).
83 By consciousness Sartre here means each of the psychic structures of the
unified consciousness in its concrete particularity: imagination is one such
structure, perception is another. The term image is somewhat misleading,
since one of Sartre’s primary arguments is that the image, as the correlate
of imaging consciousness, should not be considered a mental image, as in
some psychological theories, but the relation to an object, or a certain way
in which consciousness presents to itself an image (IM, 7 [17]). When
Sartre imagines Pierre, the object of his imaging consciousness is Pierre
himself,  not  the  image,  which  also  means  that  Pierre  is  directly  reached.
He is not observed, however, as when the perceived Pierre appears to
consciousness, but still “quasi-observed”: as an imaginary or irreal object,
Pierre as given immediately and as a whole, whereas as a perceptive or
real object, he is given immediately but in profiles (cf. IM, 8-9 [18-19]).
84 Sartre does not distinguish ‘love’ from ‘desire’ in this particular
example, as he, e.g., does in his description of concrete intersubjective
relations in Being and Nothingness (see especially pp. 477-534 [433-484]).
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In Beauvoir’s interpretation, whereas imaginary love [l’amour] is an
experience [Erlebnis]  immanent  to  consciousness,  true  love  is  a
transcendent object (PSE, 450; PS, 2074). According to her, further-
more, when Merleau-Ponty confuses the distinction between
consciousness as immediate presence to self [soi]  with the subject
or person, he fails to recognise the reciprocal conditioning of this
person––the one having real feelings––and the world of real
transcendent objects.
 The fact  that  consciousness  can only find or  appear  to  itself  in
reflection by engaging and thus losing itself in the world means
that consciousness is embodied [incarnée]. This is what the theory
of facticity, as a foundation of Sartrean ontology, expresses
according to Beauvoir:
My consciousness can only go beyond the world by engaging itself in
it,  that  is  by  condemning  itself  to  grasp  the  world  in  a  univocal  and
finite perspective, and therefore to be infinitely and inescapably
overwhelmed  by  it:  this  is  why  there  can  be  only  an embodied
consciousness (PSE, 450, translation modified, italics mine).85
In order for consciousness to surpass itself by engaging itself in the
world, it is necessary that a particular perspective be effected (PSE,
451; PS, 2075). Finitude is therefore a necessary condition of the
original project of consciousness, and the body expresses this
necessity. From Nausea to Saint Genet, Beauvoir claims, “Sartre
devotes himself to describing the passion of the embodied
consciousness” and the way in which man is overtaken by opacity
(PSE, 451).86
 The  fact  that  I  can  be  “overwhelmed”  or  “overtaken”  by  the
opacity of the world points to the limits of consciousness.
Moreover, in her subsequent explication of what it means that
consciousness is embodied, or that consciousness can only appear
to  itself  in  the  world,  Beauvoir  draws  attention  to  the  Sartrean
concept ‘interworld’, and to its implied idea that the world is
85 “Ma conscience ne peut dépasser le monde qu’en s’y engageant, c’est-à-
dire en se condamnant à le saisir dans une perspective univoque et finie,
donc à être infiniment et sans recours débordée par lui : et c’est pourquoi
il n’y a de conscience qu’incarnée” (PS, 2074-2075).
86 “Sartre s’est attaché à décrire la passion de la conscience incarnée” (PS,
2075).
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intersubjective: though I am the one by whom meanings come into
things,  that  is,  though  my  presence  is  needed  in  order  for
meanings to appear, these meanings “’are given to me as not having
been brought to light by me’” (PSE, 453, italics in original).87 From
the (transcencental) fact that the world is given to me as a structure
of objective signification ‘residing’ in the things themselves, and
not as enclosed in my own subjectivity, follows necessarily that the
world is also given to others (cf. PSE, 453; PS, 2077).
 The  world  conceived  of  as  an  interworld,  or  a  world  of
intersubjective meaning, points beyond and before the self to other
experiencing  subjects,  and  therefore  to  a  past  and  future  of
meaning. This interworld is, however, only the beginning of
intersubjective relations: before any concrete encounter between
the  self  and  the  other  has  taken  place,  others  exist  only  as
possibilities.88 Beauvoir  stresses  this  double  understanding  of
intersubjectivity when, on the one hand, writing that “the other is
present to me in things under the guise of meanings and
techniques”, and, on the other hand, quoting Sartre saying that
“[t]he fact of the Other is incontestable and touches me to the
heart”,  and  “through  him  I  am  perpetually  in  danger  in  a  world
which is this world and which nevertheless I can only glimpse”
(PSE, 454).89
 To summarise, the double presence of the other––indirectly
through the meaning of things, and directly in our concrete
encounter––makes me, the self, aware of the limits of my own
subjectivity: I cannot master the meaning of the world as real,
which has been open for interpretation by others before it revealed
itself to me, and I am not even master of myself, since I am part of
87 “‘se donnent aussitôt à moi comme n’ayant pas été mises au jour par moi’”
(PS, 2077).
88 As will be shown in the final chapter of this study, Beauvoir’s novel She
Came to Stay dramatises how concrete intersubjective relations can
radically break through the self’s habitual way of living: Françoise’s
encounter with Xavière makes her experience that she is not the sole origin
of the meaning of their common world. Moreover, Xavière’s existence is
not only refered to through shared things or places, but confronts
Françoise with concrete presence and resistance.
89 “‘Le fait d’autrui est incontestable et m’atteint en plein coeur. Je le
réalise par le malaise ; par lui je suis perpétuellement en danger dans un
monde qui est ce monde et que pourtant je ne fais que pressentir’” (PS,
2079; cf. BN, 367 [334]).
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this meaning structure that gives itself to others. Finally, since I do
not completely belong to myself, I am also open, and vulnerable, to
the other’s presence. Whereas I can only find myself in the world,
in the perspective of Sartre, the other is already an inhabitant of the
person  I  find  there.  This  shared  passivity  of  my  worldly  being  is
also a factual condition for my experience of concrete sociality and
culture.
 Through the explications of  Sartre’s early  critique of  Husserl’s
egological position, and of Beauvoir’s interpretation of Sartre’s
mature philosophy, I have partially clarified the meaning of the
transcendental ego and the way in which it differs from the ego as
transcendent to consciousness. The distinction between trans-
cendental and transcendent is fundamental to the Husserlian
perspective that Sartre criticises in The Transcendence of the Ego.
While Sartre accepts Husserl’s characterisation of consciousness as
intentional, and the shift of attitude that the reduction implies, he
rejects  the  notion  of  a transcendental ego  or  subject  existing  in  or
behind consciousness, and argues that the reflective operation of
the cogito discovers the ego as transcendent to consciousness.
 Beauvoir’s interpretation of Sartre is initiated and nuanced, and
stresses several ideas that are crucial to her own understanding of
subjectivity  and  intersubjectivity,  such  as  the  embodiment  of
consciousness and the notion of an intersubjective world that
accounts for a shared passivity between subjects.90 But nowhere
does  she  in  fact  explicitly  affirm  Sartre’s  interpretation  of  the
transcendental ego as her own. In order to understand what
Beauvoir means by the transcendental ego, therefore, we need to
go further into the phenomenological interpretations of
subjectivity. In particular, we need to see, firstly, that what Sartre
suggests does not summarise Husserl’s position, and secondly,
that  Beauvoir  had  access  to  alternative  interpretations.  I  will  end
90 It has been argued that Beauvoir’s commentary in “Merleau-Ponty and
Pseudo-Sartreanism” reflects more of her own philosophy than of Sartre’s
(see e.g., Kruks 1990). My aim here is not to decide whether Beauvoir’s
interpretation is correct or not. However, her different readings are
sensitive to the discrepancy that de Waelhens (1983 [1961]) identifies
between Sartre’s dialectical descriptions of the body (i.e., the body as
given for-me and the body as given for-others), on the one hand, and his
dualist distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, on the other
hand (de Waelhens 1983 [1961], xix; cf. BN, 401-47 [365-427]).
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this chapter by presenting Husserl’s approach to transcendental
subjectivity  as  a  dynamic  and  evolving  thought.  Husserl’s  later
conception of transcendental subjectivity is the basis for Merleau-
Ponty’s study of perception.
2.4 Husserl’s transcendental ego
A broadened understanding of transcendental subjectivity in
Husserl, which is crucial for understanding Merleau-Ponty’s
perspective in Phenomenology of Perception,  must  take into account
not only his analyses of the temporality of consciousness, but also
the temporal or historical development of Husserlian
phenomenology itself. Already in the preface to the second edition
of Logical Investigations in 1913, when Ideas I had  just  been
published, Husserl himself talks about “shift” in many of the
conceptions he had formed in his “first penetration of the new
territory” of phenomenological philosophy (Husserl 2001, 3 [VII]).
From  our  present  perspective,  Bernet,  Kern  &  Marbach  (1993
[1989]) discern a shift of interest in Husserl’s thinking, beginning
around 1915-1917, from a concern with descriptive analyses of
different types of experiences and their correlates (perceiving,
imagining, knowing etc. and their objects), of the general
structures of consciousness (such as intentionality and the
consciousness  of  time)  and  of  founding  and  elaborating  a
phenomenological methodology, to an attempt to understand the
concrete unification of experiencing in the person, in a community
of  persons  as  well  as  in  the  constitution  of  their  surrounding
worlds  and in the world common to  all  (Bernet,  Kern & Marbach
1993 [1989], 1-2). Similarly, Zahavi (2003) sees a systematic and
chronological development from Husserl’s early analyses of logic
and intentionality, through his transcendental philosophical
analyses of reduction and constitution to his analyses of
intersubjectivity and the life-world (Zahavi 2003, 3).91
91 This does not mean that the previous phases have been abandoned. In
these descriptions, the later so-called genetic phenomenology is conceived
of  as  a  supplement  to  Husserl’s  early  static-descriptive  phenomenology.
According to Zahavi, a large part of the later analyses––of the body,
intersubjectivity, and time, for instance––can  be  viewed  as  attempts  to
radicalise insights from the initial descriptive investigations of the
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 As Bernet (1998, 202) points out, the different forms of inten-
tional consciousness described in Husserl’s analyses imply
different modes of being of the transcendental subject. Depending
on the radicalness of Husserl’s phenomenology of temporality,
that is, depending on the extent to which the transcendental ‘I’ is
itself  considered  a  genetic  structure,  the  transcendental  subject  is
conceived of as ego, monad, person, intersubjective or generative
community. I will not comment on all these different notions of
transcendental subjectivity here, only give a few textual examples
which show that there is no stable notion of the transcendental ego
or subject in Husserl. With these examples, I also wish to support
the claim that a full understanding of the relations between
Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity and Husserl’s, which
goes beyond the limits of this thesis, must take into account the
fact that Husserl’s phenomenology––as well as Beauvoir’s––was
constantly developing, and that Beauvoir’s “interpretations of
interpretations” of Husserlian phenomenology, therefore, are
problematic as sources.
 In the early stage of phenomenology, Husserl first rejects the
notion  of  a  pure  ‘I’  or  ego  [Ich] in his non- or pre-transcendental
descriptions of consciousness in Logical Investigations (see, e.g.,
Husserl 2001, 86, 92 [353-354, 359]).92 The task of phenomenology,
as  distinguished from psychology,  is  to  describe the givenness  of
immanent experiences, not to explain their genesis. Husserl later
discovered the ‘I’ as a unity or principle of identity within the
stream  of  consciousness.  Even  if  he  then,  already  in  the  second
edition of Logical Investigations, employed the concept of genesis
within pure phenomenology, this concept had not yet acquired its
meaning as a “temporal generation” and “coming-to-be” (Bernet,
Kern & Marbach 1993 [1989], 196).
 In Ideas I the pure ‘I’ is conceived of as the source or subject of
intentionality of consciousness (Zahavi 2003, 3). The discovery of inten-
tionality, therefore, leads to the themes of transcendental subjectivity and
transcendental constitution (Zahavi 2003, 45-46, 79).
92 If  one  compares  the  different  translations  refered  to  in  this  section,
Dorion Cairns (Cartesian Meditatons) and Fred Kersten (Ideas  I), e.g., both
translate Ich into ‘Ego’, whereas J. N. Findlay (Logical Investigations) writes
‘ego’ uncapitalised. In their introduction to Husserlian phenomenology,
Bernet, Kern & Marbach seem consistently to use ‘I’ for Ich. I will here use
‘Ego’ and ‘I’ interchangeably, and let the context make clear what ego
concept is meant when referring to Logical Investigations.
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immanent experiences, as a “transcendency within immanency”,
and as bound to the form of the cogito (IdI, 132-133; Bernet, Kern &
Marbach 1993 [1989], 206). Even if the ‘I’ is thus distinguishable as
a principle of identity, it is nevertheless inseparable from the
passing experiences:
[T]he Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its
“regard” is directed “through” each actual cogito to the objective
something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next,
shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The
Ego, however, is something identical (IdI, 132 [109]).
Moreover, when Husserl later considered how active intentional
constitution rests on or presupposes a processes of passive
syntheses  of  association,  the  pure  ‘I’  is  understood  as  at  once
actively directed, and receptive and affected: it is “the identical
Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of consciousness, lives in all
processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to all
object-poles” (CM, 66 [100], italics in original).
 As both active and passive, the ‘I’ as a subject-pole is not to be
understood  as  an  empty  pole  of  identity.  According  to  what
Husserl calls the law of transcendental generation, the ‘I’
constitutes itself as having certain properties (CM, 66-67 [100-101]).
With  every  act  streaming  out  from  it,  that  has  a  new  objective
sense, the ‘I’ acquires new and lasting properties. With a new
decision, for instance, the ‘I’ becomes in a lasting manner “the Ego
who is thus and so decided” (CM, 66 [101]). This does not simply
mean that I can remember the decision I once took, but that I live
in it. The decision becomes a conviction that––as long as I am
convinced––determines me like a “habitus or state”: “whether I
become passive and sink into heavy sleep or live in other acts”, in
Husserl’s example, “the decision continues to be accepted and,
correlatively,  I  am  so  decided”  from  then  on,  as  long  as  I  do  not
give the decision up” (CM, 67 [101]). Similarly, I become changed if
I give up my decision. When the ‘I’ is conceived of as in this sense
self-constituting, what is constituted along with the “identical
substrate of Ego-properties” is also a personal ‘I’ with a personal
character, showing itself as a lasting style throughout alterations of
convictions (CM, 67 [101], italics in original).
 Genetic-transcendental phenomenology was publicly intro-
duced to the French audience in two lectures given in Paris in 1929,
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and then elaborated in Cartesian Meditations and The Paris
Lectures.93 The knowledge we have of Beauvoir’s familiarity with
this stage of Husserl’s thought, however, comes from her review of
Phenomenology of Perception and her employment, via Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre, of Husserl’s concept of the functioning,
subjective or lived body, as distinguished from the experienced,
objective body, in The Second Sex (see e.g., SS, 39, 61, 66; DSI, 42, 69,
75]; Heinämaa 2003a, xii, 25-26, 55-56).
 As  we  will  see  in  the  following  chapter,  when  Beauvoir  takes
up the phenomenological concept of a functioning or operative
intentionality––introduced in the preface to Phenomenology of
Perception and elaborated throughout Merleau-Ponty’s study––this
links her understanding of existence to the idea of transcendental
subjectivity as articulated within Husserl’s genetic pheno-
menology. In addition, Beauvoir’s familiarity with the idea of
transcendental subjectivity as a temporal and meaning-giving
dimension of the self came also from her own reading of Husserl’s
lectures on the phenomenology of the inner consciousness of time.
The traces of this reading in Beauvoir’s work are first of all found
in her reflections on the ‘living present’, the core of subjective time.
93 The lectures given in Paris form the basic structure of Cartesian
Meditations, and were published in the first volume of the critical edition
of Husserl’s works, Husserliana I (Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser
Vorträge)  in  1973.  At  the  time,  Beauvoir  was  completing  her  studies  at
Sorbonne and École normale supérieure, working on a thesis on the
meaning of the concept in Leibniz’ philosophy, and preparing her
teaching diploma, the French “l’agrégation de philosophie”. There are no
autobiographical references to Husserl’s Paris lectures (cf. ME; Claude
Francis & Fernande Gontier 1979, 33-34).
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3. The intentionality and temporality of subjective life
The phenomenological idea that consciousness is intentionally
directed is crucial for Beauvoir’s interpretation and investigation of
subjectivity. More precisely, Merleau-Ponty’s elaboration of the
idea  that  intentionality  is  layered  provides  an  alternative  to
Sartre’s interpretation of transcendental subjectivity. Beauvoir
welcomes this “broadening” of intentionality, as Merleau-Ponty
calls it in Phenomenology of Perception, as is clear from her review of
Merleau-Ponty’s work. As Beauvoir’s review also shows, the idea
that subjectivity is intentional leads us to the question concerning
the temporality of experience. Husserl’s early analyses of
temporality, which Beauvoir appreciated, help to understand her
original autobiographical reflections on the expression of the
temporality of subjective life.
 The method governing the first part of this chapter will be
“archaeological”: by tracing and outlining the phenomenological
idea of intentionality, which Beauvoir highlights in her review of
Phenomenology of Perception, I intend to show that she was familiar
with more than one interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology,
in addition to the one offered by Sartre in The Transcendence of the
Ego.  I  will  thus  also  be  able  to  complete  my  argument  about  her
understanding of the transcendental ego that I began in the
previous chapter. We saw there that Beauvoir did not simply
accept Sartre’s idea of the ego as an object transcendent to
consciousness as her own. When Beauvoir stresses the ambiguity
of existence this means precisely that the self can be reduced
neither to mere objective being, being in-itself, nor to pure
consciousness, being for-itself. In what follows I will show that the
notion of subjectivity that Beauvoir saw as most fruitful was
articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s investigations of perceptual
experience. Whereas my explication shows, negatively, that it is
not  clear  what  specific  notion  of  the  transcendental  ego  Beauvoir
has in mind in the debated autobiographical passage that I quoted
in Chapter 2, its positive and more important result is that the
widened concept of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty outlines in
his study of perception must be considered as underlying
Beauvoir’s own subsequent investigations of the significance of the
temporality and expressivity of subjectivity.
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 While in the former chapter, the central question concerned the
difference between the transcendental ego  and  the  ego  as trans-
cendent to consciousness, one main question in this chapter
concerns two different notions of transcendental subjectivity. What
is crucial in Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl is the
paradoxical notion of a “pre-personal I” or functioning cogito
founding the Cartesian cogito of acts. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes
this pre-personal cogito from the transcendental ego. Whereas he
identifies the latter with modern idealist philosophy and
Kantianism, he links the former closely to Husserl’s mature notion
of transcendental subjectivity as a genetic structure underlying all
higher  acts  of  conscious  experiencing.  In  order  to  complete  my
argument about Beauvoir’s notion of the transcendental ego, I will
inquire into the foundations of this alternative interpretation of
transcendental subjectivity. More specifically, I will clarify what
Merleau-Ponty means when he emphasises the distinction, made
already by Husserl, between an intentionality of acts and  a
functioning or operative intentionality on the level of sense-
experience.  The  main  issue  for  us  here  is  in  what  sense  this
operative level of intentionality is subjective.
 In the second part of the chapter, I will both widen and deepen
the perspective.  I  widen the perspective by showing that  the idea
of  a  perceptual  field,  which Beauvoir  thematises  in  her  review of
Phenomenology of Perception and in Ethics, not only has its own type
of intentional directedness, but also implies different levels of
temporal experience. Beauvoir employs different phenolmeno-
logical articulations of temporality, and we will see that Husserl’s
analyses of the consciousness of time underlie these articulations.
She explicitly refers to and affirms the value of Husserl’s analyses
in her autobiography, and operates with the basic distinction
between two levels of temporal experience, introduced in these
analyses. On the first level, we find the idea of the ‘living present’
[lebendige Gegenwart], which is at the core of any phenomenological
understanding of temporal experience. The living present is
considered  to  be  a  blending  of  the  present,  past  and  future,  and
given partly in the perceptual impression of the “now”, and partly
in so-called primary memory and primary expectation. On the
second level of temporal experience, we find recollection or
memory in the ordinary sense, along with secondary expectation,
or directedness to the future. The consciousness of the living flow
of temporal experience is constitutive for recollection and
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expectation as two modes of temporal directedness. As we will see
in the final section of this chapter, these two levels of temporal
awareness come into play in Beauvoir’s ethical and autobio-
graphical reflections on time.
 I  now  begin  by  showing,  in  the  two  first  sections,  that  sense-
experience must be understood as the founding layer of perception
and of any intentional and subjective experience. My first step is to
present the Husserlian analysis of the intentionality of acts, which
is to be distinguished from the operative intentionality.
3.1 The intentionality of acts
The idea that consciousness is essentially intentional, or
characterised  by  its  directedness  towards  the  world,  is  often
considered as the main discovery of phenomenology. Emmanuel
Levinas, for instance, who was among the first in France to study
Husserl systematically, describes intentionality as a liberation,
contributing  the  new  idea  of  “a  going  out  from  the  self  [soi],  a
primordial event conditioning all others, and not capable of being
interpreted by some deeper but internal movement of the Soul
[l’Ame]” (Levinas 2005, 261 [1965, 35]). Articulated in terms of
transcendence, intentionality is also fundamental for Heidegger’s
and Sartre’s existential ontologies, and for Beauvoir’s ethics.94
 While remaining a concept that is constantly reinterpreted and
further explained within contemporary phenomenology,
intentionality refers most generally to the idea that to be conscious
is to be conscious of something: when one perceives, feels, desires
or makes a judgement, these experiences [Erlebnisse] are directed
towards perceived, felt, desired and judged things, beings or states
of affair (IdI, 73-74, 200 [64-65, 168-169]).95 This definition covers
94 From the perspective of existence, it is also with regard to intentionality
that Arendt considers Husserlian phenomenology a response to the
modern feeling of homelessness. The lost identity of being and thought, in
her interpretation, is re-established in what appears as a “second creation”
of the world: the detour through the intentional structure of consciousness
(Arendt 2002 [1946], 346).
95 Husserl takes over this idea from the Austrian philosopher Franz
Brentano, who used the medieval concept of intentionality to distinguish
psychic experiences from physical experiences, and define them as the
object field of the emerging science of psychology, as opposed to natural
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both the special type of act intentionality that belongs to
experiences of judgement and volition, and a level of functioning
or operative intentionality. Husserl introduced the idea that con-
sciousness is intentional already in the first edition of Logical
Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900/1901). Both Merleau-
Ponty’s study and Beauvoir’s review, however, rest on and adopt
the terminology of Husserl’s mature transcendental phenomeno-
logy, already discussed in the previous chapter, and introduced by
Husserl in the first book of Ideas.96 Therefore, this is the analysis
that needs to be studied here.97
science (Brentano 1874, 115, 132-133). What is crucial for Husserl in
Brentano’s definition of intentionality is that psychical experiences are
characterized by their directedness towards objects (cf. Husserl 2001, 95
[366]).
96 That Husserl’s interest in consciousness in the Logical Investigations is not
transcendental does not mean that it is psychological in any straight-
forward sense. The work is at once a critique of psychologism, or the view
that philosophy is dependent on the results of psychology, and an attempt
to found the truth and validity of knowledge in the essential or necessary
constitution of consciousness, rather than in scientific descriptions of how
consciousness functions. The greater part of the fifth investigation is a
detailed description of consciousness in terms of intentionality, defined as
“a comprehensive designation for ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experi-
ences’, of all sorts” (Husserl 2001, 81 [346]).
97 I have made three deviations from the most recent English translation of
Ideen I. These deviations deserve a more extensive comment, because they
concern concepts that are central to the phenomenological understanding
of consciousness. First, in order to be consistent with the English
translation of Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception,  I  use
‘intentional’ for the German intentional, rather  than  ‘intentive’  as  in  F.
Kersten’s translation. The difference between the phenomenological
concept of intentionality and the English word ‘intention’, meaning a
deliberate aim at something, will become clear below. Second, I have
translated the German word Erlebnis as ‘experience’ rather than ‘mental
process’,  as  in  Kersten’s  text.  Again,  I  have  chosen  to  be  consistent  with
the English translations of Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie, as well as with
Beauvoir’s review and with Le deuxième sexe, where she operates with the
phenomenological concept of a lived experience. Here too, I follow the
authorised English translations of other works by Husserl that are relevant
to my discussions. Finally, and again for the sake of consistency, I have
translated the German words aktuelle and inaktuelle into ‘actual’ and ‘non-
actual’, instead of ‘actional’ and ‘non-actional’.
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 Intentionality as directedness towards something is one
essential  characteristic  of  a  conscious  experience,  according  to
Husserl. It does not matter, in this characterisation, whether the
experience is actual [aktueller]  or  non-actual  [inaktueller],  that  is,
whether the experience is a wakeful or “explicit” consciousness of
its objectivity––a cogito in Descartes’ sense––or  whether  it  is  an
implicit consciousness of something, that is, only a potential cogito
(IdI,  72  [63]).  Moreover,  actual  experiences  do  not  occur  in
isolation, but are always surrounded by a “halo” [Hof] or medium
of non-actual intentional experiences. Whereas intentional
directedness is essential to all conscious experiencing, it is charac-
teristic for intentional experiences that they can spontaneously
change from being actual into being non-actual, and from being
non-actual into being actual (IdI, 71 [63]). A concrete example will
illustrate the difference between actual and non-actual intentional
experiences.
 My  actual  perception  has  for  a  while  now  been  directed
towards the text that I am writing, not primarily in the sense that I
have been looking at a white paper filled with black markings, but
in  the  sense  that  I  have  been  directed  to  the  meaning  of  what  I
write. I can, however, at any moment turn my eyes from the text to
the  coffee  cup  beside  me.  The  cup,  with  its  white  and  red  floral
pattern, has been present all along (I have seen it while writing and
touched it when drinking the coffee), but it has been present as the
object of non-actual perceptual experiences: it has been present
within my perceptual field, but it has been in the margin of this
field.  If  I  would  stop  writing  and  turn  my  attention  to  the  cup––
perhaps pour some more hot coffee into it––the experiences in
which I perceive and think of the text would at once be modified,
since  the  text  would  then  be  in  the  background  of  my  actual
intentional  awareness,  and  the  cup  would  be  in  the  centre  of  my
visual experience.
 Since Husserl argues that every non-actual experience can
undergo  the  modification  of  becoming  actual  in  this  way,  he
understands  the  totality  of  the  intentional  background  as  a
“potential field of perception”(IdI, 200 [169], italics in original). This
does not mean that it is a field of mere sensations.98 The perceptual
98 In fact Husserl writes “sensation-adumbrations” [Empfindungsab-
schattungen], by which he means not sensational data or qualities, but the
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field is a field of objectivity, but the perceived thing is not the
correlate of any particular and specific perception. Moreover, the
background of the actual experience is layered, so that some of the
non-actual experiences are already impulses or “arousals”
[Regungen]  of  preferences,  judgements  and  wishes,  and  so  on.
These impulses are more or less distant from the wakeful
consciousness, and are accomplished or effected [vollzogen] only
when one actually lives in them (IdI, 200-201 [169]).99
 It is crucial for the perspective that Merleau-Ponty later
develops that Husserl’s mature account of intentionality does not
just  include  experiences  of  the  form cogito.  According  to  this
account,  the  experience  that  is  specific  to  the cogito––the “regard-
to” or “Ego-advertence”––is only one particular modality of “that
something universal which we call intentionality” (IdI, 201 [169-
170]). While Husserl distinguishes intentional experiences, or acts
[Akte] in his terminology, from non-intentional experiences,
intentionality is still considered “a universal medium” or structure
of consciousness, carrying in itself also the experiences
characterised as non-intentional (IdI, 203 [171]).100 This apparent
paradox can be explained by Husserl’s distinction between the
sensuous moment of the intentional whole, the hyle or hyletic stuff,
and its forming moment, the morphé (IdI, 203-204 [172-173]). Taken
in itself, the hyle is not intentional. Even on its highest level,
according to Husserl, the hyle consists merely of formless sensation
contents, such as colour-data, touch-data or tone-data and the like.
In order for intentional experiences to rise from the hyletic stuff, this
must be “animated” by sense-bestowing forms.
 In his further explication, Husserl calls that which forms the
hyletic stuff to an act, that is, a specific consciousness of something,
sensational sides or profiles through which the perceived object is
continually given to the perceiving subject.
99 To the background of my present perception of the text belong not just
other  perceptions:  for  instance,  just  now,  my  memory  of  the  first  time  I
was taught about intentionality, in a lecture hall at the University of
Helsinki in 1996, went through the modification from being an implicit
background experience, to being the explicit correlate of my present
thought.
100 By experiences [Erlebnisse] Husserl ultimately understands “everything
and anything” that is found in the stream of experience or consciousness,
that is, not just the actual and potential intentional experiences or acts, but
every moment and part of the stream (IdI, 74-75 [65]).
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noesis, nous or  the noetic moment of the act (IdI, 205 [174]). It is
possible to analyse phenomenologically the hyletic stratum or level,
as does Merleau-Ponty when he studies sense-experience, as well
as the noetic stratum, as when he describes perceptual experience.
In  addition  to  these  two  directions  of  analysis,  it  is  possible  to
focus on the objective correlate of the act, or what is “meant” in the
noesis. This is not the hyle or stuff, but the intentional sense of the
act, or the noema (IdI, 214 [182]). The noema is the transcendent
object of the act, as this object is intended or, again, meant.
 Beauvoir does not use the technical Husserlian terminology, or
refer  to  the  nuanced  detail  it  articulates,  but  in  her  review  of
Phenomenology of Perception she draws attention to and emphasises
importance of the phenomenological discovery of intentional
directedness on the level of sense-experience.
3.2 Sense-experience, operative intentionality and the ego
In  her  very  positive  reception  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  study  of
perception  and  embodied  subjectivity,  Beauvoir  considers  as  one
of  the  main  contributions  of  phenomenology  the  discovery  of  a
pre-scientific and pre-ethical perceptual field that is necessary for
science and ethics, and that relativizes the separation between the
other and the self,  and between the world and the self (cf.  Langer
2003). By eliminating the opposition between subject and object,
Beauvoir writes, phenomenology restores to us the spontaneous
movement of life and returns our right to an authentic existence
(PPMPE, 159-160; PPMP, 363). She also draws attention to how
phenomenology makes it possible to investigate this authentic
existence  as  it  is  present  in  na?ve  (or  natural,  non-thematised)
experience  in  an  attitude  that  differs  from,  and  therefore  can  be
directed towards, this experience. She refers to this particular
reflective attitude as the phenomenological attitude [l’attitude
phénoménologique] (PPMPE, 159-160; PPMP, 364).
 At least three levels of experience thus seem to be at stake in
Beauvoir’s account: a scientific and ethical way of experiencing
oneself, the world and others, and a pre-scientific and pre-ethical
naïve experience in which an authentic or more original existence
is  present  but  hidden,  since  it  can  only  be  seen  from  the
perspective  of  a  certain  reflective  attitude.  More  precisely,  what
Beauvoir  recognises  in  Merleau-Ponty’s  work  is  a  living  or  vital
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communication with the world, and an intentional network [tissu
intentionel] on the level of sense-experience (PPMPE, 162; PPMP,
365). This intentional network underlies all explicit subject-object
relations, in natural life as well as in science and ethics.
Furthermore, phenomenology is able to restore the original
“communication” with the world, which scientific and ethical
abstractions have habituated us to forget.101 In her review Beauvoir
draws attention to and emphasises the claim that phenomeno-
logical philosophy gives sense-experience a founding role in the
constitution of perceptual experience and its objects.102
 The phenomenological view that perceptual experience and
higher acts of cognition are founded in sense-experience was first
articulated by Husserl. In the second book of Ideas,  he claims that
all regions of being are built up in experiential syntheses that
originate in primitive, subjective experiences of sensation and
affectivity. He distinguishes three different ontological regions and
describes their constitution: the regions of material, animal, and
spiritual being. In my explication of how perception is founded in
sense-experience, I focus on Merleau-Ponty’s development of
Husserl’s main insights concerning regional constitution, since this
is  one  crucial  source  for  Beauvoir’s  understanding  of  the
phenomenological account of perceptual experience.
101 Linguistic metaphors and concepts are not just accidentally present in
Phenomenology of Perception, but structure Merleau-Ponty’s whole
argument about cognition and about the phenomenological method of
investigating its conditions: cognition, he writes in the preface, is
“sustained by a ‘ground’ of postulates and finally by our communication
with the world as primary embodiment of rationality” (PP, xxi [xvi]). The
aim  of  phenomenological  description  and  variation  is  to  give  life  to  this
primary communication in explicit, creative, language (PP, xv, xx [x, xv];
cf. Husserl in CM, 38-39 [77]).
102 How  to  understand  ‘constitution’  is  one  of  the  recurrent  problems
within phenomenology, but constitution can generally be understood as a
process  of  manifestation  and  signification,  or  “a  process  of  bringing  to
appearance” (Zahavi 2003, 72-23). Although what appears in the process
of constitution always appears for one or several transcendental subjects,
and although this process also presupposes a passive pre-givenness of
what appears, constitution is neither creation, nor passive observation, but
a process of unfolding and meaning-giving that takes place between the
subject, or several subjects, and the world (Zahavi 2003, 74; cf. CM, 130-
131 [158-159]).
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 As Beauvoir indeed stresses in her review of Phenomenology of
Perception, one fundamental phenomenological insight is that the
perceptual experience of objects, and the distinction between the
intentionally experiencing subject and the experienced world, is
founded on a more primordial level of intentional experience,
which unifies the subject with the world. In Merleau-Ponty’s view,
Husserl’s most original contribution to the philosophical
understanding of intentionality was not the idea that every con-
sciousness is consciousness of something, but the “broadening” of
intentionality to a level of experience preceding this objectifying
consciousness.  If  we  turn  to  the  place  where  Merelau-Ponty  first
introduces intentionality in his text, then we find him stating that
its originality is that “the unity of the world [.  .  .]  is ‘lived’ [vécue]
as ready-made or already there”, before being posited by
knowledge in a specific act of identification (PP, xvii, 121n [XII,
141n]).103
 It is also in this context that Merleau-Ponty draws attention to
Husserl’s distinction between the intentionality of acts, which
characterises our judgements and voluntarily position taking, and
an operative intentionality [intenntionalité opérante, fungierende
Intentionalität], which produces the natural and antepredicative
unity of the world and of our life (PP, xviii [XII-XIII]). The
discovery and articulation of this deeper or original level of
intentionality  rules  out  the idealist  notion of  a  detached and god-
like transcendental ego, freely positing a world in front of itself:
before coming to awareness of itself as intentionally directed to its
environment, the ego is already “anchored” in this environment
(PP, xviii, 121n, 241, 416 [XIII, 141n, 279, 476]). An illuminating
quote  by Merleau-Ponty illustrates  the way in  which the unity  of
103 Merleau-Ponty opposes this characteristic of consciousness’ directed-
ness to the world with a view he ascribes to Kant. In Merleau-Ponty’s
interpretation, though inner perception for Kant is impossible without
outer perception, and the world (as a collection of connected phenomena)
is anticipated in the consciousness of one’s own unity, and the means by
which one comes into being as consciousness, the subject here is still “the
universal thinker of a system of objects rigorously interrelated, the
positing  power  who  subjects  the  manifold  to  the  law  of  the  under-
standing” (PP, xvii [XII]). However, Merleau-Ponty also finds the phenol-
menological idea of an operative intentionality anticipated in the Critique
of Judgement, to which Husserl refers when thematising the pre-objective
unity of the world (PP, xiii [XII]).
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the world surrounding me is lived before being identified in
thought:
To  return  to  things  themselves  is  to  return  to  that  world  which
precedes knowledge [connaissance], of which knowledge always speaks,
and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract
and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the
countryside in which I have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie
or a river is (PP; ix [III], italics in original).
Merleau-Ponty elaborates on this metaphor of nostalgia when he
writes  that  the  human  world  is  “the  seat  and,  as  it  were,  the
homeland of our thoughts” (PP, 24 [32], italics in original). The
metaphor is comprehensible against the background of the
phenomenological descriptions of sense-experience as our original
mode of being unified with the world.
 In opposition to empiricist and intellectualist understandings of
sense-experience, Merleau-Ponty argues that experience does not
consist of the combination or association of simple atomistic
sensations, but is a texture of affective qualities. These qualities are
not subjective elements of consciousness, but constituted as
properties of the perceived object. As properties of the object,
moreover, sensory qualities are as indeterminate and as “rich and
mysterious [obscure]” as the object that one perceives (PP, 4 [10]).104
The most well-known example illustrating this claim concerns the
perception of colour. With a different emphasis, this example is
present in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Beauvoir.
 Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty shows that sensations are
constituted in perceptual experience as responses to affective
qualities belonging to the object. Moreover, he argues, with Sartre,
that the experience of a colour, for instance, is always blended with
other sensations, such as the sensations of shape and texture, in the
perception of an object. The red patch seen on the carpet, Merleau-
Ponty writes, is red by virtue of the light, shape and material of the
carpet  through which it  is  perceived:  the shadow lying across  the
104 From the  onset  of  his  study,  Merleau-Ponty  stresses  the  ambiguity  of
the  perceived  object,  which  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  it  is  always
experienced with a co-given horizon or context: “[T]he perceived, by its
nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting, and is shaped by its
context” (PP, 11 [18]).
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carpet, the play of light upon it, and the spatial configuration in
which the colour red is an element (PP, 4 [10]). The size and texture
of the carpet also contribute to the quality of the colour: the
perceived red is “the woolly red” of a carpet (PP, 5 [11]).
 Sartre in The Imaginary discusses  the  red  of  a  carpet  in  his
concluding  discussion  of  the  role  of  “imaging”  consciousness  or
imagination in the experience of a work of art. Whereas the work
of  art  or  the aesthetic  object,  in  his  view,  is  an irreal  or  imagined
object, the material object in which this irreality is manifested, “the
painting, the canvas, the real layers of paint” is not (IM, 188-189
[239]). However, the real sensuous pleasure provoked by a Matisse
painting, for instance, does not depend on the red in itself, but on
its position in the whole aesthetic object: it is “the red of a rug near
a table” (IM, 190 [241]). In fact there is never anything like pure
colour, according to Sartre. When one enjoys the colour of the rug,
tactile  elements  (or  qualities)  are  intended  through  the  red  of  the
rug:  “it  is  a woollen red,  because  the  rug  is  of  woollen  material”
(IM, 190 [241], italics in original).
 Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s and Sartre’s arguments are about
sense-experience in perception and imagination, a passage from
Beauvoir’s autobiography illustrates how sensational qualities are
experienced as a totality also in memory. The sensuous red of the
carpet appears in Beauvoir’s description of an early childhood
experience in the beginning of Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter
(Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, 1958), her first autobiographical
volume. Beauvoir’s main aim is not to analyse sense-experience,
but she elucidates the fact that sensational qualities are never given
as moments in isolation. In memory, as in perception, sense-
experience remains a visible, tactile, spatial and affective
intentional totality:
I  retain only one confused impression from my earliest years:  it  is  all
red, black, and warm. Our apartment was red: the upholstery was of
red moquette, the Renaissance dining-room was red, the figured silk
hangings over the stained-glass door were red, and the velvet curtains
in Papa’s study were red too. The furniture in this awful sanctum was
made of black pear wood; I used to creep into the kneehole under the
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desk and envelop myself  in its dusty glooms; it  was dark and warm,
and the red of the carpet rejoiced my eyes (ME, 5).105
This passage illustrates the existential-phenomenological claim
that sensational qualities, and the objects to which they belong, are
given as  a  sensuous and affective totality:  what  is  primary in  the
memory is the total experience of “red, black and warm”. The
things described––the apartment, the upholstery, the dining-room,
the curtains, and so on––are only subsequently distinguished from
this sensuous and affective whole.106
 It is important to emphasise one point about sense-experience
before continuing the discussion of the intentionality on the level
of sense-experience. It concerns the simultaneous activity and
passivity of sense-experience. As affective, the perceptual object
attracts or repulses me. A perceptual object free from all values
and affectivity, in other words, merely considered in its extension
or form, would be a theoretical abstraction.
 On the one hand, this means that sense experience always gives
us active qualities. Merleau-Ponty draws on insights from Gestalt
psychology  when  he  claims  that  an  object  “looks  attractive  and
repulsive before it looks black or blue, circular or square”, and that
feeling, as well as action and will, are original ways of positing an
object (PP, 24, 52 [32, 64]).107 On the other hand, sense experience
also recalls the problems of association and passivity, to which
Beauvoir draws attention in her review: being a ”vital communi-
105 “De mes premières années, je ne retrouve guère qu’une impression
confuse :  quelque chose de rouge, et  de noir,  et  de chaud. L’appartement
était rouge, rouges la moquette, la salle à manger Henri II, la soie gaufrée
qui masquait les portes vitrées, et dans le cabinet de papa les rideaux de
velours ; le meubles de cet antre sacré étaient en poirier noirci ; je me
blottissais, dans la niche creusée sous le bureau, je m’enroulais dans les
ténèbres ; il faisait sombre, il faisait chaud et le rouge de la moquette criait
dans mes yeux” (M, 9-10).
106 The  fact  that  the  redness  and  warmth  of  the  carpet  seems  to  colour
Beauvoir’s whole memory, moreover, actualises the question concerning
the lasting significance of early experiences of sensation and affectivity.
107 Gestalt psychology originated in the study of perception. For a classical
introduction to the central concepts of German Gestalt-Theorie, see Kurt
Koffka (1922). See also Merleau-Ponty’s (1982-83 [1951-52]) lecture course
on the experience of others, where he considers the advantages and
limitations of Gestalt psychology.
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cation” with the world, sense experience makes the world present
as the “intentional tissue” to which the perceived object and the
perceiving subject owe their thickness (PPMPE, 162; PPMP, 365, cf.
PP, 52-53 [64-65]). If consciousness is studied in the process of
perception, rather than as directing itself to an already constituted
objective world, then association is the central phenomenon of
perceptual life. Merleau-Ponty defines association as a passive and
instinctual constitution, as distinguished from the (active) con-
stitution of judgemental and volitional acts (cf. PP, 53 [65]). It is on
the basis of this dynamic view of perception that Merleau-Ponty
can  state,  as  he  does  in  the  introduction  to Phenomenology of
Perception, that perception is not an act, or “a deliberate taking up a
position”, but the background from which acts stand out, and
therefore presupposed by them (PP, x-xi [V]).
 If the basic level of perceptual experience is sensory,
intentionality on this level of experience cannot mean wilful or
deliberate action. Yet as distinguished from the freely constituting
transcendental ego of idealist philosophy, and from the empirical
subject of natural or everyday experience, Merleau-Ponty identi-
fies, on the operative level of intentionality, the presence of a
concrete pre-personal ‘I’ [Je prépersonnel] or primary consciousness (PP,
276n [319n-320n]). This primary, but nevertheless subjective,
consciousness  is  never  fully  aware  of  its  own  role  in  the
constitutional process, Merleau-Ponty claims, because it is this
process itself (cf. PP, 241, 276n [279, 319n-320n]). In  the  frame  of
the  present  study,  Merleau-Ponty’s  notion  of  a  pre-personal  I
enables  us  to  see  more  clearly  a  possible  alternative  to  the
transcendental  ego that  Sartre  criticises  in The Transcendence of the
Ego and to continue the analysis of Beauvoir’s notion of
subjectivity.
Merleau-Ponty distinguishes the primariy consciousness from
the consciousness belonging to the transcendental ego:
What for us is primary consciousness [conscience originaire]  is  not  a
transcendental Ego [Je transcendantal]  freely  positing  before  itself  a
multiplicity in itself, and constituting it throughout from start to finish,
it is an I [Je] which dominates diversity only with the help of time, and
for whom freedom itself is a destiny, so that I [je] am never conscious
of  being  the  absolute  creator  of  time,  of  composing  the  movement
through which I live, I have the impression that it is the mobile entity
itself which changes its position, and which effects the passage from
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one instant or one position to another (PP, 276n [320n], italics in
original).
As is evident from this quote, the unity of perceptual experience is
not  merely spatial  and affective,  but  also temporal:  the  deeper  or
operative intentionality is the process of passive association in
which temporal experiences are unified. Time and subjectivity
communicates “from within”, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, and in
order to understand the subject of this deeper level of
intentionality––which is never a freely positing and universally
constituting ego, but a functioning temporal consciousness––one
needs to consider time itself (PP, 410 [469]). To analyse time is,
inversely, to gain access to the concrete structure of subjectivity.
 It  is  not  my aim here  to  provide a  full  account  of  the primary
consciousness or pre-personal subject that Merleau-Ponty opposes
to the transcendental ego, or––as he repeatedly says––to the
classical conception of an actively constituting consciousness,
found in Descartes,  Kant  and Husserl  in Ideas I (cf. PP, 243, 276n,
372 [281, 319n-320n, 426]). For my purposes it is enough to bring
out two central characteristics of the pre-personal cogito. These
characteristics  make  clear  that  this  notion  of  subjectivity  can
neither be identified with Sartre’s impersonal consciousness, nor
with his notion of the ego as a worldly object for consciousness.
 Firstly, while the primary consciousness for Merleau-Ponty is
pre-personal,  this  does  not  mean  that  it  is  an impersonal
nothingness  or  freedom: subjectivity  on the level  of  the operative
or functioning intentionality owes its anonymity to its embodied
pre-history, constituted in the temporal flow of sense-experience,
of  which  the  conscious  ego  is  never  fully  aware.  Expressed
differently, personal existence has a pre-personal history in the
sense  that  it  “takes  up  and  absorbs  into  itself”  or  “lives”  the
sensuous world––the  seeing  of  colours  and  lights,  the  hearing  of
sounds,  the  desiring  of  other  bodies––as this world is
anonymously given in primary processes of “living” (PP, 160
[186]).108 Secondly, that the subject is unified with the world in a
108 Merleau-Ponty refers to the difference between the German words leben
and erleben, when distinguishing between anonymous ‘living’[vivre] and
to personally ‘live’ a particular world [“vivre” tel ou tel monde], respect-
ively  (PP,  160  [186]).  The  frame  of  his  discussion  is  the  coming  into
existence of things or beings through affectivity, and more specifically,
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functioning perceptual experience, which is passively living rather
than actively lived, means that it is never completely separated
from the objects that appear as transcendent and other to the
consciousness of intentional acts; one’s own body, of course, but
also  other  bodies  and  things.  As  Merleau-Ponty  repeatedly  says,
one’s  own  body  is  a  privileged  object,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a
perspective on the world: it is “not primarily in space  [dans
l’espace]”,  but  of  space [à l’espace], and to be a body is, concretely,
“to be tied to a certain world” (PP, 148 [173]).
 Given these characteristics, and to return to the question con-
cerning transcendental subjectivity posed in the former chapter, it
is not obvious from Beauvoir’s brief autobiographical passage that
she  follows  Sartre  in  his  interpretation  and  critique  of  Husserl’s
transcendental ego. As I already noted, she explicitly refers to the
ego  [l'Ego] as transcendental, and distinguishes this ego from the
ego as transcendent to consciousness. As compared to her auto-
biographical remarks on The Transcendence of the Ego, moreover,
Beauvoir’s more extensive commentary of Sartre’s ontology in
“Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism”, moreover, downplays
its inherent dualism and stresses the embodied nature of
consciousness and the intersubjective nature of the world.109
 While we must conclude, therefore, that it remains open what
exact notion of transcendental ego  or  subjectivity  Beauvoir  has  in
mind in her brief autobiographical remark, it is certain that she
was also familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of
Husserlian phenomenology, which offered an alternative
desire or love (PP, 154 [180]). In the case of erotic experience, too, Merleau-
Ponty identifies a pre-reflective intentionality that “comprehends blindly
by linking body to body” and in doing so “follows the general flow of
existence” (PP, 157 [183]).
109 By taking into account Beauvoir’s stress on the non-dualist elements of
Sartre’s mature ontology, my interpretation differs from Monica Langer’s
(2003), where the emphasis is on the difference between Sartre’s dualist
and Beauvoir’s and Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist conceptions of ambi-
guity. I agree with Langer’s main argument, however, that Beauvoir’s
concept of ambiguity is not derivative of Sartre’s. In addition, Langer’s
exceptional interpretation of the similarities between Beauvoir’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of ambiguity has been a source of inspiration
for  me.  Like  my  own  discussion  of  subjectivity  in  Chapter  3,  Langer’s
study of ambiguity articulates the philosophical implications of Beauvoir’s
review of Phenomenology of Perception.
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conception of the transcendental ego. In other words, and as the
positive review of Phenomenology of Perception shows, Sartre’s
existentialism  was  not  Beauvoir’s  only  or  primary  frame  of
reference. While Beauvoir does not explicitely perform the
reduction in any of her works, the operative or functioning
intentionality on the level of perception and sense-experience is
fundamental for her notion of subjectivity in The Second Sex and in
the autobiographical writings, as is the phenomenological idea of
subjectivity  as  concretely  constituted  in  the  temporal  flow  of
perceptual experience.
 I have already mentioned that the most essential structure of
the deeper intentionality that Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl,
calls operative is the consciousness of time. I will now continue my
investigation of Beauvoir’s notion of subjectivity by studying how
she explicates the temporality of existence in a way that brings the
phenomenological descriptions of time into focus. It should then
be remarked, initially, that the phenomenological concepts of time
are  not  the  only  tools  Beauvoir  uses  in  her  articulation  of  the
temporality of the self. As we have seen so far, Kierkegaard’s
conceptualisation of existence as an inward becoming is also
central to her understanding of what it means to be a self and self-
conscious, as is Bergson’s dynamic notion of life. In The Second Sex,
moreover,  she introduces  and operates  with a  Hegelian notion of
temporality in her understanding of historical becoming. This
aspect of subjectivity and intersubjectivity will be studied in
Chapter 5, where I also introduce the topic of sexual difference. In
the greater part of my continued explication of subjectivity in this
chapter, I focus on Beauvoir’s autobiographical descriptions of
time, in comparison with her more schematic description of
temporality in Ethics. The phenomenological distinction between
subjective and objective time inform both descriptions,  and––as a
consequence––the idea of the living present,  which is at the core of
the Husserlian understanding of transcendental subjectivity or, in
Merleau-Ponty’s words, the concrete structure and source of
subjectivity as functioning intentionality (PP, 410, 415-416 [469,
475-476]).
 Beauvoir became familiar with this phenomenological under-
standing of time by reading the early phenomenological research.
Phenomenology of Perception,  therefore,  was  not  her  only  or  even
first acquaintance with temporality as articulated in the
phenomenological tradition. This is documented in the second
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volume  of  Beauvoir’s  autobiography,  where  she  makes  one  of  a
few  explicit  remarks  about  her  own  reading  of  specific  texts  and
testifies to her familiarity with Husserl’s works. The following
remark in Prime of Life gives a strong indication of how to frame an
interpretation of Beauvoir’s own reflections on time:
I  also dipped into Husserl  for the first  time. Sartre had told me all  he
knew  about  Husserl:  now  he  presented  me  with  the  German  text  of
Leçons sur la conscience interne du temps, which I stumbled through
without too much difficulty. Every time we met we would discuss
various passages in it. The novelty and richness of phenomenology
filled me with enthusiasm; I  felt  I  had never come so close to the real
truth (PL, 241).110
Beauvoir’s  interest  in  Husserl’s  lectures  on  the  consciousness  of
time is not surprising, considering that for Husserl it is from its
temporal character that consciousness derives its capacity to
transcend itself towards what is absent––towards past or future, an
imagined world or the inaccessible lived experience of the other
(Bernet 1998, 203; cf. CM, 115 [145]; Stein 1989, 8-11 [1917, 6-11]).
This temporal transcendence is at the core of the phenomeno-
logical understanding of subjectivity, and thus crucial to
Beauvoir’s autobiographical studies. It is necessary, therefore, to be
familiar with its central ideas.
3.3 Subjective and objective time
Alongside intentionality, temporality is one universal structure of
consciousness, according to Husserl’s lectures. As constituting
rather than constituted, time-consciousness is even disclosed as the
110 ”je m’initiai  à Husserl.  Sartre m’avait exposé tout ce qu’il en savait.  Il
me mit entre les mains le texte allemand des Leçons sur la conscience interne
du temps que je déchiffrai sans trop de peine. A chacune de nos rencontres,
nous  en  discutions  des  passages.  La  nouveauté,  la  richesse,  de  la
phénoménologie m’enthousiasmaient : il me semblait n’avoir jamais
approché de si près la vérité” (FA, 231). The text Beauvoir refers to is the
original 1928 publication of a series of lectures that Husserl gave 1905.
These lectures were later republished in the critical edition of Husserl’s
works, the Husserliana series (Volume X, 1966).  All  references here are to
the English translation of the Husserliana edition.
110
most fundamental consciousness, and as presupposed in all other
structures and forms of consciousness (PCIT, 77-80 [77-76]; Bernet,
Kern & Marbach 1993, 5, 88-114). This fundamental or absolute
level of temporality forms the “dynamic core” of transcendental
subjectivity, understood as becoming, that is, a genesis. Though
Husserl had not yet explicitly introduced his concept of the
phenomenological reduction at the time when he gave his lectures,
the descriptions he gives rest on the shift of attitude that the
reduction implies: the genesis he has in mind is not empirical or
natural, but is the genesis of consciousness as phenomenologically
purified  or  transcendental.  In  other  words,  and  as  Husserl
announces in the introduction to his investigations, a
phenomenological study of temporality requires first that we
exclude all assumptions, stipulations, and convictions with respect
to objective time, or the “complete exclusion of all transcending
presuppositions concerning what exists” (PCIT, 4 [4]). This is
explained with a comparison to space:
Just as the actual thing, the actual world, is not a phenomenological
datum,  neither  is  world  time,  the  real  time,  the  time  of  nature  in  the
sense of natural science and even in the sense of psychology as the
natural science of the psychic (PCIT, 4-5 [4]).
To  the  contrary,  since  objective  time,  in  Husserl’s  view,  has  its
constitutive origin in the lived time of the subject, an explication of
objective time can only begin in subjective experience. This does
not  imply  any  exclusion  of  temporal  objects:  to  speak  about  the
analysis of time-consciousness is precisely to speak of the temporal
givenness of the objects of perception, memory, and expectation
(PCIT, 5 [4-5]).
 As Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993 [1989]) point out, Husserl’s
descriptions of time-consciousness follow two main directions. The
first  direction  is  objective,  in  the  sense  that  it  “begins  from  the
question regarding the possibility of comprehending a temporal
object  [Zeitobjekt]”,  by  which  is  meant  a  duration,  such  as  the
duration of a tone or a melody (1993 [1989], 101). The second is
subjective, in the sense that the theme is consciousness, both as “a
temporalizing [zeitigend] ‘absolute subjectivity’ constituting all
appearance”, and as a self-appearing or self-temporalising
“constituted flow of consciousness” (1993 [1989], 101).
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 The  most  relevant  line  of  description  for  my  attempt  to
understand how the phenomenological conception of temporality
operates in Beauvoir’s analyses of time, on the one hand, and her
explicit reflections on the expressions of temporal experience, on
the one hand, is the objective line of description. This is where we
find Husserl’s account of the living present, as well as his
distinctions between different levels of the subjective experience of
time.  In  fact,  Husserl’s analyses  of  how temporal  objects  must  be
understood as constituted in intentional experiences cannot be
completely separated from the subjective line of description, since
the condition and starting point for temporal awareness is
perceptual experience, in which the temporal object is given as
“now”.
 By temporal objects Husserl understands “objects that are not
only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in
themselves” (PCIT, 24 [23]). He gives two examples from the realm
of music: when a tone sounds, one can make the tone itself, which
endures and fades away, into an object, but one can also make the
tone  in  its  duration  into  an  object.  The  tone  is  then  a  temporal
object,  as  is  a  melody,  or  any  change.  Husserl’s  subsequent
descriptions show that  the enduring tone,  just  like  the melody,  is
given  in  a  continuum  of  acts  that  consists  in  part  of  memory,  in
part of perception, and in part of expectation (PCIT, 25 [23]). As an
enduring  temporal  object,  the  tone  begins  and  ends.  After  it  has
ended, the whole tone-duration, or the unity of the whole process
in which the tone begins and ends, “recedes” or sinks back into the
more distant past. In this sinking back, Husserl notes, one can still
“hold on to it” in one’s hearing, or have it in primary memory or
retention. In retention, one is aware of the tone as “immediately
past”,  or  as  part  of  the  extended  present  in  which  the  tone  is
perceived.  Even  after  the  tone  has  elapsed,  when  it  appears  as
something that is no longer being vitally generated, or no longer
animated  by  the  generative  point  of  the  now,  the  tone  is  still
intended “for a time” in retention, as having been. (PCIT, 25-26
[24])
 When Husserl  considers  the way in  which one is  conscious of
the  different  modes  in  which  the  tone  “runs  off”  into  the  past,  it
turns  out  that  the  perceived  tone  is  in  fact  not  fully  present,  but
only present in a blending of presence and non-presence––of what
is  now  and  what  is  not  now––or a temporal fringe or horizon,
consisting of the now, the just-past and the just-coming (PCIT, 27,
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41 [25-26, 39-40]). With regard to our consciousness of time, only
the now is really perceived, or experienced in what Husserl calls
primal  impression,  whereas  the immediate  past  phase of  the tone
is experienced in retention, and the part of the tone that is just
entering into the now is anticipated or expected in protention
(PCIT, 27, 37, 41 [25-26, 35, 39-40]). The present, therefore, must be
understood  as  an  extended  or  living  present,  and  the  now  or
“source point” in which the enduring object begins as the ideal
limit  where the “new” or  “not  yet” running off-mode passes  into
the “just past” (cf. PCIT, 42 [40]).
 As  the  consciousness  giving  the  now  or  source  point  of  the
temporal object, perception is not merely distinguished from
retention  and  protention,  that  is,  from  primary  memory  and
anticipation, but also from secondary memory, or what Husserl
calls recollection [Wiedererinnerung], and from expectation
[Erwartung] (PCIT, 42-43, 57-58 [41, 56-57]). This distinction draws
attention again to the two levels of act intentionality and
functioning intentionality: whereas perception, recollection and
expectation are acts, retention and protention are not. In addition,
one crucial difference between retention and recollection is that
recollection does not give the present originally. In other words, if
we think of the whole living present as perceived or given in itself,
then primary memory belongs to perception, since it gives the
“present” tone itself in the mode of past (PCIT, 42-43 [40-41]). In
contrast,  recollection  does  not  give  the  tone  itself,  but  is  a  re-
presentation [Vergegenwärtigung, Re-präsentation] of the living
present; in recollection or secondary memory, all the phases of the
tone that belonged to the present are given again, but now as
remembered. Whereas perception “places something before our
eyes as the thing itself”, re-presentation places the object before our
eyes  “in  image”,  as  Husserl  writes,  although  not  as  when  one
actually sees an image or picture (PCIT, 43 [41]).111
 As distinguished from primary memory or retention, in which
the flowing-away of the temporal horizon is something fixed, or is
something that we can only passively experience through
111 When I see an image or a picture of an object, what is given originally
or in person is the image or picture, not the object to which I am referred,
or which is the meaning of the image or picture.  In contrast,  recollection
gives  me  the  object  itself,  i.e.,  there  is  no  mediating  image  or  picture
(PCIT, 61-62 [59-60]).
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“affection”, recollection is a free or voluntary running through. As
Husserl writes:
[.  .  .]  We  can  carry  out  the  re-presentation  “more  quickly”  or  “more
slowly”, more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single
lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on (PCIT, 49-50
[48]).
While in principle one can freely remember as often as one likes,
what is repeatedly recollected will become increasingly distant, as
the beginning-point of one’s memory “sinks further and further
back in time” (PCIT, 50 [48]). The relation between the (past)
present that one remembers and one’s present now is in fact what
distinguishes recollection from fantasy consciousness or imagina-
tion,  which for  Husserl  is  a  different  kind of  re-presentation.  The
difference between remembering consciousness and fantasy
consciousness,  more  precisely,  is  that  in  fantasy,  there  is  no
retentional or temporal relation between the reproduced now and
the present now (PCIT, 47-49, 52-54 [45-47, 50-52]).
 Husserl’s analyses of inner time consciousness are not the only
phenomenological attempt to reach and describe an original
temporality, as distinguished from an objective or factual con-
ception of time and temporal experience. As, for instance, Hans
Ruin (1994) remarks in a study of the sense and significance of the
theme of historicity in Heidegger’s writings, time and temporality
can be viewed as “the phenomenological problems par excellence”;
it  is  a  recurrent  theme  in  Husserl’s  writings  after Logical
Investigations, and the direction taken by Heidegger (Ruin 1994,
146). It is also the ground on which subsequent generations of
phenomenologists have expanded the conceptual limits of their
“founding fathers” (Ruin 1994, 146-147). How does Beauvoir relate
to this tradition of temporality?
 We have already seen that Beauvoir’s understanding of ambi-
guity in Ethics implies a conception of temporality: the singular
individual experiences the paradox of existence not only as the
tensions between being “unlimited” consciousness and being
embodied, and between being a unique subjectivity, and never-
theless being dependent on things, places and other subjects, but
also as the tension between an experience of infiniteness and
finitude; between the universality of one’s existence, and the fact of
one’s singular life and death.
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 Beauvoir’s autobiographical writings can be viewed as an
original mode in which she investigates the ambiguity of existence
specifically in terms of time and temporal experience. It is original
in the sense that the classical phenomenological conceptualisations
of  time  and  temporality  are  “framed”  by  the  perspective  of  her
concrete singularity. The autobiographical description differs from
those in Ethics, where the temporality of existence is thematised
conceptually and more schematically. Beauvoir’s second original
contribution to the existential-phenomenological investigations of
temporality is her description of ‘feminine becoming’ in The Second
Sex,  which  I  will  study  in  Chapter  5.  Contrary  to  her  ethical  and
autobiographical studies, on which I concentrate here, temporality
in The Second Sex is considered in terms of a historical becoming
that is structured by the existential conditioning of sexual
difference.
3.4 Historically and singularly lived time
As  already  noted,  temporality  is  one  of  the  topics  that  Beauvoir
draws attention to in her review of Phenomenology of Perception. In
her interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, it is time that explains the
opacity  of  the  world  and  the  opacity  of  myself:  I  am  not  an
impersonal and timeless consciousness, Beauvoir underlines, but
concrete and historical in a transcendental sense (cf. PPMPE, 163;
PPMP,  366).  She  also  remarks  that  one’s  lived  body  not  only
implies a history that can be remembered, but that the past is
incarnated  in  one’s  lived  body,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  a
relationship to a past prior to the conscious self, or a prehistory to
which  the  self  has  no  reflective  access.  As  we  already  saw,
Beauvoir seems to agree with Merleau-Ponty that an indefinite
past must be presupposed in all perception (PPMPE, 163; PPMP,
366; cf. PCE, 93-94; PC, 211-212).
 The notion of a perceptual field is the basis for Beauvoir’s
discussion of temporality in Ethics a few years after the publication
of her review. The frame of these ethically motivated
conceptualisations  of  time  is  her  discussion  of  the  ambiguity  of
individual existence, and, particularly, of the way in which the
‘distance’ between the self and the world also constitutes the self’s
presence  to  the  world.  As  we  saw  in  the  first  chapter,  Beauvoir
discusses this Heideggarian idea in concrete geographical terms: it
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is by the distance that “the sky and the water” exist to the self, and
the self to them (EA, 12; MA, 17-18). These metaphors are not just
literary decorations, but reinforce the Husserlian idea that our
most primordial experience of the world is that of being unified
with the world in perception and sensation.
 Already in  her  review of Phenomenology of Perception, Beauvoir
draws attention to how the perception of space expresses the way
in which the self stretches out toward the future through the body
and  through  things;  perception  expresses  the  life  of  the  subject
(PPMPE, 161; PPMP, 365). Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions are
echoed in Ethics: since perception ties the self to the world,
Beauvoir  writes,  the  landscape before  me is  not  foreign [étranger].
She also characterises the distance between the self and the world
as a perceptual field with particular forms and colours, and as
opened  up  by  the  way  in  which  temporality  distinguishes  one’s
presence today from that in an unforeseeable future (EA, 121; MA,
151).112 Whereas  Beauvoir’s  description  of  lived  time  in  the
autobiography concerns the relation between present and past
time,  her  focus  in Ethics is the relation between present time and
future  time,  or  what  is  yet  to  come.  In  her  analysis  of  political
freedom in the second part of the essay, Beauvoir distinguishes
between two different meanings of the word future [avenir] (EA,
115-116; MA, 143-144). These two meanings are closely connected
to  the  two  aspects  of  the  ambiguous  condition  of  man  [l’homme],
understood  as  lack  of  being  or  existence.  In  more  precise  terms,
they correspond to ‘existence’ and to ‘being’, respectively, and
depend on the relation between the present and the future. In the
course  of  historical  time,  Beauvoir  furthermore  argues,  these  two
meanings have fused into a third concept of the future.
 According to the first meaning, corresponding to existence, the
future is “the definite direction of a particular transcendence”,
Beauvoir  writes,  and  so  closely  bound  to  the  present  that  it
“composes with it a single temporal form” (EA, 116; MA, 144).113
Beauvoir  ascribes  this  concept  of  the  future  to  Heidegger,  and
describes it also as “a reality which is given [donnée] at each
moment [instant]”  (EA,  116;  MA,  144).  The  idea  that  the  future  is
112 “un champ perceptif avec ses formes et ses couleurs” (MA, 151).
113 “c’est le sens défini d’une transcendance singulière et il est si
étroitement  lié  au  présent  qu’il  compose  avec  lui  une  seule  forme
temporelle” (MA, 144).
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continually given with the present, articulated by both Husserl and
Heidegger, suggests a conception of temporality which emphasises
the passing and coming of time, rather than its enduring presence.
 What is original in Heidegger’s (1962 [1927]) analysis in Being
and Time is not so much the conceptualisation of the threefold
structure  of  past,  present  and  future,  considered  to  underlie  a
naïve idea of presence, that is, of time as that which is and of being
as  that  which  is in time.  As  we  saw,  this  structure  is  articulated
already  in  Husserl’s  lectures  on  the  consciousness  of  time  from
1905. Heidegger’s innovative account rearticulates and connects
this primordial temporal structure to the self-understanding of the
human mode of being or Dasein. Temporality here means the way
in which Dasein comes to understand itself, not as “being in time”,
but  as  being  outside  of  itself  or ec-static: as “having been”
[Gewesenheit], as “being alongside” [Sein-bei] and as being “ahead
of  itself”  [Sich-Vorweg] (cf. Heidegger 1962, 375-377 [327-329]). In
other words, the crucial aspect of temporality in Being and Time is
non-presence, rather than presence, and the most important
temporal characteristic of Dasein is––as already outlined in the first
chapter  of  my  study––the potentiality for being, or the “futural”
mode of understanding oneself as possibility.114
 In Beauvoir’s interpretation of the second meaning of the
future, related to ‘being’ rather than to ‘existence’, temporality is
the experiential structure where history and religion meet: this
notion of the future does not “prolong the present”, but rather cuts
the continuity of time (EA, 116; MA, 144). The future in this sense
is close to imagination, in that it lacks the linkage with historical
existence, as is illustrated by the example Beauvoir gives from the
realm of religion: “[t]hrough the centuries, men have dreamed of
another  future  in  which  it  might  be  granted  them  to  retrieve
themselves as beings in Glory, Happiness, or Justice” (EA, 116).115
In  Christianity,  this  future  was  located  to  heaven,  and  almost
114 Ruin (1994) argues that the theme of temporality must be related to the
theme of historicity in Heidegger’s thought. Only then can one grasp his
analysis of the Augenblick or moment, as the name for human, lived time,
as distinguished from the inauthentic presence of the now-point (cf. Ruin
1994, 26-28, 145, 177-178).
115 “Mais les hommes ont rêvé à travers les siècles d’un autre avenir où il
leur fût permis de se récupérer comme êtres dans la Gloire, le Bonheur ou
la Justice” (MA, 144).
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stripped of its temporal character, in Beauvoir’s historical inter-
pretation, but then “the anti-Christian humanism of the eighteenth
century” again brought it down to earth (EA, 116; MA, 144). In the
idea  of  progress,  furthermore,  Western  humanism  elaborated  a
third  idea  of  the  future  in  which  the  transcendence  from  the
present, on the one hand, and the immobility of being, on the
other,  combine.  The  meaning  of  the  future  is  now  terrestrial,  but
also “the resting-place of things” [le repos des choses] and as such no
longer living (EA, 116; MA, 144). In Beauvoir’s view, the future in
the third meaning appears as at once infinite and a totality: it is
“the  abolition  of  the  negative  [négatif]”  and  as  such  complete
fullness [plénitude] and happiness (EA, 116; MA, 145).
 Beauvoir’s ethical conceptualisation of temporality differs from
her autobiographical description of temporality in two ways that
are of particular importance for my interest in subjectivity and
expressivity. Firstly, whereas Beauvoir’s primary concern in Ethics
is  the  future,  or  human  existence  in  terms  of  individual  and
collective possibility, her primary interest in the five-volume
autobiography is the past or already lived time. Secondly, whereas
her description of the different meanings of the future in Ethics is
abstract and schematic, her autobiographical description of the
past is concrete and sensitive to the different levels and nuances of
lived time, and to the possibility of expressing these nuances in
language. Put differently, in Beauvoir’s autobiographical study of
the past, the questions concerning the temporality and expressivity
of experience are intimately connected.
 In  what  has  been  viewed  as  a  Proustian  opening  scene  of All
Said and Done (Tout compte fait, 1972), the last autobiographical
volume, Beauvoir depicts a childlike surprise at waking up in her
own room, after having fallen asleep during the day.116 The theme
that  runs through her  autobiography as  a  whole,  however,  is  not
primarily involuntary memory, as in Proust’s novel, but a desire to
describe and understand the pattern of a particular life (her own)
and the circumstances, chances, events and decisions that made it
116 Leah Hewitt (1990), for instance, in her comparative reading of the
autobiographical writing of Beauvoir, Nathalie Sarrute, Marguerite Duras,
Monique Wittig, and Maryse Condé, draws attention to the intertextual
connection between All  Said  and  Done and  the  first  volume  of  Marcel
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, Swann’s Way (À la recherche du temps perdu,
Du côté de chez Swann, 1913).
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become this particular life.117 What  surprises  the  subject  of
Beauvoir’s autobiography is not primarily the possibility of being
unexpectedly  reminded  of  places  where  she  once  lived,  or  the
temporary forgetting of her identity between being asleep and
being fully awake, but the possibility of her unique singular
existence, or to find herself deeply embedded in this life, at this
time, and not in any other life: “why am I myself?”, the narrator
asks, and also: “[w]hat stroke of chance has brought this about?”
(ASD, 1).118
 The method or means of Beauvoir’s search for understanding in
All Said and Done is a deliberate will to remember:
At present I am concerned with recovering my life––reviving forgotten
memories, re-reading, re-seeing, rounding off incomplete pieces of
knowledge, filling gaps, clarifying obscurities, gathering scattered
elements together (ASD, 39).119
In  fact,  this  will  to  understand  governs  all  Beauvoir’s
autobiographical volumes, although the first, Memoirs of a Dutiful
Daughter,  has  a  more  fiction-like  unity  than  the  others.  Beauvoir
compares the first volume to a Bildungsroman (roman
d’apprentissage), where “time runs straight on from beginning to
117 For a discussion of involuntary memory in Proust, see, e.g., Bernet
(1993).  In  his  study  of  the  “framing”  of  the  past,  Bernet  compares  the
phenomenological, epistemological analysis of voluntary memory found
in  Husserl  to  Proust’s  exposition  of  aesthetic,  involuntary  memory  in
writing, and to Barthes’ thematisation of the framing itself in his analysis
of the provoking of memory by photographs. What unifies these different
descriptions of memory, according to Bernet, is the conviction that the
remembered past is essentially subjective; the frame of memory “results
from the experience of life acquired by an individual subject or the
convictions of a community which have forged themselves in the course of
history” (Bernet 1993, 2).
118 “[P]ourquoi suis-je moi? [. . .] Ce qui me surprend ––comme l’enfant
quand il prend conscience de sa propre identité –– c’est de me retrouver
ici, maintenant, au coeur de cette vie et non d’une autre : par quel
hasard?” (TCF, 11).
119 “J’ai actuellement le souci de récupérer ma vie : ranimer les souvernirs
oubliés, relire, revoir, compléter des connaissances inachevées, combler
des lacunes, élucider des points obscurs, rassembler ce qui est épars”
(TCF, 60).
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end” (ASD, 14).120 As  she  continues  with  her  second  autobio-
graphical volume, the motivation changes as compared to the first.
Her concern in Prime of Life is not so much her own shaping, as the
specific  pattern  of  a  singular  life  as  such.  In  order  to  understand
this interest as philosophical, it is crucial to remember the idea of
the singular universal that I introduced in the first chapter of this
study. The revelation of an individual life, Beauvoir claims, has a
universal significance: “[i]f any individual [. . .] reveals himself
honestly, everyone, more or less, becomes involved” (PL, 6).121 This
explains why Beauvoir often chooses herself as a concrete example
when studying a general problem, such as the problem of tempo-
rality:  “[t]he  question  can  be  better  answered  by  studying  an
individual case than by offering generalized abstractions” (PL, 6;
cf. EE, 439).122
 As distinguished from the preceding autobiographical volumes,
Beauvoir’s primary aim in the last volume, All Said and Done, is not
to  bring the past  back to  life,  but  to  examine her  history through
certain given concepts and notions (ASD, 3; TCF, 13).123 Chance [le
hasard]  is  the  key  word  in  this  examination.  In  the  final  volume,
Beauvoir once more considers her childhood and youth, her
friendships  and  love  relations,  and  the  deaths  that  have  moved
her, from the perspective of her interest in the play between
chance,  circumstance  and  choice.  The  possibility  of  these  re-
flections depends on the temporal remoteness in which her life can
appear as a totality that can be studied as an object: “[t]he nearer I
come towards the end of my existence, the more I am enabled to
see that  strange thing,  a  life,  and to  see  it  whole” (ASD, Prologue,
translation modified).124
120 “Comme dans  les  romans  d’apprentissage,  du  début  à  la  fin  le  temps
coule avec rigueur” (TCF, 27).
121 ”si un individu s’expose avec sincérité, tout le monde, plus ou moins, se
trouve mis en jeu” (FA, 12).
122 ”L’étude d’un cas particulier renseigne mieux que des réponses ab-
straites et générales” (FA, 12).
123 In addition to this initial investigation, Beauvoir also continues in the
last autobiographical volume to recount her primary occupations during
the most recent past: reading, writing, travelling, and, more than ever
between 1962 and 1972, engaging herself in the political events of her time.
124 “Plus je me rapproche du terme de mon existance, plus il me devient
possible d’embrasser dans son ensemble cet étrange objet qu’est une vie”
(TCF, 9).
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 While  her  own  birth  and  sex  seem  unlikely  in  the  first  place,
Beauvoir reasons, and subjected to chance and contingency, her
own existence is at the same time not contingent: “If I had not been
born no question would have arisen:  I  have to  take the fact  that  I
do  exist  as  my  starting  point”  (ASD,  1).125 Even  if  there  is  a
necessary  coincidence  of  herself  as  a  subject  and  her  history,  the
becoming of this history nevertheless intrigues Beauvoir. Her
continued investigation of the problem takes two directions.
 On the one hand, Beauvoir studies the ambiguity of life: “My
life: it is both intimately known and remote; it defines me and yet I
stand outside it. Just what, precisely, is this curious object?” (ASD,
1-2).126 On the other  hand,  she investigates  her  life  with regard to
the  mode  in  which  it  was  formed.  The  questions  guiding  the
second line of investigation concern the roles played by circum-
stance, necessity, chance and the subject’s options and initiatives
for the becoming of a singular life (ASD, 2; TCF, 12-13). The two
lines of inquiry intersect, moreover, since in the latter case life is
considered a special kind of temporal object.
 Beauvoir  begins  by  stating  that  a  singular  life  is  at  once
boundless [illimité]  and finite  [fini]  (ASD,  2;  TCF,  12).  It  is  bound-
less because it runs back to the beginnings of the world and to its
utmost limits: “[i]n my being I sum up the earthly inheritance and
the state of the world at this moment” (ASD, 2).127 But  a  life  is  at
the  same  time  boundless,  because  each  of  its  elements  has  a
meaning that differs with the perspective from which it is viewed.
When Beauvoir gives the example of a linguistic assertion, this is
also one of the very rare places in her work as a whole where she
specifically discusses language: “The fact ‘I was born in Paris’”, she
claims,  “does  not  represent  the  same  thing  to  a  Parisian,  to  a
person from the provinces, and to a foreigner” (ASD, 2, translation
modified).128 Rather, the apparent simplicity of the statement is
scattered [s’éparpille] among the millions of individuals who have a
125 ”Il n’y aurait pas de question si je n’étais pas née : je dois partir du fait
que j’existe” (TCF, 11).
126 ”Ma vie : familière et lointaine, elle me définit et je lui suis extérieure.
Qu’est-ce au juste que ce bizarre objet ?” (TCF, 12).
127 ”Je résume en moi l’héritage terrestre et l’état de l’univers en cet
instant” (TCF, 12).
128 ”Ce fait : ‘Je suis née à Paris’ ne représente pas la même chose aux yeux
d’un Parisien, d’un provincial, d’un étranger” (TCF, 12).
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relation to Paris. This is also why an autobiographical tale [récit]––
even if evolving on a plane different from the lived experience
[l’expérience vécue] and replacing for the fluid ambiguity of the
actual experience the contours of the written phrase––still, like the
experience, implies the infinite: the images suggested by words are
shifting  and  vague,  according  to  Beauvoir,  and  the  knowledge
[savoir] conveyed by words are not sharply delineated (ASD, 2-3;
12-13).
 However, a life is also a finite reality [réalité finie] in two senses.
It  has  a  center  of  interiorisation  [centre d’intériorisation], and this
center  is  an  ‘I’  [je]  which  poses  itself  as  identical  through  all
moments (ASD, 2; 12). As a finite reality, furthermore, a life
inscribes itself in a certain endurance [durée] and is located; it has a
beginning  and  an  end,  evolves  in  given  places,  retains  the  same
roots and constitutes an unchanging past, whose opening towards
the future is limited (ASD, 2; 12). Still, one cannot know [saisir] and
define [cerner]  a  life  as  one  defines  and  knows  a  thing,  Beauvoir
remarks, because a life is also a “detotalized totality” [totalité-
détotalisée];  it  is not, or has no being (ASD, 2; TCF, 12; cf.  EE, 443).
Beauvoir echoes her own descriptions of existence in Ethics, by
now considering a life as a becoming that, while constantly having
to be made, also leaves behind itself a definite past which future
acts are unable to change in any radical way.
 Several scholars have argued that Beauvoir’s autobiography
should be read as a testimonial document of her time, her
intellectual generation and her sex (see, e.g., Moi 1994, Tidd 1999,
Holveck 2002).  In  my view,  however,  Beauvoir’s memoirs  are  not
primarily descriptions of objective time or history. While her
autobiography is certainly not a systematic investigation of time in
its universal form, it cannot be reduced to personal testimony
either.129 If one pays attention to Beauvoir’s methodological ideas
about the possibility of expressing and communicating experiences
of existence, her autobiography is rather to be considered a
philosophically significant “mediator” between the universal and
the singular, and between the supra-temporal and the temporal: a
129 For a strong argument that Beauvoir’s autobiographical project should
be read against the background of twentieth century witnessing literature,
see especially Tidd 1999, 143-154.
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narrative description that reveals time and history as subjectively
lived. 130
 In this description, Beauvoir operates with an existential-
phenomenological understanding of temporality that stresses the
crucial role of memory for the consciousness of temporal duration
and succession, and, indeed, for any experience of subjectivity and
self. As in the case of the autobiographical passage on the
transcendental ego, Beauvoir does not comment on or explicate her
understanding temporality systematically, but it is clear from the
final autobiographical volume that the theme of what Husserl calls
the  living  present  of  subjective  time  is  operative  in  her  auto-
biography. In order to see this, one must understand how the
problem of temporality for Beauvoir intersects with the problem of
the structure of the autobiographical works and, in addition, how
temporality intersects with the methodological question con-
cerning how to investigate a singular life.
 Unlike the first autobiographical volume, with its fiction-like
unity, and the three proceeding volumes, which have a chrono-
logical structure, the closing volume is organised thematically. As
Beauvoir explains, using chronological order is motivated by a
130 By narrative, I think generally of a story or “dramatic unity”, having a
beginning, middle and end, as in Aristotle’s early definition of tragedy as
an imitation of “action and life” (Ross, 1924, De Poetica, 1450a-b). Paul
Ricoeur’s (1984) comparative reading of Poetics and St Augustine’s
Confessions is illuminative for distinguishing a narrative or dramatic
structure from a chronological or temporal. Ricoeur understands the unity
of tragedy as ”dramatic” rather than ”temporal”: whereas a temporal
unity  characterises  a  period  of  time  with  all  that  happened  within  it,  a
dramatic unity characterises a single action in its completeness (see
Ricoeur 1984, chapters 1 and 2). In his own theory of narrative, the activity
of narrating a story and the temporality of human experience correlate, so
that “time  becomes  human  to  the  extent  that  it  is  articulated  throughout  a
narrative,  and narrative attains its  full  meaning when it  becomes a condition of
temporal existence” (Ricoeur 1984, 52, italics in original). For an introduction
to narrative drawing on contemporary linguistic and literary theory, with
examples from various discourses, see Micheal Toolan (1988). A minimal
definition of narrative provided by Toolan is the following: “A narrative is
a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events, typically
involving, as the experiencing agonist, humans or quasi-humans, or other
sentient beings, from whose experience we humans can ‘learn’” (Toolan
1988, 8).
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wish to  express  the sequence of  time,  as  this  corresponded to  her
experience.131 For her, “living was an undertaking that had a clear
orientation”,  and in order  to  give an account  of  her  own life,  she
had to follow its course (ASD, Prologue).132
 The problem with the chronological structure, however, which
Beauvoir also realises, is that while being faithful to the experience
of development, it fails to give the past its threefold dimension; it
is unable to reveal the way in which past, present, and future are
bound together in each moment, and the way in which every stage
of her life, as she says, “was haunted” [était hantée]  by  those  she
had lived through earlier (ASD, Prologue; TCF, 9-10). Her previous
attempts to make herself exist for others––this  is  how  Beauvoir
expresses her autobiographical aim in the preface to the second
volume––failed not only because she turned something infinite,
her life, into a finite reality. It failed, more precisely, because she
did this by reducing a living horizon of past, present, and future to
a meaningless and perpetual present, separated from what came
before and what followed after it (cf. ASD, Prologue; TCF, 10).133
 This discussion echoes another autobiographical reflection on
lived time. Every moment, Beauvoir writes in Force of Circumstance
I, reflects her past, her body, her relations with others, the task she
has  undertaken,  the  society  and  world  in  which  she  lives  (FCIE,
275; FCI, 374). These realities sometimes reinforce each other and
“descant together” [s’harmonisent], but they sometimes interfere
with, contradict or neutralise each another (FCIE, 275-276; FCI,
374). As Beauvoir explains, her attempt in the autobiography is to
capture this totality in its “diversity and fluidity” (FCIE, 276; FCI,
375). The most crucial aspect of such a totality, in her view, is that
it changes with time, and her primary aim is to make visible the
131 Cf. Force of Circumstance I, where Beauvoir remarks that telling her story
of the past in a ”historical mode” [mode historique] is the result of a project
(FCI, 263 [358]).
132 ”Vivre était pour moi une entreprise clairement orientée et pour en
rendre compte il me fallait en suivre le cheminement” (TCF, 10).
133 Cf. Force of Circumstance I,  where  Beauvoir  also  comments  on  the
threefold dimension of lived time in connection with the topic of The
Mandarins,  her  last  novel:  “An  experience  is  not  a  series  of  facts”,  she
writes, and she “had no intention of composing a chronicle” [Une
expérience, ce n’est pas une série de faits et je n’envisageai pas de
composer une chronique] (FCIE, 263; FCI, 358]).
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temporal transformations, ripenings, and irreversible deteriora-
tions, of others and of herself (FCIE, 276; FCI, 375-376).
 One important aspect of the autobiographical project is that it
contributes to and becomes part of the transformations that
Beauvoir strives to capture. The first passage in which she ex-
presses her autobiographical aim appears in Prime of Life, the
second volume. Here Beauvoir explains that the reason for telling
the  story  of  her  life  was  a  wish  to  rescue  her  past  self  from  the
passing of time:
I  had long wanted to tell  the story of my first  twenty years;  nor did I
ever forget the signals which my adolescent self sent out to the woman
who was afterwards to absorb me, body and soul. Nothing, I feared,
would  survive  of  me,  not  so  much as  a  pinch  of  ashes.  I  begged my
successor to one day recall  me from the nothingness [néant]  to which
she had consigned me (PL, 5, translation modified).134
At fifty,  Beauvoir  writes,  she took “the child and the young girl”
that  had  been  abandoned  and  lost  with  lost  time  [temps perdu],
endowed them with her present awareness and gave them a new
existence “in black and white, on sheets of paper” (PL, 5).135
 The  theme  of  the  autobiographical  study  is  not  her  life  as  a
factual, objective reality, but life as a subjectively lived and open-
ended totality. In the following chapter, Beauvoir’s articulations of
the problem of expressing the subjective aspects of existence as
such a totality will be studied in more detail. My explications of
ambiguity, paradox, intentionality and temporality have provided
conceptual tools to understand Beauvoir’s notion of subjectivity.
Her descriptions of how the novel and the autobiography express
existence will now enable us to understand the systematic relation
between Beauvoir’s conceptual investigations of subjectivity and
her poetics: the literary explorations of human existence.
134 ”Mes  vingt  premières  années,  il  y  a  longtemps  que  je  désirais  me les
raconter ;  je n’ai jamais oublié les appels que j’adressais,  adolescente,  à la
femme qui allait me résorber en elle, corps et âme : il ne resterait rien de
moi, pas même une pincée de cendres ; je la conjurais de m’arracher un
jour à ce néant où elle m’aurait plongée” (FA, 11).
135 ”A cinquante ans [. . .], j’ai prêté ma conscience à l’enfant, à la jeune fille
abandonnée  au  fond  du  temps  perdu,  et  perdues  avec  lui.  Je  les  ai  fait
exister en noir et blanc sur du papier” (FA, 11).
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4. Existence and expressivity
When Beauvoir rejects what she calls system-building philosophy,
this does not mean that she rejects conceptual philosophy
altogether, or philosophy that can only be grasped in pure
thinking. The concept of the living present is, as we have seen,
central  to  Beauvoir’s  notion  of  subjectivity,  and  is  one  mode  of
describing the unity and ambiguity of existence. Connecting the
past, which forms part of human facticity, to what is coming and
yet undetermined, the concept of the living present accounts for
Beauvoir’s understanding of existence as an at once unique,
because singularly lived, and spontaneous becoming. What she
criticises  are  closed  systems  or  structures  of  thought  that  cannot
account for life’s facticity and change, or that fail to account for the
concrete  meanings of  existence as  ambiguous and paradoxical.  In
Beauvoir’s conception, literature suggests one possible––and
privileged––mode of accounting for these meanings.
 The conceptual key to this privilege is expression. It should be
noted already here that Beauvoir’s discussions of expression
concern primarily linguistic expression and communication.
Moreover, she turns to literature in her attempt to account for
existence, because literary expression is able to describe and
mediate the subjective aspects of human existence, that is, the
aspects by which human existence is individualised and connected
to a particular time and place. These aspects would remain
inexpressible if one were left exclusively to conceptual language.
Abstracting from the historicity and contingency of life, conceptual
language in its extreme form can only express what is universal
and  thereby  fails  to  account  for  human  existence  in  its  pregnant
sense, that is, as a universal and singular reality. Literature has a
privileged standing in Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence by virtue
of its ability to express the universal in its singular, temporal and
contingent manifestations.
 My aim in this chapter is to explicate in detail Beauvoir’s
reasons for considering what she calls the ‘metaphysical novel’ as
the mediator par excellence of human existence. As  I  said  in  the
introduction,  my  aim  is  not  to  defend  Beauvoir’s  views  on
language or expression, which remain bound to a pre-structuralist
conception of language and meaning, but to reconstruct her
existential and phenomenological position on these topics in a way
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that has not been systematically done before.136 By focusing on the
interdependence between Beauvoir’s notion of human existence
and  her  conception  of  the  metaphysical  novel,  I  contest  the  view
that Beauvoir rejected philosophy for literature. I argue, to the
contrary, that she advocated a certain mode of philosophising,
motivated by her understanding of human existence. On its most
general level, therefore, this chapter actualises the questions
concerning the limits and being of philosophy as such, and
discusses the implications of one specific non-systematic philo-
sophical style.
 In “Literature and metaphysics” from 1946, Beauvoir articulates
her position as a defence of the metaphysical novel. Underlying
this defence is a discussion of the possibility to express metaphysical
experience.  In  order  to  understand  Beauvoir’s  argument  about  the
136 The  late  twentieth  century  critiques  of  dichotomous  thinking,  of  any
simple and stable distinction between expression and the meaning
expressed, and––in general––of self-sufficient systems of meaning and
knowledge, are intellectually and politically challenging. However, if the
critique is not to remain on the abstract level, and merely voice a general
suspicion about (structuralist or modern) concepts such as the self, the
subject,  expression  and  communication,  it  would  have  to  address  the
specific concepts that Beauvoir uses and develops. A critique of Beauvoir’s
notions of subjectivity and expressivity, in other words, would have to be
based on a clear and justified view of her position on each of these topics.
Such a view has––thus far––been wanting, and any critique would
therefore have to be judged prematurely. My aim here is to carry through
the primary task of explicating how subjectivity and literary writing are
connected in Beauvoir’s thought.  Such an explicative project is necessarily
prior to any adequate structuralist or post-structuralist critique. Although
language is primarily a means of communication between subjects for
Beauvoir, her nuanced notion of subjectivity resists any dogmatic
interpretation. It could, moreover, be argued that her reflections on
writing, reading and the literary work anticipate what has been
proclaimed as “the death of the Author”, that is, the rejection of the idea of
the author as the authoritative producer of the content of a text, and the
recognition of the crucial contribution of the reader, as well as of the text’s
internal play of meaning (see, e.g., Roland Barthes 1977 [1968], 142-148).
The  justification  of  such  a  claim reaches  beyond the  limits  of  this  study.
For an introduction to the post-structuralist critiques within literary
theory, see, e.g., Culler 1982. Cf. Terry Eagleton 1983, who relates these
critiques to early phenomenological and hermeneutic notions of language
and expression (Eagleton 1983, 54-81).
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metaphysical  novel,  one  needs  to  be  clear  about  how  she  under-
stands metaphysics and metaphysical experience. My clarification
here suggests that metaphysics for Beauvoir should not be under-
stood as detached from the intentional and temporal subjective life
that existential and phenomenological philosophy investigates, but
as another name for the study and articulation of this life.
 In “Mon expérience d’écrivain” from 1966, where the central
topic is the philosophical advantages of investigating the universal
problems of existence under the form of what is singularly lived,
Beauvoir  widens  and  elaborates  her  conception  of  the  philo-
sophical function of literature by discussing the novel and the
autobiography as two different modes of indirect communication.
While direct communication “speaks” its meaning, indirect
communication does not speak, but rather “shows” or makes
meaning manifest by the presence of contingent details and the use
of different narrative voices. The “silence” of indirect communi-
cation differs from silence as the voiceless communication of
universal thought. We meet the latter, Beauvoir claims, in
philosophies that neglect both the subjective side of existence, and
the fact that universal thought is always anchored in the philo-
sophers’ singular lives (cf. PC, 112; PC, 251).
 There  are  two  limits  to  my  investigation  in  this  chapter  that
need to be mentioned. The first limit concerns Beauvoir’s
conception of literature: she discusses exclusively prose––either
narrative-reflective prose, as in her autobiography, or narrative-
dialogic prose, as in her novels. She does not, for instance, discuss
non-narrative literature, such as poetry. The main reasons for this
is that Beauvoir is particularly concerned with the subjective
aspects of existence, and that the expression of these aspects, in her
view, must engage the reader to (temporally) live through
imaginative experiences. Her mode of addressing the facticity of
human existence––its contingency and change––from different
narrative viewpoints is therefore of central importance.
 The second limit concerns Beauvoir’s conception of philo-
sophical style. While Beauvoir is critical towards philosophical
systems, she defends the integrity of the philosophical concept or
idea: the “complexity and multiplicity” of the applications of an
idea, she writes, will always exceed the concrete examples in
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which one tries to confine it (LME, 272; LM, 1157-1158).137
However, she does not explicitly consider the possibility of
temporally tinged philosophical discourse, that is, systematic
philosophy that changes over time in its concepts and expressions,
or non-literary philosophy where time and alteration are present in
the mode of expression.138
 This being said, I now begin by discussing Beauvoir’s views on
the very possibility of expressing the subjective aspects of existence
in language. I approach this theme by first considering Beauvoir’s
understanding  of  her  own  mode  of  writing  in  light  of  a  more
general discussion of subjectivity and expressivity. I then move on
to a specific analysis of illuminative passages in Beauvoir’s
autobiographical writings where she discusses and illustrates the
tension between the living, temporal aspect of existence and its
linguistic expression. In my analysis of these examples, the
experiences  of  pain  and  suffering  evoke  the  question  of  the
inexpressibility of experience. The third section of the chapter is
devoted to the study of Beauvoir’s philosophical and technical
descriptions of the metaphysical novel and its particular mode of
expression,  both  of  which  must  be  understood  in  light  of  her
concepts of metaphysics and metaphysical experience.
137 As there is no discussion in Beauvoir’s works of the possible difference
between ‘concepts’ and ‘ideas’, I will simply follow her and use these two
terms interchangeably. Given the phenomenological influence on
Beauvoir’s understanding of the dependence of thought on language,
according to which thought can only be fulfilled or “completed” in
expression––and therefore hardly distinguished from its verbal
expression––it  seems  uncontroversial  to  suggest  that  for  Beauvoir  a
philosophical idea or conceptual meaning cannot exist before being
formed in language (PPMPE, 163; PPMP, 367; cf. PP, 178, 183 [207, 213]).
138Beauvoir touches upon this topic indirectly, when she considers Sartre’s
thought as developing, and when she identifies both a closed systematic
side  to  Hegel’s  philosophy,  and  takes  up  the  non-systematic  side  of  his
philosophy in The Second Sex. Change is also the governing concept when
Beauvoir describes and reflects on her own philosophical and literary
education and fields of interest in her autobiography. For the latter, see
especially Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter and Prime of Life.
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4.1 Expression of subjective thought
In the second volume of Force of Circumstance Beauvoir states that
she considers her own philosophical writing to belong to two main
categories: essays and novels (FCEII, 41; FCII, 62). This distinction
reflects the way in which she understands existence to involve two
different orders of experience: one practical, guided by ethical
decisions,  and one existential,  pre-ethical,  driven by the course  of
life. As different modes of self-expression, Beauvoir explains, her
essays reflect her practical choices and intellectual certitudes,
whereas her novels are attempts to express or recapture life’s
contradictions in their nuances and ambiguities. Does this mean
that  existence or  the pre-ethical  order  of  experience could also be
expressed otherwise?
 Beauvoir’s essays on literature and philosophy, and on the task
of the existential writer, provide one possible answer. The
philosopher who wants to express existence can, on the one hand,
strive to elucidate life’s universal meaning. She will then use
abstract language and develop theories by which the “meta-
physical experience” of life will be described and systemised in its
essential form, that is, as timeless, universal and objective (cf. LME,
273; LM, 1159). A philosophy that affirms this aspect of human
existence as real, and posits its subjectivity and historicity as
negligible, will diverge from any expression of its singularity and
particularity. One the one hand, the philosopher who admits the
ambiguity  of  existence  will  attempt  to  account  for  the  universal
meaning and structures of existence by expressing its subjective,
singular and dramatic aspects. When recalling her own reading of
Hegel’s system in Ethics, for instance, Beauvoir is intrigued by the
apparent distance between the universal descriptions provided by
the system and the temporal and concrete reality of a singular life:
As soon as one considers a system abstractly and theoretically, one
puts  himself,  in  effect,  on  the  plane  of  the  universal,  thus,  of  the
infinite. That is why reading the Hegelian system is so comforting. I
remember having experienced a great feeling of calm on reading Hegel
in  the  impersonal  framework  of  the  Bibliotheque  National  in  August
1940. But once I got into the street again, into my life, out of the
system, beneath the real sky, the system was of no use to me: what it
had offered me, under a show of the infinite,  was the consolations of
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death; and again I wanted to live in the midst of living men (EA,
158).139
In the above example, considering a philosophical system in
abstract terms means taking a universal and infinite point of view,
in contrast to taking the singular and temporal point of view of
one’s personal life.140 The  formulation  “as  soon  as”,  however,
leaves room for the possibility that a philosophical system might
be  considered  differently.  In  fact,  Beauvoir’s  discussion  of  the
opposition between subjectivity and objectivity in her review of
Phenomenology of Perception presents  a  less  categorial  view  of  the
relation  between  what  she  in  the  above  quote  describes  as  an
abstract, theoretical consideration and life, respectively.
 According to the alternative view, abstract reflection can
account for our lived experience. As Beauvoir explicitly writes in
her  review:  “the  phenomenological  attitude  allows  man  to  access
the world, and to find himself there” (PP, 160).141 Within the frame
of Beauvoir’s discussion of Phenomenology of Perception,  it  is  not
philosophy that represents the impersonal “consolations of
139 “Dès qu’on considère abstraitement et théoriquement un système, on se
situe en effet sur le plan de l’universel, donc de l’infini. C’est pourquoi la
lecture du système hégélien est si consolante : je me souviens d’avoir
éprouvé un grand apaisement à lire Hegel dans le cadre impersonnel de la
Bibliothèque nationale, en août 1940. Mais dès que je me retrouvais dans
la rue, dans ma vie, hors du système, sous un vrai ciel, le système ne me
servait  plus  de  rien  :  c’était,  sous  couleur  d’infini,  les  consolations  de  la
mort qu’il m’avait offertes ; et je souhaitais encore vivre au milieu
d’hommes vivants” (MA, 196).
140 This point is already stressed in Pyrrhus and Cineas, where Beauvoir also
discusses Hegel: “The universal spirit is voiceless, and every man who
claims  to  speak  in  its  name  only  lends  it  his  own  voice.  How  could  he
adapt the universal’s point of view since he is not the universal? One
cannot  have  a  point  of  view  other  than  his  own”  [L’esprit  universel  est
sans  voix,  et  tout  homme  qui  prétend  parler  en  son  nom  ne  fait  que  lui
prêter sa propre voix. Comment pourrait-il prendre le point de vue de
l’universel, puisqu’il n’est pas l’universel ?] (PCE, 112; PC, 251, italics in
original). Beauvoir makes a similar point in Prime of Life, contrasting
‘universal being’ to the experience of one’s individual self, and the
necessity of history to the contingent truth of the living present (PL, 564-
565; FA, 537]).
141 ”l’attitude phénoménologique permet à l’homme d’accéder au monde
et de s’y retrouver lui-même” (PPMP, 364).
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death”––to borrow Beauvoir’s expression from Ethics––but science.
The contrast between a philosophical and a scientific attitude
towards  the  world  is  articulated  in  terms  of  subjectivity  and
objectivity. Subjectivity, in this opposition, signifies the privilege of
affirming oneself as ‘I’ when faced with others, rather than
considering oneself objectively as one individual among others,
subjected––like them––to universal laws (PPMPE, 159; PPMP, 363).
To affirm oneself subjectively, moreover, has epistemological
implications in the sense that it means to know a “mysterious
intimacy” [mystérieuse intimité]  with  one’s  own  existence,  or  to
experience the living and meaningful world disclosed by one’s
own embodied consciousness, rather than being directed to the
objective world of science (PPMPE, 159; PPMP, 363). Objectivity
here differs from intersubjectivity in Beauvoir’s existential ethics,
according  to  which  the  self  and  the  other  are  related  as  free
subjects or singularities, not as objects of scientific laws. As
opposed  to  the  subjectively  lived  world,  the  objective  world  of
science  is  a  “a  universe  of  frozen  objects  independent  of  all  gaze
and all thought” (PPMPE, 159).142
 Beauvoir is nowhere as explicit about her own more precise
understanding of the concepts subjectivity, objectivity, singularity
and universality, and of how their differences, as she is in the
review. Ultimately, however, the meaning of these concepts must
be understood from the perspective of the convergence, in
Beauvoir’s thought, of the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity
in terms of the individual thinker’s intuitive discovery of existence,
on  the  one  hand,  and  what  Kierkegaard  describes  as  the  truth  or
paradox of  subjectivity,  on the other:  the  singular  devotedness  of
personal decision and the impossibility of communicating this
decision as objectively comprehensible to others.
 A  closer  look  at  this  convergence  reveals  two  interrelated
difficulties. The first difficulty concerns the specific meaning of
subjectivity  for  Descartes  and  Kierkegaard,  and  the  second  the
possibility of expressing this meaning to other subjects. To
articulate  the  two  difficulties  more  precisely,  in  the  case  of
Descartes, subjectivity means the clear intuition of one’s existence
142 “un univers d’objets glacés, indépendants de tout regard et de toute
pensée” (PPMP, 363).
132
in thought, as this is expressed in the cogito.143 For  the  Cartesian
thinker, or the subject conceived of as a thinking thing, the
problem of communicating the experience of subjectivity seems
not to appear, since each individual subject, in this view––
regardless  of  the  contingent  aspects  of  his  or  her  existence––
immediately grasps the meaning of the expressions ‘I think’ and ‘I
exist’, and their relation.144 In the case of Kierkegaard, subjectivity
is rather the opposite of an intuitive grasp of oneself as thinking,
since it means to experience the paradox as an inexplicable
determination of existence. The experience of the paradox would
be  completely  lost  if  it  was  to  be  expressed  directly,  or  in  what
Kierkegaard calls objective communication. In fact, if the specific
“truth  of  subjectivity”  as  paradox  is  to  be  preserved  in  language,
that  is,  if  language  is  to  express  the  existent’s  mode  of  being  at
once temporal and eternal, singular and universal, communication
can only be indirect.
 Kierkegaard’s notion of the subjective thinker’s specific mode
of  communicating  is  crucial  for  Beauvoir’s  conception  of  the
difference between conceptual and literary expression, which I will
study  in  the  last  section  of  this  chapter.  Moreover,  it  adds  to  our
143 By intuition, as we saw in the first chapter, Descartes means the simple
and clear perceptions of the intellect, or the unprejudiced natural
intelligence of each individual (Descartes 1985, 14 [AT X, 368]).
144 When Descartes grasps his existence as a ‘thinking thing’ for the first
time in the second meditation, expressivity at least does not affect the
truth  of  this  intuition:  “the  proposition  ‘I  am,  I  exist’”,  he  writes,  “is
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my
mind” (Descartes 1996, 17 [AT VII, 25]). Alanen (2003) notes that while
Descartes thinks that speech presupposes thought, he offers no account in
his works of the precise connection between thought and language
(Alanen 2003, 102). The fact that Cartesian thought (cogitatio)  “may  not
require membership in a linguistic community”, Alanen also argues, does
not mean that the emphasis on the isolation of the thinking ego should be
overestimated: the thinker certainly belongs to a “community of rational
beings” and the Meditations, therefore, presuppose an interlocutor. This
interlocutor may be God, an alter ego or even a Super ego, Alanen
suggests, represented by reason or truth itself: “Descartes’ solitary
discourse is a dialogue between his anxious, imperfect, doubt-ridden,
finite  self  and  his  ideal  of  a  perfect,  infinite  thinker  who  never  makes
mistakes, whose knowledge is not limited but constitutes the true science
(Scientia) characterized by complete knowledge” (Alanen 2003, 103).
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understanding of the distinction between subjectivity and
objectivity in her thought, which is my concern in this section. I
will now therefore explicate the Kierkegaardian notion of indirect
communication.
 As Kierkegaard writes in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the
“double reflection” of the subjective thinker, which means his or
her double experience of “infinity” and “isolation,” becomes a
contradiction in communication with other individuals. This is
because communication assumes that the individual who exists in
the isolation of  his  or  her  singular  experience of  inwardness,  and
who  desires  “through  this  inwardness  to  express  the  life  of
eternity”, nevertheless wishes to communicate with others (CUP,
68 [74], translation modified). Kierkegaard’s response to the
contradiction is a distinction between direct and indirect com-
munication, which goes together with the distinction between
objectivity, as the common or shared experience of the temporal,
and subjectivity, as the singular experience of the eternal.145
 As indifferent to subjectivity, the mode of communication of
objective thinking, to which Kierkegaard also counts ordinary or
everyday  communication,  is  direct  and  supposes  certainty  (CUP,
68, 70 [74, 76]). This does not mean that direct communication is
easy,  only  that  it  lacks  the  “elusiveness  and  the  art  of  double
reflection”, or the human solicitude in communicating itself, which
belongs to subjective thinking (CUP, 70 [76]). Since subjectivity or
inwardness, as we saw in the first chapter of this study, is
characterised by becoming, and thus ambiguity and uncertainty,
the individual who wishes to express his or her subjectivity cannot
use direct communication. Rather, subjective thought must be
communicated  in  a  way  that  preserves  it  as  becoming  or––as
Kierkegaard writes––“essentially secret” [væsentlig Hemmelighed]
(CUP, 73 [79]). What is essentially secret, according to Kierkegaard,
is not secret in the way something said in a secret meeting is first
unknown, and then understood as soon as it is revealed (CUP, 74
145 As we saw in the first chapter, the eternal here should be understood in
terms of a personal genesis of being in time, rather than an impersonal,
changeless infinity. The religious background of Kierkegaard’s thought
illuminates this concept of the eternal. As Kern (1970) writes, Kierkegaard
“believed in an eternal essential truth of which the individual in his most
passionate inwardness was able to partake, a truth which was totally
subjective and yet transcended subjectivity” (Kern 1970, 4-5).
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[79]). This would only be “accidentally secret”. An essential secret
remains a secret for “everyone who is not in the same way doubly
reflected within himself” (CUP, 73 [79]). Subjective thought, in
other  words,  retains  part  of  its  secrecy  even  when  communi-
cated.146
 In the phenomenological reinterpretation and development of
Cartesian philosophy, the cogito is extended to a level prior to
reflective thought and––as my study of the difference between the
intentionality of acts and operative intentionality made clear––
understood as constituted in affectivity, perception, temporality
and expressivity. When Beauvoir, as belonging to this inter-
pretative tradition, reformulates cogito from the perspective of the
Kierkegaardian paradox, the  human  being  is  conceptualised  as  a
subjectivity  that  can  realise  itself  only  as  a  presence  in  the  world
(EA, 10; MA, 14). Indeed, this way of understanding subjectivity
echoes the core of her affirmative review of Phenomenology of
Perception, where she welcomes the phenomenological under-
standing of the body as a mode of being in the world, rather than
an object. As a mode of being, the body is not given in the world in
the way inanimate objects are, like trees or rocks, but “expresses
our existence” [exprime notre existance] (PPMPE, 161; PPMP, 364).
 To know oneself, in Beauvoir’s phenomenological and ex-
istential reinterpretation of Descartes’ discovery of subjectivity,
means to know oneself in and through the world with which one is
involved in embodied experience before reflective thought has
formulated the cogito. Any authentic expression in language of
subjectivity  in  this  sense  must  therefore  be  an  expression  of  the
world as felt and acted in, rather than merely thought. Since there
is no immediate intellectual access to this spontaneous, but
nevertheless subjective, level of experience, its expression cannot
be direct, or––at least––can never be completed. It must rather
146 Thus there is a subjective dimension, in the Kierkegaardian sense, even
in Descartes’Meditations:  the  turn  to  the  thinking  I,  or  to  subjectivity,  is
executed by the method of doubt, and the autobiographical form of the
text  represents  this  singular  gesture.  My claim is  not  that  the Meditations
should be read as a personal narrative about the particular individual
René  Descartes,  but  that  the  mode  of  writing  is  significant  in  that  it
expresses indirectly what the text speaks about directly: the withdrawal to
oneself, and the discovery––in intuitive reasoning––of what is common or
universal, or what is evident to all rational beings (cf. Alanen 2003, 106).
135
remain indirect, open and––in this sense––uncertain, like lived
experience itself.
 While there are, as we have seen, philosophical difficulties
connected to the convergence of a Cartesian and a Kierkegaardian
notion of subjectivity in Beauvoir’s thought, it is possible to briefly
distinguish subjectivity and objectivity, on the one hand, from
singularity and universality, on the other hand. Whereas the first
opposition refers to the subjectively lived experience or existence,
as distinguished from the objective systematisation of this
experience in science or philosophy, the second refers to the two
different aspects of lived experience or existence: its individual,
temporal and contingent aspect (singularity) and its shared or non-
individual, a-temporal and necessary aspect (universality). As we
will see in the next section, the question concerning the
expressivity and inexpressivity of experience complicates these
distinctions and reminds us that their meanings are by no means
stable.
4.2 Expressivity and inexpressivity
Beauvoir  does  not  offer  any systematic  account  of  expressivity  or
language as such.147 While the topic of writing is present
throughout her philosophical and literary works––especially in her
essays on the relation between literature and philosophy––she
does,  however,  devote  one  section  in Pyrrhus and Cineas to the
more general topic of communication. The frame of Beauvoir’s
discussion of communication is ethical: communication is
considered in light of the relationship between the self and the
other,  and  as  a  form  of  action  by  which  individuals  create  new
values, desires and needs for each other (PCE, 126, 129; PC, 284,
290). From this ethical perspective, language is viewed as an
appeal to the other’s freedom, whereas silence––as the reverse side
of language––signifies “true contempt” [véritable mépris] (PCE, 133-
134; PC, 299-300).
 Communication  as  a  form  of  action  is  neither  abstract  nor
impersonal,  but,  on  the  contrary,  concrete  and  personal.  It  is
147 Her example of the ambiguous meaning of the utterance ‘I was born in
Paris’ in All Said and Done, which I discussed at the end of Chapter 3, is an
exception (cf. ASD, 2; TCF, 12).
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concrete,  not  only  in  terms  of  speech  and  other  modes  of
expression, but also in terms of cultural objects: “[m]y being enters
into communication with others only through those objects in
which it is engaged”, Beauvoir writes, and goes so far as to claim
that if one would not make anything exist, communication would
also be impossible (PCE, 129-130).148 Communication is personal in
the sense that the expressive appeal is not directed to just anyone,
but to specific others: “[w]e look for the completion of the project
in which our freedom is engaged, and therefore others must
project me toward a future that I recognize as mine” (PCE, 133).149
 In  the tradition in  which Beauvoir  was active,  cultural  objects,
like  novels  and  all  kinds  of  works  of  art,  are  understood  as
expressive  unities  to  whose  meaning  we  respond,  just  as  we
respond to the bodily expressions of living beings.150 One  of
Beauvoir’s most explicit remarks on language with reference to
this tradition is again found in her review of Phenomenology of
Perception: Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir writes, “offers some very rich
suggestions, particularly about the question of sexuality and that
of language” (PPMPE, 163).151
 To  summarise  the  core  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  philosophy  of
language, expression and style are––to  say  the  least––central for
his whole understanding of subjectivity. Already on the level of
sense-experience, the lived body appears as expressive, rather than
an object bound by causality (cf. PP, 160 [187]). Though Merleau-
148 ”mon être n’entre en communication avec autrui que par ces objets où il
s’engage” (PC, 291).
149 “car dans la communication avec autrui nous cherchons l’achèvement
du projet  où  notre  liberté  s’engage  ;  et  il  faut  donc  qu’autrui  me projette
vers un avenir que je reconnais pour mien” (PC, 299).
150 See e.g., Ideas II, where Husserl discusses the unity of ‘expression’ and
‘the expressed’in the grasping of what he calls spiritual or comprehensive
wholes: whether I look at a human face, experience a work of art or read a
book,  what  I  see,  experience  or  comprehend is  the  sense  of  a  whole  or  a
unity, or a spiritual being which “essentially includes the sensuous” (IdII,
251, 333, 352 [239, 320-321, 340-341]). To understand the meaning of
spiritual unities means to “live” in them, or to “comprehend” the sense
that animates and even fuses with their sensuous appearances (IdII, 248-
250 [236-238]). For a detailed study of this aspect of Husserl’s pheno-
menology in relation to Beauvoir’s philosophy, see Heinämaa (2003a).
151 “il apporte, en particulier sur le question de la sexualité et sur celle du
langage, des suggestions très riches” (Beauvoir 1945, 367).
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Ponty also speaks about a “vital communication” between the
lived  body  and  the  world  on  the  level  of  sense-experience,  he
distinguishes this fundamental level of expressivity, to which “the
perceived object and the perceiving subject owe their thickness”,
from linguistic communication, which he, like Beauvoir, considers
an intersubjective experience; a concrete “taking up of other’s
thoughts  through  speech”,  or,  as  he  also  expresses  this,  a
“reflection in others, an ability to think according to others [penser
d’après autrui] which enriches our own thoughts” (PP, 52-53, 179,
354 [64-65, 208, 407], italics in original).
 Two implications of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language
are particularly interesting for my subsequent investigation of
Beauvoir’s  notion  of  literary  expression  as  a  mode  of  indirect
communication: the distinction between authentic or first-order
speech and second-order expression, on the one hand, and the
gestural and the conceptual meaning of speech, on the other. Let
me briefly outline these two distinctions and their connection.
 The distinction between first-hand and second-order expression
brings  to  light  not  only  how  language  must  always  refer  back  to
itself, but also how speech is capable of reshaping already existing
language and expressing what has never been said before.
Whereas authentic speech thus formulates experience “originally”,
and in this sense cannot be separated from thought, second-order
expression should rather be understood as “speech about speech”,
and as constituting empirical, factual and habitual language, which
expresses already established meaning (PP, 178n, 179n [207n,
208n]). Merleau-Ponty’s repeated references to art, music and
literature illustrate how authentic expression ‘breaks through’
what is already familiar, known or reasonable, and confronts us
with the new, as yet indeterminate and without justification. These
illustrations are often modelled on the spontaneous intentionality
of the body, and––moreover––imply the distinction between the
gestural and the conceptual meaning of language.
 In the following quote, the gestural meaning of expression––its
mode of expressing indirectly or pointing (like the gesture)––is
thematised as a “second-order value” of expression. This second-
order value should not be confused with empirical language, but is
an integral part of all language: hidden in the words themselves,
the second-order value or mute forms of expression “lead the
vague life of colours” and gestures (cf. S, 45 [56-57). The creative
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writer––or the painter or the musician––reorganises what we
already know by means of gestures, silences, colours, and sounds:
[. . .] the writer transports us without transitions or preparations from
the world of established meanings to something else. And as our body
guides us among things only on condition that we stop analyzing it
and  make  use  of  it,  language  is  literary  (that  is,  productive)  only  on
condition  that  we  stop  asking  justifications  of  it  at  each  instant  and
follow  it  where  it  goes,  letting  the  words  and  all  the  means  of
expression of the book be enveloped by that halo of signification that
they owe to their singular arrangement, and the whole writing veer
toward a second-order value where it almost rejoins the mute radiance
of painting (S, 78 [97]).152
Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the gestural and the
conceptual meaning of linguistic expression stresses the mediating
function  of  language  in  general,  Beauvoir’s  main  concern  is  with
the mediating function of the novel, considered as one form of
indirect  expression.  In  her  view,  the  novel  can  overcome  the
separation between subjectivity and objectivity by unifying the
singular and universal aspects of experience in its style (LME, 274-
276; LM, 1160-1163).
 Before explicating in more detail how the novel is able to unify
the singular and universal aspects of experience, one more aspect
of the general problem of the expressivity and inexpressivity of
experience needs to be discussed: the ambivalence in Beauvoir’s
thought concerning the question whether language can express all
dimensions of subjectivity.
 This ambivalence is a recurrent theme in Beauvoir’s autobio-
graphical writings, and appears as a paradox of linguistic
expression that echoes Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the
152 As  in  the  above  quote,  a  radical  distinction  between  authentic  and
second-order expression (that is, already established meaning) is less
obvious in Merelau-Ponty’s later works on language: in a structuralist
frame,  speech  in  general  is  viewed  a  mediator  in  the  creation  of  new
meaning (see, e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1988 [1968]). Here, Merleau-Ponty
suggests not only that the writer is capable of original expression, but also
that the way in which literary expression breaks and refashions everyday
language––by making everyday language recreate the contours of
experience––illustrates and extends our conception of the mediating
function of speech.
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empirical and creative function of language. According to this
paradox, linguistic expression fixes what is ambiguous and fluid in
experience and thereby on the one hand reduces the living aspects
of  existence  to  stable  and  static  forms,  and  on  the  other  hand
preserves them by giving new expression to what would otherwise
be lost in the flow of time and forgetting. As we saw in Chapter 3,
when retrospectively reflecting on her motivation to write the first
autobiographical volume, Beauvoir stresses the positive side of this
paradox: by endowing her past selves with her present awareness,
she  gave  them  a  new  existence  “in  black  and  white,  on  sheets  of
paper”  (PL,  5;  FA,  11).  What  is  crucial  here  not  merely  the  act  of
remembering the past, but also that of recreating the past in
writing.
 By contrast, the following autobiographical passage, which
illustrates the discrepancy between immediately experiencing the
world and articulating one’s experiences  in  language,  stresses  the
negative,  reductive  side  of  language.  In  this  example,  the
separation between lived experience and language, moreover,
coincides with a separation of feelings and embodiment from their
linguistic expression. Whereas (the fictionalised) Beauvoir in this
retrospective passage feels “astonishment” and “delight” at the
sight of a landscape, (the fictionalised) Sartre remains “cool-
headed” and immediately attempts to “verbalise his visual
impressions”:
One afternoon we were standing on the heights of Saint-Cloud, and
gazing out at a wide landscape of river and woodland: I felt elated by
this  spectacle,  and  reproached  Sartre  for  his  indifference  to  it.  He
talked about the forest and the river far more eloquently than I did, yet
they did not make him feel anything. He defended himself against this
charge by asking what the real definition of feeling was (PL, 43, italics
in original).153
In  her  continued  account,  Beauvoir  elaborates  on  these  two
positions. In the view represented by Sartre, “disordered physical
153 “Un après-midi, nous regardions des hauteurs de Saint-Cloud un grand
paysage d’arbres et d’eau ; je m’exaltai et je reporchai à Sartre son
indifférence : il parlait du fleuve et de forêts beaucoup mieux que moi,
mais il ne ressentait rien. Il se défendit. Qu’est-ce au juste que sentir ?”
(FA, 49).
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reactions”  [mouvements désordonnés du corps] paralyse verbal
communication, whereas the “disembodied” [désincarnée]
significance  of  the  sight  of  a  landscape,  for  instance,  can  be
expressed in words and thus communicate to others (cf. PL, 43).154
Beauvoir’s discussion of the example concludes that there is a gap
between life and language: the writer should remain detached
from  the  felt  experiences  in  order  to  be  able  to  express  them.
Moreover,  since  “words  have  to  murder  reality  before  they  can
hold it captive”, the most important aspect of reality––its
presence––remains linguistically inexpressible (PL, 43-44).155
 When  Beauvoir  returns  to  the  topic  a  little  further  on,  in  the
same autobiographical volume, she maintains the view that lived
reality is inexpressible: reality extends beyond anything that can be
said  about  it  in  words,  she  writes,  and  instead  of  “reducing  it  to
significations capable of verbal expression”, we should face it in its
ambiguous impenetrability (PL, 173, translation modified).156 Yet
in  a  later  passage,  she  also  elaborates  on  this  view  and  suggests
that the discrepancy between life’s immediate presence and
writing [l’écriture] is a creative condition for literature, rather than
a disturbing paradox (cf. PL, 173; FA, 168). From this position, the
task  of  the  writer  is  to  arrange  the  world  in  a  personal  pattern,
which requires  that  he or  she grasps the meaning [sens] of things
and fixes them in language (PL, 173; FA, 168). This position is close
to the one Beauvoir argues for in her more systematic essays on
literature and philosophy, published after the time accounted for
in the autobiographical passages just quoted: by creating the
conditions for a new living experience for the reader of a novel, the
writer is, in fact, able to express indirectly the living present of
existence (LME, 272; LM, 1157).
 The problem of linguistic expression, literary or conceptual, is
not merely a problem of communication for Beauvoir, or of being
154 Sartre presents his own phenomenology of the emotions in Sketch for a
Theory of Emotions (Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions, 1939). This work
precedes his phenomenological description of the imaginary and relates to
the analysis of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego.
155 “je  me  disais  que  les  mots  ne  retiennent  la  réalité  qu’après  l’avoir
assassinée ; ils laissent échapper ce qu’il y a en elle de plus important : sa
présence” (FA, 49-50).
156 “la réduire à des significations qui se laissent exprimer par des mots”
(FA, 168).
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or not being able to share one’s experiences with others, but a more
fundamental problem of the inexpressivity or “silence” of
experience. Silence as defined here differs both from its “ethical”
meaning,  according to  which silence,  as  we saw,  is  considered as
non-communication and even contempt, and from the creative
significance, underlined by Merleau-Ponty, according to which
silence “speaks” across or between words (S, 45, 76 [56, 95]; cf.
PCE,  134;  PC,  300).  The  third  meaning  of  silence  is  close  to  the
existential isolation in Kierkegaard’s description of the subjective
thinker, since it means the impossibility of articulating and even
recognising one’s experiences.
 There is one realm of experience in particular by which
Beauvoir’s illustrates this silence––the realm of pain and suffering.
In the preface to Adieu: A Farewell to Sartre (Les Cérémonie des adieux,
1981), she claims that there are experiences that remain
inexpressible. It is impossible, she writes, to articulate her
experience of Sartre’s death: “These things cannot be told; they
cannot  be  put  into writing;  they cannot  be  formed in one’s mind.
They are experienced and that is all” (Beauvoir 1984 [1981], 3).157
Yet  she  does  write––and show––something: Beauvoir’s retro-
spective account of Sartre’s last years, and the interviews added to
the first autobiographical part of the book, illustrates the solitude
in pain and suffering.
 Similarly, A Very Easy Death (Une mort très douce, 1965),
Beauvoir’s autobiographical essay relating the events surrounding
the  death  of  her  mother,  shows  how  suffering  isolates  in  two
different senses: confronted with someone else’s suffering, one is
isolated from the other as well as from oneself. In the first sense of
isolation, experiencing someone else’s suffering means being
closed  off  from  the  other,  or  not  being  able  to  experience  the
other’s pain for or with him or her.158 All one can do is to respond,
as  if  from  the  outside,  to  the  expressions  of  the  other’s  suffering.
As Beauvoir  writes  in  a  memory of  her  mother  at  the hospital:  “I
touched her, I talked to her, but it was impossible to enter into her
157 “Ça  ne  peut  pas  se  dire,  ça  ne  peut  pas  sécrire,  ça  ne  peut  pas  se
penser ; ça se vit, c’est tout” (Beauvoir 1981, 13).
158 Beauvoir does not distinguish between pain and suffering here, but
views both as lived experiences to whose embodied expressions we
respond.
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suffering” (ED, 81).159 Suffering  does  not  isolate  the  self  from  the
other  in  the  sense  that  they  were  not  previously  separate,  but
reveals, in its extremity, the impossibility of having first-person
access to the other’s experiences.
 The isolation in suffering in the second sense means, rather,
that one is alienated from oneself in one’s own suffering. When
Beauvoir describes her sorrow in A Very Easy Death she manifests a
split internal to the experience of suffering: “This time my despair
escaped from my control; someone other than myself was weeping
in me” (ED, 31).160 Beauvoir returns to this experience of being
“outside  of  oneself”  in  “Mon  expérience”,  suggesting  that
suffering, because of this split, means to  suffer  in  a  double  sense:
one  suffers  the  pain  that  one  feels,  and  the  isolation  in  that  pain
(EE, 443, 456, italics mine).
When Beauvoir formulates her feelings about suffering in A
Very Easy Death, she does this in descriptions of bodily expressions.
In her mother’s lip, “with its faint downy shadow”, she reads
“greediness refused, an almost servile humility, hope, distress,
loneliness––the  loneliness  of  her  death  and  her  life––that did not
want to admit its existence” (ED, 28, 31).161 Involuntarily, her body
takes  over  her  mother’s  expressions,  as  Sartre,  in  the  narrative,
makes Beauvoir aware of:
[. . .] he told me that my own mouth was not obeying me anymore: I
had  put  Maman’s  mouth  on  my  own  face  and  in  spite  of  myself,  I
copied its movements. Her whole person, her whole being, was
concentrated there, and compassion wrung my heart. (ED, 31)162
Beauvoir’s descriptions of how her face takes over the expressions
of  her  mother’s  face  illustrate  how  the  body  expresses  a  gestural
159 “Je la touchais, je lui parlais, mais impossible d’entrer dans sa
souffrance” (MD, 115).
160 “Cette fois, mon désespoir échappait à mon contrôle : quelqu’un
d’autre que moi pleurait en moi” (MD, 43).
161 “une gloutonnerie refusée, une humilité presque servile, de l’espoir, de
la détresse, une solitude –– celle de sa mort, celle de sa vie –– qui  ne
voulait pas s’avouer” (MD, 44).
162 “Et  ma  propre  bouche,  m’a-t-il  dit,  ne  m’obéissait  plus  :  j’avais  posé
celle de maman sur mon visage et j’en imitais malgré moi les mimiques.
Toute sa personne, toute son existence s’y matérialisaient et la compassion
me déchirait” (MD, 44).
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meaning before––or in spite of––the conceptual meaning provided
by  words.  Her  example  also  shows  that  one  is  dependent  on
others’ recognition of this gestural meaning in order to identify
and gain “conceptual” access to what one feels.
 The second implication of the example helps with the
interpretation of the autobiographical statement that I quoted
earlier  in  this  study.  As  Beauvoir  adds  to  her  affirmation  of  the
transcendental ego in Prime of Life,  “[.  .  .]  the  ego  [moi]  is  only  a
probable object, and anyone saying ‘I’knows it only in profiles;
another can have a clearer and more correct picture”(PL, 444; FA,
419). That the other can sometimes recognise my feelings before I
can, does not mean that there is not also something that will
always escape the other. Given Beauvoir’s descriptions of and
reflections  on  the  experience  of  pain  and  suffering,  the  ‘I’  cannot
experience  others’  feelings  in  the  way  they  do,  or  from  their
subjective perspective, and they cannot experience what ‘I’ go
through from my first person perspective. The experiences we
have  of  each  other  are  “shared”,  however,  in  the  sense  that  they
can only be grasped in perception.
 Beauvoir’s notion of the inexpressivity of experience appears
even more clearly if contrasted with Bergson’s notion of intuition
[l’intuition]. As a mode of knowledge of the unique and
inexpressible, intuition is to be distinguished from analysis, which
for Bergson is knowledge in a relative and therefore more objective
sense:
If there exists a means of possessing a reality absolutely, instead of
knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of adopting
points of view toward it, of having the intuition of it instead of making
the analysis of it, in short, of grasping it over and above all expression,
translation or symbolical representation, metaphysics is that very
means. Metaphysics is therefore the science, which claims to dispense with
symbols (Bergson 1975, 162 [1903, 206], italics in original).
Whereas in analysis or relative knowledge one perceives the object
from  without,  and  always  in  perspectives,  according  to  Bergson,
intuition or absolute knowledge is understood as a coincidence
with the object itself; a “feeling oneself one” with it, and dependent
on imagination rather than perception (Bergson 1975, 159 [1903,
202-203]). What is crucial here for my comparison with Beauvoir’s
descriptions of pain and suffering, is Bergson’s claim that whereas
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the knowledge gained in analysis is mediated through expression,
the knowledge gained in intuition is inexpressible: as relative,
analysis provides general knowledge of an object, or gives me
“what it has in common with others”, as opposed to what properly
belongs  to  the  object  itself,  its  uniqueness  (cf.  Bergson  1975,  160
[202-204]). This is internal by definition and can neither be
perceived, nor expressed.163
 Beauvoir’s  discussion  of  the  gap  between  experience  and
language, and her conviction of the inexpressibility of certain
experience, echoes Bergson’s notion of the opposition between
symbolic  and  verbal  expression,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
inexpressibility of what is absolutely unique in intuitive
experience, on the other hand. Her phenomenological under-
standing of how intersubjective comprehension is necessarily
mediated by perceptual (expressive) experience, however,
basically  contrasts  with  Bergson’s  concept  of  intuition.  It  is  not
only that  language and expressivity  are  on the side of  perceptual
experience in the phenomenological framework, and that human
communication, as we have seen, would be impossible without the
gestural meaning of words. In the phenomenological theory of
cognition, perceptual experience is also one mode of intuitive or
immediate knowing, and even considered the model for all other
modes of intuitive knowledge.164 This  mode  of  understanding
experience and verbal expression is also the basis for Beauvoir’s
conception of the metaphysical novel.
163 According to Deleuze (1988 [1966]), Bergsonian intuition cannot be
reduced to ordinary intuition, understood as immediate knowledge
[connaissance], but is a method that establishes “philosophy as an
absolutely ‘precise’ discipline in its field”, or as a discipline capable of
being prolonged and transmitted like science (Deleuze 1988, 13-14 [1-2],
italics in original). As founded on feeling and imagination, intuition in the
Bergsonian sense is also to be distinguished from Cartesian intuition, since
the knowledge we gain from the senses and from the judgements of the
imagination cannot be certain, according to Descartes.
164 This contrasts with Bergson’s conception of perception, according to
which a perception is not a conscious or subjective experience, but a
(dynamic) material reception and transmission of a present excitement by
the brain (Bernet 2005, 71). In order to become conscious, such corporeal
perception needs to be synthesised with memory, or with a consciousness
of  the  past.  For  a  detailed  study  of  Bergsonian  perception,  see,  for
instance, Mullarkey 1999.
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4.3 Metaphysical experience and the metaphysical novel
We have seen in the preceding chapters of this study that Beauvoir
understands experience in line with the phenomenological
articulation of subjectivity as intentional, temporal and expressive,
and as accessible for philosophical reflection through a shift of
attitude,  described  by  the  phenomenologists  as  the  method  of
phenomenological or transcendental reduction. In this shift of
attitude, the philosopher turns his or her reflective attention from
factual experience to transcendental experience, regardless of
whether or not these experiences are affective, perceptual,
theoretical  or  practical,  and  regardless  of  whether  they  have
actually been lived through, or remain possibilities. But how does
this understanding of experience combine with Beauvoir’s use of
the term metaphysics? Her early essay on literature and
philosophy is helpful in this respect.
 First  of  all,  this  essay  makes  clear  that  Beauvoir’s  notion  of
metaphysics differs fundamentally from Aristotle’s definition of
philosophy as the first science in Metaphysics, since in his
understanding science is concerned with the a-temporal essence or
nature of that which is, or with being as such.165 Beauvoir points to
the absurdity of imagining an Aristotelian novel––or a Spinozan or
Leibnizian novel––since, as she writes, “neither subjectivity nor
temporality has a real place in these metaphysics” (LME, 274).166
 Regardless of the Cartesian roots of Beauvoir’s thought,
moreover, it is doubtful weather metaphysics could be a science in
Descartes’ sense, that is, a science that is intuitive and deductive in
the sense of “seeing” evident truths and their necessary
relationships intellectually. The notion of metaphysics that
Beauvoir has in mind is not comparable in method to axiomatic-
deductive sciences either, where one proceeds by abstract proofs
and demonstrations from a general truth to particular instances of
this  truth.  As  Beauvoir  writes,  one  does  not  “do”  metaphysics  as
one does mathematics or physics. Metaphysics in Beauvoir’s sense
165 Cf. Aristotle’s definition of first philosophy as “a science which studies
Being qua Being  and  the  attributes  that  belong  to  it  in  virtue  of  its  own
nature” (Ross, 1928, Metaphysica, 1003a).
166 “ni  la  subjectivité  ni  la  temporalité  n’ont  de  place  réelle  dans  ces
métaphysiques” (LM, 1159).
146
is more a matter of existential realisation than of intellectual––
scientific or philosophical––methodology:
In reality, “to do” metaphysics is “to be” metaphysical; it is to realize
in oneself the metaphysical attitude, which consists in positing oneself
in one’s totality before the totality of the world (LME, 273).167
As the realisation of an attitude, metaphysics must be
distinguished  not  only  from  the  exact  sciences,  but  also  from  the
empirical sciences. Every human event has a metaphysical signify-
cation beyond its psychological and social meaning, according to
Beauvoir, because each event concerns this total taking or positing
of  oneself  as  deeply  related  to  the  world  (LME,  273;  LM,  1158-
1159). This signification is more personal than any psychological
description  would  be,  since  it  concerns  what  is  unique  for  each
individual  or  for  his  or  her  life.  Even  if  one  realises  one’s
metaphysical situation through experiences that could be
explained psychologically, that is, through “joys, sorrows,
resignations, revolts, fears, and hopes”, a psychological description
cannot account for the total meaning of this situation (cf. LME, 273;
LM, 1159). Whereas a psychological investigation of emotions or
feelings studies particular feelings in objective isolation from one
another, and in causal or motivational association with other
physical or mental data, and generalises from these cases, a
“metaphysical description” would reveal how a particular feeling–
–like the feeling of pain or suffering––colours and gives meaning
to the entire being and situation of a singular individual.
 As an attitude that one realises in oneself,  Beauvoir’s notion of
metaphysics is close to Merleau-Ponty’s description of a “meta-
physics in action” [métaphysique en acte] as distinguished from “a
system of principles employed by reason” in the constitution of
science and morality (SNS, 83 [165-166]). Described also in terms of
a  “radical  subjectivity”  that  one  forgets  in  one’s  natural  or
everyday life, and a type of knowledge where one’s experiences
are inseparable from their meaning, this metaphysics is considered
as tacitly present in the human sciences, as well as in literature and
poetry (SNS, 83, 92-93 [165, 185-187]). What Merleau-Ponty calls
167 “En réalité, “faire” de la métaphysique c’est être métaphysique, c’est
réaliser  en  soi  l’attitude  métaphysique  qui  consciste  à  se  poser  dans  sa
totalité en face de la totalité du monde” (LM, 1158).
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metaphysical consciousness indeed seems close to what Beauvoir
describes as the metaphysical attitude, since it means neither to
experience the world, other people and history naturally, nor to
take an objective attitude towards them, but to rediscover “the
miracle of their appearing” in subjective experience (SNS, 94
[189])..
 Following Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, we can conclude that
metaphysics and metaphysical experience, in fact, means nothing
else  than  experience  and  description  according  to  the  shift  of
attitude made possible by the phenomenological epoché. The
originality of Beauvoir’s contribution to the phenomenological
method, therefore, is not to be found in her concept of experience.
Rather, and as I will show in what follows, Beauvoir’s originality
when it comes to method is to be found in what I have called her
‘poetics’, that is, in her philosophical and technical descriptions of
how a literary work can reveal subjectivity by expressing what is
universal in experience from the point of view of a singular,
unique historical situation or perspective. In order to show this, we
need once again to turn back to Beauvoir’s critique of systemising
philosophy.
 The identification of abstract modes of expression with
philosophical systems, which I discussed in the beginning of this
chapter, reappears in Beauvoir’s distinction between two modes of
philosophical description: for the philosopher who wishes to
express existence, Beauvoir argues, it is not a matter of describing
[décrire] existence abstractly, or of systemising it in its essential
character, but rather of indirect expressing and manifestation.
Beauvoir distinguishes the “system building philosopher” from
the existential writer, and claims that the latter is first of all
concerned with making manifest the subjective, singular, dramatic
and  ambiguous  character  of  existence,  or  of  describing  what  she
calls the metaphysical experience in its singular and temporal form
(LME, 273-275; LM, 1158-1162). The motif of making subjectivity
manifest  is  also  central  to  Beauvoir’s  understanding  of  the
metaphysical  novel:  if  the  description  of  essence  is  a  matter  for
philosophy properly speaking, the novel evokes the genesis of
subjectivity as the “original up springing [jaillissement] of existence
in its complete, singular, and temporal truth” (LME, 274).168
168 “seul le roman permettra d’évoquer dans sa vérité complète, singulière,
temporelle, le jaillissement originel de l’existence” (LM, 1161).
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 Beauvoir shares the general French existentialist ideal of
‘committed literature’, that is a literature that engages itself in the
political debates of its time, and which demands the writer’s total
presence in what he or she has written. As Beauvoir explicitly says,
existentialism wants to be more than a theoretical enterprise; it
wants to be a living attitude to the contemporary political
situation, in which “the individual is seeking with anguish to find
his place in a world turned upside down” (Beauvoir 2004 [1947],
325).169 Her own commitment as a writer, however, consists neither
in documenting historical events nor in creating fiction that takes
sides  or  teaches  the reader  how to act  in  specific  situations.  What
fundamentally motivates her to write novels, rather than system-
atic philosophy, is a the wish to evoke existence by communicating
what  is  unique  in  her  own  experience  in  relation  to  its  universal
structures,  such  as  intersubjectivity  or  temporality  (PL,  266;  FA,
254-255). In the creation of an intrigue, therefore, Beauvoir begins
from a concrete psychological experience. Her task as a writer, as
she describes it in “Mon expérience”, is then to find a form for her
singularly lived experience, so that each single reader can
recognise herself in the literary work, and thus communicate
subjectively with the subjectivity of the writer (cf. EE, 441).170
169 Though Beauvoir does not make the connection herself, the striving to
reach outside the more narrow academic circles can also be viewed as the
embrace  of  a  gesture  internal  to  the  French  tradition  of  modern  philo-
sophy: when Descartes wrote the Discourse on Method [Discourse de la
méthod, 1637] in French and not in Latin, he broke philosophically and
literally with the scholastic tradition. Cf. the beginning of this work, where
the author claims that reason is equal in all human beings (Descartes 1985,
111 [AT VI, 2]). For an interesting and thorough study that relates
Descartes’ conception of reason to questions of sexual equality and
difference, see Martina Reuter 2000.
170 Cf.  the following autobiographical remark on the motivation to write:
“What I  wanted was to penetrate so deeply into other people’s lives that
when they heard my voice they would get the impression they were
talking to themselves. If my words multiplied through millions of human
hearts, it seemed to me that my existence, though reshaped and
transfigrured, would still, in a manner of speaking, survive” (PL, 680).
This motivation connects to Sartre’s (1974 [1966]) discussion of the
singular universal with reference to the life and work of Kierkegaard. The
“scandal and paradox” of Kierkegaard as a thinker, according to Sartre, is
his transhistoricity: the transcendental fact that a singular historical being
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 Whereas the central philosophical problem of She Came to Stay,
for instance, is the existence of other consciousnesses or subjects,
for whom the ‘I’ appear as an object, Beauvoir’s actual motivation
to  write  the  novel  came  from  an  unfortunate  and  difficult
emotional event: her personal experience of the so-called trio (EE,
440-441; cf. PL, 305-312, 381, 440). The novel, then, becomes a
means to express the universal aspects of this experience through
its singular nuances, ambiguities and contradictions. In this sense,
a literary work––the novel as well as the autobiography––is  a
mediator between the uniqueness of one’s singular existence and
the shared, universal structures of human existence (EE, 446).
 This  is  the  core  meaning  of  the  concept  of  the  singular
universal,  which  Beauvoir  illustrates  with  reference  to  her  own
experience of writing in “Mon expérience”, and elaborates in a
discussion  of  the  indirect  communication  of  a  literary  work  (EE,
439, 447). Whereas Beauvoir’s focus in the early essay on
metaphysical literature is on the novel, her later essay compares
the novel to the autobiography. I will discuss this comparison first,
and then return to her early description of the novel.
 The main similarity between the autobiography and the novel,
according  to  Beauvoir,  consists  in  that  they  are  expressions  of
subjectivity, rather than objectivity, in the Kierkegaardian sense. In
her interpretation and development of Kierkegaard’s under-
standing of the subjective thinker’s mode of communication,
Beauvoir argues that the writer does not express the lived meaning
[le sens vécu] of subjectivity under the form of knowledge [savoir] or
objectivity, where the singular experience of the universal is
conceptualised, but under the form of the intimate and singularly
lived experiences themselves. The universal, more precisely, is
expressed indirectly and by means of what Beauvoir views as the
contingent details of life, or the “nonsense” [non-sens]  in  and  by
which the “sense” of existence can appear (EE, 441). The fact that
both autobiography and the novel communicate through non-
can continue to communicate, through his works, with succeeding
generations in the mode of an “absolute subject” (Sartre 1974, 152 [306]).
What Sartre calls the singular universal is described in different ways: it is
chance that, in living, has assumed the form of necessity, or the “non-
significance accidents of being” as transcended toward a significance they
did not first have, or again, man as the singular being “through which the
universal comes into the world” (Sartre, 1974, 158 [312-313]).
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knowledge [non-savoir]  or  the  subjective,  rather  than  through
knowledge or the objective, makes them “the privileged place of
intersubjectivity”, as distinguished from scientific objectivity. As
singular universals, the novel as well as the autobiography make
possible communication between subjectivities through time (EE,
456).
 In this sense the work of the writer is comparable to that of the
painter, in a description given by Merleau-Ponty: “[t]he painter
recaptures and converts into visible objects what would, without
him, remain walled up in the separate life of each consciousness:
the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things” (SNS,
17-18 [33]). The work of the writer is not comparable to that of the
painter, however, if one––with Sartre (2001 [1948])––distinguishes
fundamentally between prose and poetry. Whereas the writer of
prose “speaks” [parler], in Sartre’s view, and in doing so utilises
language in order to express meaning, the painter, the musician
and  the  poet  are  all  “mute”,  which  does  not  mean  that  they  are
silent,  but  that  colours,  tones  and  the  poetical  meaning  of  words
refer to nothing outside themselves. At most, they “mirror” the
world (Sartre 2001, 4-7 [15-20]). As I said in the beginning of this
chapter, Beauvoir does not explicitely consider the difference
between prose and poetry. Her stress on the literary value of non-
significant details for communicating singularity, however,
suggests  that  there  is,  for  her,  something like  a  poetic  or  gestural
meaning in her understanding of literature: the novel does not say
directly [dire], but rather presents indirectly the contradictions,
difficulties and ambiguities of objects that do not speak [parler] (EE,
444, 447).
 One of the main differences between the novel and the auto-
biography concerns the role of details in them. This difference is
the consequence of a more fundamental difference between the
modes of recreating lived experience in the novel as compared to
the autobiography. Beauvoir generally understands autobio-
graphical  writing  as  the  activity  of  recreating  past  events  in  the
form of memory, or of “reanimating” the vague images of the past
(EE, 452). The contingent, non-significant and abundant details of
lived experience are of particular importance in the recreation of
the past,  according to  Beauvoir,  since  its  primary aim is  to  reveal
the facticity of human existence (EE, 454). Factual details have a
function in the novel too, but as the aim is not to recreate the past
in its facticity, but to imitate the real, perceptual world more freely
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in the imagination, only the details that are crucial to the imagi-
nary creation are reintroduced in the novel (EE, 443).
 The real, as distinguished from the imaginary, always appears
to a singular individual in Beauvoir’s view, that is, in perspective
and as temporally given. Beauvoir does not provide any technical
phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experience when she
compares the novel and the autobiography as two modes of
recreating the real. As is clear from her ethical essays and from her
review, however, she basically assumes the phenomenological
understanding of the perspectival givenness of reality, even when
this givenness concerns conflicting or contradictory points of view.
One central aim of literature, according to her, is precisely to make
visible the equivocal and separate truths that no single moment is
able represents in their totality (FCIE, 263; FCI, 358).
 The advantage of the novel in this respect, as compared to the
autobiography, is that it can exhibit two or several opposite points
of view or perspectives (EE, 444, 456). Along with her own real life
experiences,  Beauvoir  illustrates,  she  also  knows  of  the  lives  of
others:
[T]hrough knowledge [connaissence], sympathy, common action,
imagination, I participate in a numerous lives that are not mine, and
there are numerous things that are part of my experience without
constituting my life itself (EE, 445, translation mine).171
By expressing the viewpoints of several different characters, the
novel makes it possible to speak about all that surrounds a
singular life, but which is not that life itself (EE, 445). Again, the
novel does not express the different viewpoints directly, but
organises a collection of difficulties, ambiguities and contradictions
that  constitute  the  lived  meaning  of  co-existence  (EE,  444).  This
idea is discussed at length in the autobiography, where Beauvoir
argues  that  existence  “cannot  be  reduced  to  ideas,  it  cannot  be
171 “par la connaissance, la sympathie, l’action commune, l’imagination, je
participe à une quantité de vies qui ne sont pas la mienne et il y a un très
grand nombre de choses qui appartiennent à mon expérience, sans
constituer ma vie même” (EE, 445).
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stated in words: it can only be evoked through the medium of an
imaginary object” (FCIIE, 41, cf. FCIE, 263; FCI, 358).172
 Any thesis or doctrine that the writer attempts to explicate in a
work of fiction would immediately destroy the work’s effect,
according to Beauvoir, since it would make the work appear as an
artefact  and a  means,  rather  than an end in itself. The real world
and the imaginary world of the novel thus exclude one another, as
becomes clear when Beauvoir’s compares the effect of a novel to
that of a dream in “Literature and metaphysics”:
Just  as  a  dream  breaks  into  pieces  if  the  dreamer  has  the  slightest
perception  that  it  is  a  dream,  the  belief  in  the  imaginary  vanishes  as
soon as one considers confronting it with reality; one cannot posit the
existence of the novelist without denying that of his protagonists
(LME, 270-271).173
The  strength  of  the  metaphysical  novel,  from  this  perspective,  is
that it expresses reality in its totality, that is, as at once “a concrete,
temporal world, peopled with singular characters and events”, and
as timeless and unlimited (LME, 269; 1153). It  is  because  the
metaphysical novel is neither what Beauvoir calls “pure literature”
nor “pure philosophy”, but a living unity and ambiguity, that it
can express existence in its totality.
 Beauvoir recognises the interdependence between literary
forms of expression and philosophical meaning already in the
dialogues of Plato:
[A]s long as Plato asserts the supreme reality of the Forms, which this
world  only  mirrors  in  a  deceptive,  debased  way,  he  has  no  use  for
poets; he banishes them from his republic. But, when he describes the
dialectical movement that carries man toward the Forms, when he
integrates man and the sensible world into reality, then Plato feels the
need to make himself a poet.  He situates his dialogues that show the
172 “ne se réduit pas en idées, elle ne se laisse pas énoncer : on ne peut que
l’évoquer à travers un objet imaginaire” (FCII, 62).
173 “de  même  que  le  rêve  éclate  en  morceau  si  la  moindre  perception  se
révèle comme telle au dormeur, de même la croyance imaginaire
s’évanouit dès qu’on songe à la confronter avec la réalité : on ne peut pas
poser l’existence du romancier sans nier celle de ses héros” (LM, 1155).
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path to an intelligible heaven amidst blooming fields, around a table,
at a deathbed, that is, on earth (LME, 274).174
 In addition, she explicitly refers to Kierkegaard as one con-
temporary representative of metaphysical literature. The examples
of  the  metaphysical  novel  that  Beauvoir  discusses  in  most  detail,
however, are all by early 20th century writers. In Prime of Life, she
mentions two writers in particular, in whose works she finds the
subjective and the objective aspects of existence reconciled: Ernest
Hemingway and William Faulkner.175 The most obvious influence
on her writing, Beauvoir notes, is Hemingway’s (PL, 415; FA, 392).
In his writing, Hemingway rejected pretended objective or realist
descriptions, Beauvoir explains, in preference for subjective
descriptions of “landscapes, interiors, or artefacts” through the
eyes of the central character and in the limiting perspective of the
action at stake (PL, 415; FA, 392). The details of daily life––meals,
wines, walks and conversations––take on meaning, and
temporality, for instance, is revealed through the enduring quality
of things (PL, 165-166). Instead of described things ‘just as they
were’, as in the old realism, or being too subjectivist––like Joyce or
Proust, in Beauvoir’s view––in Hemingway’s works the world was
“opaque and externalized, but always examined through the eyes
of one particular individual [sujet singulier]”,  so  that  the  author
never  gave  more  than  could  be  grasped  by  the  present  character
(PL, 165). Beauvoir finds the latter approach even more advanced
174 “Ainsi, en tant qu’il affirme la réalité suprême de l’Idée dont ce monde
n’est qu’une dégradation trompeuse, Platon n’a que faire des poètes, il les
bannit  de  sa  République  ;  mais  en  tant  que,  décrivant  le  mouvement
dialectique qui porte l’homme vers l’Idée, il intègre à la réalité l’homme et
le monde sensible, Platon éprouve le besoin de se faire lui-même poète, il
situe dans les prairies en fleurs, autour d’une table, au chevet d’un
mourant, sur terre, les entretiens qui montrent le chemin du ciel
intelligible” (LM, 1160).
175 With  some exceptions,  Beauvoir  does  not  discuss  the  style  of  women
writers  in  any  detail,  but  quotes  women  authors  extensively  in  her
investigation of femininity in The Second Sex. She explicitely appreciates
Emily Brontë for having questioned ‘death’ in her novels, Virginia Woolf
for having investigated ‘life’, and Katherine Mansfield for having
portrayed everyday contingence and suffering (SS, 720). Similar to Woolf,
who discusses women and literature in A Room of One’s Own, Beauvoir
also discusses the situation of women writers (cf. Beauvoir 1984 [1979]).
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in Faulkner, who in addition to “deploying and harmonizing
multiple viewpoints [une pluralité de points de vue]” got inside each
individual mind and put forward its knowledge and ignorance, its
insincerity, its fantasies, its words and silences (PL, 221).
 These two examples illustrate Beauvoir’s basic claim about the
metaphysical novel in “Literature and metaphysics”: in com-
parison with the philosopher and the essayist, who give the reader
“an intellectual reconstruction [reconstruction] of their experience”,
the novelist, “claims to reconstitute [restituer] on an imaginary
plane this experience itself as it appears prior to any elucidation”
(LME, 270; LM, 1155-1156). Rather than compelling us to the ideas
that the thing and the event might suggest, the novelist creates “a
story that imitates [imite] life’s opacity, ambiguity, and im-
partiality”. If the imitation is successful, the reader reacts as if
faced  with  lived  events,  responding  with  “a  movement  of  his
entire being” [mouvement de tout son être] before formulating
judgments. Literature, therefore, concerns possible experience,
rather  than actual  experience:  the  wish to  be “taken in” [être pris]
by  a  novel,  according  to  Beauvoir,  is  a  wish  “to  surpass  on  the
imaginary level the always too narrow limits of actual lived
experience” (LME, 271).176 This expectation demands that the novel
constitutes  a  living  discovery  for  the  author  as  well  as  for  the
reader.  From this  perspective,  the  novel  is  not  a  manufactured or
even  fabricated  object,  but  appears  as  an  “authentic  adventure  of
the mind [authentique adventure sprituelle] (LME, 272; LM, 1157). As
the  story  unfolds,  the  novelist  “sees  truths  appear  that  were
previously unknown to him, questions whose solutions he does
not possess” (LME, 272).177
 In this context, Beauvoir establishes an analogy between the
experimental scientist and the metaphysical writer: similar to the
way in which a scientific hypothesis needs to be verified by facts,
the  sketches  of  the  writer  need  to  be  confronted  with  their
realisation in writing and reading. According to the analogy, the
result of the literary experiment is not primarily the literary object
itself, the physical thing or the cultural product, but the imaginary
176 “on espère, nous l’avons vu, dépasser sur le plan imaginaire les limites
toujours trop étroites de l’expérience réellement vécue” (LM, 1156).
177 “Ainsi,  au  fur  et  à  mesure  que  l’histoire  se  déroule,  voit-il  apparaître
des vérités dont il ne connaissait pas d’avance le visage, des questions
dont il ne possède pas la solution” (LM, 1157).
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and intersubjective event or experience that the work makes
possible, and that must be lived: a successful novel, in Beauvoir’s
view, makes the reader undergo imaginary experiences that are
“as complete and disturbing” as real experiences. Beauvoir
elaborates on the results and the confrontation with the real, which
the metaphysical writer shares with the experimental scientist, and
in doing so introduces the idea of the unexpected:178
Just as a scientific truth finds its worth in the totality of the
experiments that found it and are summed up by it, so the work of art
comprises the singular experiment of which it is the fruit. The scientific
experiment is the confrontation of the fact, that is, of the hypothesis
considered as verified, with the new idea. In an analogous manner, the
author must constantly confront his sketches with their realization,
which  is  outlined  by  them  and  immediately  reacts  upon  them.  If  he
wants the reader to believe in the inventions he proposes, the novelist
must  first  believe  strongly  enough  in  them  himself  to  discover  a
meaning in them which will flow back into the original idea, a
meaning that will suggest problems, new twists, and unforeseen
developments (LME, 272).179
This ‘authentic imitation’ is distinguished from a kind of
‘inauthentic imitation’ (cf. LME, 272; LM, 1157). Whereas the latter
is characterised by observation, the characteristic of the former is
communication. The metaphysical novel is not supposed to merely
imitate  the  living  process  of  creation  from  the  outside  [du dehors
178 There are thus affinities between Beauvoir’s poetics of subjectivity and
the phenomenology of the event, as articulated by, e.g., Françoise Dastur
(2000). For an original Foucauldian analysis of the tension between
unpredictability and lived experience within feminist philosophy of the
body, see Johanna Oksala (2004).
179 “De même qu’une vérité scientifique trouve son prix dans l’ensemble
des expériences qui la fondent et qu’elle résume, de même l’oeuvre d’art
enveloppe l’expérience singulière dont elle est le fruit. L’expérience
scientifique est la confrontation du fait c’est-à-dire de l’hypothèse
considérée comme vérifiée avec l’idée neuve. D’une manière analogue
l’augeur doit sans cesse confronter ses desseins avec la réalisation qu’il en
ébauche  et  qui  aussitôt  réagit  sur  eux  ;  s’il  veut  que  le  romancier  y  croie
d’abord assez fortement pour découvrir en elles un sens qui rejaillira sur
l’idée primitive, qui suggérera des problèmes, des rebondissements, des
développements imprévus” (LM, 1156-1157).
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cette démarche vivante],  Beauvoir  writes,  by  leading  the  future
reader  on  an  insincere  quest  that  the  writer  had  conducted  for
himself, but should strive to establish a genuine communication
(LME, 272; LM, 1158).
 Existential authenticity is also the criteria by which Beauvoir
compares the novel to the philosophical system. The philosophical
or metaphysical novel is renounced to the extent that philosophy is
defined  as  a  fully  constituted  system,  according  to  her.  The
“adventure of the mind” [l’aventure spirituelle]  is  indeed lived out
in the course of the building of the system, and the novel that
proposes to illustrate it will therefore end up “exploiting its frozen
riches, without risk and without real invention” (LME, 272).180 In
this sense, Beauvoir seems to defend the value and integrity of so-
called conceptual philosophy as well as that of existential
literature: it is impossible to introduce theories into fiction without
harming the free development of the novel, she argues, but also
that it is equally impossible for the novel to serve ideas that have
already found their proper conceptual expression. This could only
diminish  and  impoverish  them,  for  an  idea  is  also  free  “in  the
complexity and multiplicity of its applications” [sa complexité et la
multiplicité de ses applications], and will exceed the singular
examples in which it was confined (LME, 272; LM, 1158).
 The final chapter will contextualise Beauvoir’s statement about
the integrity of the literary and the conceptual description in a
study of  one of  Beauvoir’s own metaphysical  novels, She Came to
Stay, in comparison with her systematic investigation of sexual
difference in The Second Sex. Instead of arguing that the novel
illustrates Beauvoir’s conceptual claims about sexual difference, or
that The Second Sex says directly what She Came to Stay expresses
indirectly, I will show that while Beauvoir’s original insights about
the temporally changing meaning of femininity are present in an
operative sense, and therefore anticipated, in She Came to Stay, the
literary description is an irreducible mode of expression that
cannot be reformulated in any abstract or schematic way. This
thematic-operative relation internal to Beauvoir’s thought
resembles, and therefore further illuminates, the relation between
conceptualised and lived experience.
180 “ne  fera  qu’en  exploiter  sans  risque  et  sans  véritable  invention  les
richesses figées” (LM, 1157).
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5. Becoming subjective
The title of this chapter appears to entail a paradox: if subjectivity,
as we have seen so far, means becoming, how can one then become
subjective?  How can one become what  one already is?  Keeping in
mind the phenomenological understanding of subjectivity
discussed earlier downplays this seeming paradox, since
subjectivity in this view is not static or stable, but a passive and
active becoming. More specifically, whereas subjectivity on the
level of the functioning intentionality or transcendence is a
sensuous, affective, driven––and in this sense passive––becoming,
subjectivity on the level of act intentionality is a conscious, and in
this sense active, becoming in which a personal self constitutes
itself in relation to the world and other selves. In The Second Sex,
Beauvoir develops this idea by studying how subjective becoming
as a singularly lived but yet intersubjective reality is necessarily
sexed, and how woman’s becoming entails its specific paradox of
subjectivity as compared to man’s becoming. This development of
the meaning of ‘becoming subjective’ is the topic of the present
chapter.
 Beauvoir’s central argument about sexual difference in The
Second Sex proceeds in two steps. First, she claims that human
existence is divided into two different modes of experiencing and
relating to the world: the feminine and the masculine (SS, 14-15, 65,
740; DSI, 15, 72-73; DSII, 661; cf. Heinämaa 2003a, 84-85). In
addition, she argues that the feminine mode of experiencing the
world entails its own paradox of subjectivity. Like any human
individual, the feminine individual has to realise existence. In this
sense, she is to be understood as becoming rather than being.
However, in fundamental conflict with this ontological condition,
outlined in detail in Pyrrhus and Cineas and Ethics, women find
themselves conditioned primarily as determined being rather than
free becoming: as immanence more than transcendence, as the
inessential in relation to the essential and as objects in relation to a
superior subjectivity: man (cf. SS, 16, 17, 29; DSI, 16, 17, 34).
 This specific paradox of the feminine condition affects women’s
lived subjectivity, which as a result becomes divided between
objectivity and subjectivity. Objectivity here means the cultural
and historical reality that is at once constituted by individual
women and men, and transcends these individual lives. Beauvoir’s
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study shows that reality is predominantly androcentric, and
therefore women’s modes of existence, as well as their
opportunities to justify their existence, are more complex and
challenging than are men’s (SS, 608-609; DSII, 484). Women’s
individual  becoming,  in  other  words,  has  to  take  place  in  a
situation that differs from men’s, who are not torn in the same way
between the values and demands of the common (androcentric)
world and their personal, lived experiences. Women therefore, in a
different mode than men, have to become subjective, or become what
they ontologically “are”: beings of change and self-transcendence
that, like men, have to realise the paradoxical human condition––
the condition of being at once immanence and transcendence,
necessity and possibility, determination and freedom––in their
concrete singular lives.181
 The influence of The Second Sex on feminist politics and gender
theory  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  Many  scholars  today
acknowledge that Beauvoir’s study of the phenomenological and
existential meaning of sexual difference is her main philosophical
contribution. The detailed descriptions of feminine lived
experience in The Second Sex shows that in so far as one agrees that
perceptual experience and the body is fundamental for human
existence, a serious consideration of subjective and intersubjective
becoming must take into account the possible constitutive meaning
of sexuality and sexual difference for this becoming.182
181 The idea that femininity and masculinity should be understood in their
becoming, rather than in their being, permeats the whole of The Second Sex.
For instance, when discussing the meaning of physiological functions in
the  human  sexes  as  compared  to  other  living  beings,  Beauvoir  writes:
“animal species are fixed and it is possible to define them in static terms . .
.  .  whereas  the  human  species  is  for  ever  in  a  state  of  change,  for  ever
becoming” [les animaux constituent des espèces donnés don’t i lest
possible de fournir des descriptions statiques . . . tandis que l’humanité est
sans cesse en devenir]. (SS, 65; DSI, 73)
182 Beauvoir is not the only phenomenologist among her contemporaries to
consider the meaning of sexuality and sexual difference for subjectivity
and intersubjectivity. As she notes in a critical footnote in The Second Sex
on Levinas’ masculinist viewpoint, femininity is substantially crucial for
Levinas’ notion of radical alterity or otherness (SS, 16; for a discussion of
the philosophical implications of Beauvoir’s twofold criticism of Levinas,
see Sandford 2000, 59-63; cf. Heinämaa 2003a, 88-91). In Phenomenology of
Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes how the lived body is constituted in
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 But what is this difference and how, more precisely, does it add
to our understanding of what it means to become subjective? I will
answer this question by studying two concrete descriptions of
subjective becoming, as compared to the more abstract notions of
subjectivity that I have outlined in the previous chapters. These are
Beauvoir’s systematic, schematic description of feminine becoming
in The Second Sex and  her  literary  description  of  Françoise’s
becoming in the novel She Came to Stay.183
 Beauvoir did not consider She Came to Stay a novel about sexual
difference. As she repeatedly says, what she aimed to describe in
this  story  was  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  other  conscious-
nesses. The concrete experience of ‘the other’ in this novel,
however, is depicted through the intimate, erotic and conflictual
relations  between  Françoise,  Pierre  and  Xavière,  and  through  the
existential  transformations  of  its  main  character,  Françoise.  In
other  words,  the  self  and  the  other,  as  well  as  the  problem  of
subjective becoming, are sexed in Beauvoir’s literary writing before
the question of sexual difference is posed in The Second Sex. In
addition, and as I aim to show in this chapter, there are substantial
philosophical connections between Beauvoir’s descriptions of
becoming in She Came to Stay and in The Second Sex: the concept of
‘the  woman  in  love’  (l’amoureuse), explicated in The Second Sex, is
anticipated or operative already in the description of Françoise’s
attitude towards Pierre.
 The idea of an unthought or operative level in philosophical
thinking assumed here has its background in phenomenological
love and desire and Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, analyses the concrete,
and for him necessarily conflictual, relations between the self and the
other  in  terms  of  love,  desire,  masochism  and  sadism  (see  PP,  154-173
[180-202], and BN, 471-556 [428-503]). What distinguishes Beauvoir’s
approach from the approaches of the others’ is not simply that she studies
the relations between the sexes from a woman’s point of view, but that she
explicitely problematises femininity in connection with subjectivity.
183 The  expression  ‘feminine  becoming’  calls  for  comparisons  with  Luce
Irigaray’s claim that woman has to become the woman she is by nature, on
the one hand, and with Rosi Braidotti’s feminist interpretation of Gilles
Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s concept ‘becoming-woman’, on the other
hand (cf., e.g.,  Irigaray 1996 [1992]; Braidotti 2003). Such comparisons
would, however, go beyond my questions in this chapter.
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methodology.184 More precisely, it is indebted to the explications of
the German phenomenologist Eugene Fink (2005 [1957]), and
refers  to  a  field  of  concepts  that  is  “thought  through”  [Durch-
dachte], but not really considered, thematised or explicated in itself
(Fink 2005, 245 [186]). As distinguished from “thematic concepts”,
the “operative concepts” are the so-called medium that reflective
thought uses for its thematic concerns, but that remains un-
reflected, or the necessary shadow of reflective thought. In Fink’s
view, any significant philosophy has this necessary tension
between  a  thematic  and  an  operative  level.  He  writes:  “in  the
formation of thematic concepts, creative thinkers use other
concepts and patterns of thought, they operate with intellectual
schemata which they do not fix objectively” (Fink 2005, 245 [185-
186]).  Fink  even  gives  this  idea  an  existential  meaning  when  he
says that “[t]he presence of a shadow [Verschattung] is an essential
feature of finite philosophizing” (Fink 2005, 255 [203]).185
 The thematic-operative relation integral to Beauvoir’s articula-
tion of femininity that I will describe in this chapter can only be
adequately understood by making explicit the presence of another
“shadow” in her thought, namely the role of psycho-analytical
concepts in her philosophical study of sexual difference. As is well
known, Beauvoir has an ambivalent attitude to psychoanalysis. On
the one hand, she stresses what she considers to be the
“tremendous advance” of psychoanalysis over psycho-physiology:
“no factor becomes involved in the psychic life without having
184 Cf. Bergoffen (1997), who distinguishes between the specific or explicit
philosophical identity in Beauvoir’s philosophical discourse and her
muted voice: “what might be called the un-thought of Beauvoir’s
thinking” (Bergoffen 1997, 2). This voice, which Bergoffen finds in the
margins of Beauvoir’s philosophical texts, articulates an “erotic
generosity” that challenges a traditional understanding of the subject and
intersubjectivity within phenomenological and existential philosophy.
185 Merleau-Ponty  (1964  [1960])  takes  up  the  same theme in  an  article  on
the relationship between the natural and the transcendental attitudes in
Husserl’s phenomenology. When introducing the idea of the unthought or
“shadow” of reflective thought, however, he quotes Heidegger’s The
Principle of Reason (Der Satz vom Grund, 1957): “[. . .] the greater the work
[Denkwerk]  accomplished  (and  greatness  is  in  no  way  equivalent  to  the
extent and number of writings) the richer the unthought-of [das
Ungedachte]  elements  in  that  work”,  or  the  “never  yet  thought  of  “  [das
Noch-nicht-Gedachte] (S, 160; cf. Heidegger 1991, 71 [123-124]).
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taken on human meaning” (SS, 69, translation modified).186 With
an implicit but clear reference to phenomenology, she adds that it
is  not  the  “body-object”  [corps-objet] of biological science that
exists, but the “body as lived in by the subject” [corps vécu par le
sujet] (SS, 69; DSI, 80). In other words, what is crucial for femininity
and masculinity is the lived experience, rather than objective
biological features that may not be part of this experience. On the
other hand, Beauvoir holds that Freudian psychoanalysis not only
rests on confused philosophical assumptions, but also fails to
explain how values are involved in sexuality. By implication,
psychoanalysis models the psychosexual “destiny of woman”
[destin de la femme] on that of man (SS, 70-71; DSI, 81).
 My aim here is not to evaluate Beauvoir’s critical discussion of
the metaphysical and androcentric assumptions of psychoanalysis.
This criticism notwithstanding, the general psychoanalytic
conceptualisations of subjectivity are significant in Beauvoir’s
descriptions of feminine becoming in The Second Sex.  First,  it  is
crucial to Beauvoir’s understanding of femininity here that Freud
views  sexual  and  personal  identity  as  the  result  of  a  process  of
development.187 Still more important to her notion of feminine
becoming are the consequences of the psychoanalytical idea that
‘anatomy is destiny’. In so far as this idea is echoed in the French
philosophy of existence, it is not interpreted as a “rigorous
universality” [rigoureuse universalité], Beauvoir claims, but accounts
186 “qu’aucun facteur n’intervient dans la vie psychique sans avoir revêtu
un sens humain” (DSI, 80).
187 In a public lecture on femininity from 1932, Freud declares that
psychoanalysis makes no attempt to explain what a woman is, but
attempts  to  explain  how  a  girl,  an  originally  bisexual  child  in  Freud’s
theory, becomes a  woman  through  the  losses  and  substitutions  of  love
objects (Freud 1964 [1932]). Similarly, the establishment of male person-
ality  is  a  process,  but  one  less  complex  than  in  the  case  of  women.
Psychoanalysis cannot solve the ‘enigma of femininity’, Freud also thinks,
until biology has explained the general differentiation of living organisms
into two sexes. As if in response to this, Beauvoir’s study of biology in The
Second Sex interestingly shows that there is not always a clear-cut division
of  one  species  into  two  sexes.  More  importantly,  from  her  perspective,
biology has no privileged authority when it comes to understanding
femininity,  because  woman,  like  man,  must  be  understood  from  the
perspective of existence as a total, becoming reality (cf. SS, 36-37, 65-66;
DSI, 38-39, 73-75).
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for the fact that “general types may be recognized in individual
histories” (SS, 78, translation modified).188 Beauvoir’s affirmation
of types does not mean that she accepts any form of determinism,
biological, psychological or social. On the contrary, throughout The
Second Sex she  argues  that  the  human  being  is  not  first  of  all  a
natural species, but an existential situation. Biological facts, for
instance, constitute an essential element in this situation, but they
do not establish a fixed and inevitable destiny for the sexes (SS, 65-
66, cf. 83, 91; DSI, 73-75, cf. 97, 107-108).
 According to Beauvoir, underlying each individual feminine
existence is a common, historically changing feminine condition.
This shared condition accounts for the general types or attitudes
that,  at  the  end  of The Second Sex, she distinguished as specific
feminine modes of realising the paradox of existence. Beauvoir
distinguishes four feminine existential types or attitudes: ‘the
narcissist’, ‘the woman in love’, ‘the mystic’ and ‘the independent
woman’. The concept of narcissism, which was first defined in
relation to sexual difference in the writings of Freud, underlies
Beauvoir’s discussion of all these attitudes, of which only the last is
considered a potential authentic mode of becoming subjective.
 In contrast with Beauvoir’s schematic description in The Second
Sex, the literary description in the novel makes manifest how the
attitude of the woman in love concretely appears in an ambiguous
human situation, and is blended with other metaphysical attitudes.
In addition, the novel exemplifies and studies the complexity of
intersubjective relations in the realm of love. On a formal level, the
descriptions of feminine becoming in She Came to Stay and The
Second Sex are  variations  of  the  two  different  modes  of
philosophising that I discussed in the previous chapter: a literary
mode, which describes the universal in its singular manifestations,
and a conceptual, yet concrete, mode, which describes a trans-
cendental historical universality: femininity. I have chosen She
Came to Stay as  a  case  study  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  temporal
aspect of subjectivity is central in this novel; the story of Françoise
is  indeed a  story about  subjective becoming.  Second,  the fact  that
Beauvoir operates with the topic of sexual difference already in
this novel reveals the continuity between her literary writings and
her essays in a new way. In order to see the general systematic
188 “de retrouver dans les histoires individuelles des types généraux” (DSI,
91).
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relations between the existential and phenomenological frame-
work that I have explicated and Beauvoir’s literary writings,
however, other novels could equally well have been analysed. If
we turn to Beauvoir’s autobiographical reflections on her novels,
we find that the problem of intersubjectivity underlies several of
them, and that each novel exhibits its lived complexity from a new
side.  In  each  novel,  intersubjectivity  is  also  related  to  other
metaphysical topics, such as love, temporality and mortality.
 In She Came to Stay––the story of a triangular relationship
between a heterosexual couple and a younger woman in the
bohemian circles of Paris––the focus is on the role of the other for
the ontological and ethical becoming of the self. This novel also
actualises the question of the possibility for mutual recognition,
which is also one central theme in Beauvoir’s second novel, The
Blood of Others (Le sang des autres, 1945). The setting of the latter
story, Resistance France, enabled Beauvoir to describe the problem
of one’s relationship to the other “in all its real complexity”, as she
writes, that is, its sociality, or the way intersubjective relations and
actions both affect and depend on a larger political community.
The social dimension of intersubjective relations is extended in
Beauvoir’s two subsequent novels, All Men are Mortal (Tous les
hommes sont mortels, 1946) and The Mandarins (Les mandarins, 1954),
to include historical existence. The main character’s immortality,
furthermore, in the former novel, evokes questions of finitude and
singularity, as well as the situatedness of human commitment, and
through the story of a group of lovers, friends and intellectuals in
The Mandarins, Beauvoir explores not only intersubjective
responsebility and historicity, but also eroticism and love.
Intersubjective experience through love and desire is a central
theme already in She Came to Stay, as my analysis will show, and is
present in Beauvoir’s very first novel, published only in 1979, When
Things of the Spirit Come First: Five Early Tales (Quand prime le
spirituel). There is, interestingly, a correspondence between this
early novel and Beauvoir’s last novel, Les Belles Images (Les belles
images, 1966), in that both focus on women’s situation, although in
different ages, and before and after the investigation of femininity
in The Second Sex.189
189 In  addition  to  her  five  novels,  Beauvoir  wrote  one  play, The Useless
Mouths (Les bouches inutiles, 1945) and one collection of short stories, The
Woman Destroyed (La femme rompue, 1968). Like All Men are Mortal,
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 There are also correlations across the stories on the level of
character. Beauvoir herself considers the main character of The
Blood of Others, Jean Blomart, a development of the character of
Françoise in She Came to Stay,  in that he struggles with the ethical
(and metaphysical) problem of recognition, or how to establish
relationships with others that involve “freedom on both sides” (PL,
561). Hélène, the other main character in The Blood of Others, is also
a variation of Françoise’s attitude, in that she seeks the justification
of her existence through devoted love. Contrary to Françoise,
however, Hélène develops an authentically subjective attitude
through friendship and political action. There are, finally, cor-
respondences between the characters in She Came to Stay and The
Mandarins. For instance, the attitudes of Françoise, Elisabeth and
Xavière in the former novel are all mirrored in the loving devotion
and  narcissism  of  Paule  in  the  latter.  What  is  interesting  for  my
argument  in  this  chapter  is  that  Beauvoir  had  not  yet  articulated
the existential attitudes of ‘the woman in love’ and ‘the narcissist’
when she wrote She Came to Stay.
 In addition to character, Beauvoir’s formal literary choices
reveal her interest in the conditions and possibilities of subjective
and intersubjective experience: she experiments with narrative
voices and points of view, with detail, dialogue, and––especially in
her last novel––how  to  “express  silence”.  In  all  her  novels,
Beauvoir also struggles with the ideal of ‘the metaphysical novel’,
as  distinguished  from  the  so  called  ‘roman  à  thèse’:  that  of
mediating the ambiguity of life by suggesting [signifier] philo-
sophical  ideas  through  the  literary  work,  rather  than
demonstrating [démontrer] them (PL, 655-656; FA, 622).
 Since the frame of my discussion of subjective becoming in She
Came to Stay is sexual difference, I will now begin by presenting
Beauvoir’s analysis of feminine becoming in The Second Sex. I will
then  consider  the  main  insights  of  her  debut  novel,  in  order  to
finally compare these two different modes of investigating
feminine becoming.
Beauvoir’s play is situated historically, and shares the philosophical
concerns of The Blood of Others; freedom and responsibility. The three short
stories in The Woman Destroyed have a clear feminist orientation.
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5.1 Feminine becoming in The Second Sex
The introduction to the first book of The Second Sex can be viewed
as a phenomenological reduction, in the sense that it clears the
ground for Beauvoir’s subsequent study of how the meaning of
femininity, and of the being of the sexes, is interpreted in scientific,
historical, mythical and literary discourses, on the one hand, and
how  it  is  constituted  in  women’s  lived  experiences,  on  the  other
hand. As Beauvoir writes, her aim is first of all to study “the light
in which woman is viewed by biology, psychoanalysis and
historical materialism”, and then the myth of the eternal feminine,
in order to understand how woman has become the other [l’Autre]
in relation to man (SS, 29; DSI, 34).190
 In Beauvoir’s view, otherness or alterity [altérité] is not specific
to  the  relation  between  the  sexes,  but  is  a  general  structural
characteristic of all relations between human beings, and “as
primordial as consciousness itself” [originelle que la conscience elle-
même] (SS, 16; DSI, 18). Though alterity expresses itself concretely
in human relations, it is not dependent on any empirical fact, but is
a “fundamental category of human thought” [une catégorie
fondamentale de la pensée humaine] (SS, 17; DSI, 18). In order to
clarify philosophically how alterity is a primordial human
category,  Beauvoir  turns to  Hegel.  She takes  as  her  starting point
the passage in Phenomenology of Spirit in  which  Hegel  traces  the
movement of spirit through a struggle for recognition between two
self-conscious  beings.  This  passage  is  part  of  a  more  general
discussion of natural and spiritual being, according to which spirit
develops from consciousness of the external world to self-
consciousness, where it becomes an object for itself (Hegel 1977
[1807]; cf. Hutchings 2003, Werner 2007). Before showing how this
passage is significant for Beauvoir’s understanding of woman’s
otherness in The Second Sex, let me briefly outline the crucial
context of Hegel’s discussion of spirit’s becoming.
 In Hegel, the struggle for recognition passes from a “fight to the
death” to a relationship of master and slave, on the one hand, and
190 “les points de vue pris sur la femme par la biologie, la psychanalyse, le
matérialisme  historique”  (DSI,  34).  In  the  second  part  of  the  book,  in
contrast, Beauvoir sets out to describe the concrete world in which women
live, or the shared feminine conditions, “from woman’s point of view” (SS,
30-31; DSI, 34; DSII, 9).
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a  relationship  of  the  slave  to  the  external  world  as  “something
upon which he self-consciously works to create a ‘second nature’”,
on the other hand (Hutchings 2003, 46; Hegel 1977, 111-119 [145-
155]). The idea of a ‘second nature’ receives its specific significance
from  Hegel’s  understanding  of  spirit  [Geist],  which  in  turn
captures a range of meanings (Hutchings 2003, 39). The most
fundamental of these is the distinction between objective and
subjective  spirit,  both  of  which  refer  to  “a  world  of  inter-
subjectivity”, which is self-determining and self-changing and
described by Hegel as “’I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” [Ich, das
Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist], that is, as subjective and intersubjective
(Hegel 1977, 110 [145]; cf. Hutchings 2003, 39). Whereas subjective
spirit includes individual self-conscious existence and experience,
objective spirit includes what self-consciousness has produced in
terms of culture, laws, institutions, habits and “the ‘second nature’
of an environment produced through human labour” (Hutchings
2003, 39-40). Art, religion and philosophy belong to spirit as well,
but as modes of its self-reflection, rather than its products. While
subjective and objective spirit, finally, can be distinguished
analytically, they are inseparable in actual history and “mutually
constitute each other in an ongoing dialectical process” (Hutchings
2003, 40).
 Beauvoir’s interpretation of the becoming of self-consciousness
or  spirit  in  the struggle  for  recognition is  one of  the first  feminist
interpretations of Hegel (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996 [1991]; Hutchings
2003; cf. Bauer 2001). Her interpretation enables her to
conceptualise not only the alterity between human conscious-
nesses, but also the lack of recognition, and even struggle, between
men and women. More specifically, Beauvoir finds in Hegel’s
discussion the idea of a fundamental hostility in self-conscious
beings towards every other self-conscious being, according to
which “the subject can be posed only in being opposed––he sets
himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential,
the object” (SS, 17).191 The process is reciprocal, however, since the
other consciousness or ego “sets up a reciprocal claim” [oppose une
prétention réciproque] (SS, 17; DSI, 19). What intrigues Beauvoir
when considering the relation between the sexes through this
dialectic  struggle  is  that  in  the case  of  the sexes,  woman does not
191 “le sujet ne se pose qu’en s’opposant ; il prétend s’affirmer comme
l’essentiel et constituer l’autre en inessentiel, en objet” (DSI, 19).
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view herself as the essential, but often accepts––and even enjoys––
her  position  as  inessential,  and  in  this  sense  other,  in  relation  to
man.
 In order to understand this enjoyment of passivity, one needs to
recall  Beauvoir’s  ethics,  according  to  which  there  is  a  general,
inherent anguish in the face of one’s own freedom or potential,
which motivates and explains different attitudes of “failure” in the
realisation of  existence (cf.  EA,  34;  MA, 45).  From the perspective
of sexual difference, moreover, one must also consider the specific
feminine possibilities (and impossibilities) of realising existence,
and how the feminine condition makes woman inclined to seek
recognition through the immanence of her person or through the
transcendence of another person, rather than through her own
acts, and their objective products or ideas (cf. SS, 642; DSII, 526).192
Only then is it possible to understand why in science, history,
myths and––not least––in the lived experience of individual
women, the meaning of ‘femininity’, ‘woman’ and everything
associated with this concept seems constantly to be defined in
relation to ‘man’ and masculine existence in a non-reciprocal way
(cf. SS, 15-16; DSI, 16-17).
 Even women who have the ambition of realising existence
objectively and creatively, Beauvoir claims, have to struggle
against the tendency and habit to rely on immanence rather than
on their own transcendence. They are too busily preoccupied with
their immanence, and lack the kind of self-forgetfulness necessary
for true creativity (SS, 711, cf. 715; DSII, 625-626, cf. 631). In order
192 The echo of Hegel’s understanding of the constitution of subjective and
objective  spirit  in  the  central  arguments  of The Second Sex is somewhat
surprising, considering that Beauvoir distances herself from Hegelian
philosophy in both Pyrrhus and Cineas and in Ethics. The influence might,
however, be explained by Beauvoir’s awakening interest in history in the
1940s, and by the general French reception of Hegelian philosophy.
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit was translated into French in 1939, and
introduced by, among others, Alexandre Kojève. According to Herbert
Spiegelberg (1982), both Kojève’s Husserlian misinterpretations of Hegel’s
philosophy and method, and the “need of the time” for concreteness and
structure, account for the French combining the two phenomenologies
(Spiegelberg 1982, 440-442). For a detailed discussion of the French
interpretations of Hegel, and of Beauvoir’s own interpretation of Kojève’s
reading, see Lundgren-Gothlin 1996 [1991], 56-82. Cf. Le Doeuff 1998
[1989]; Le Doeuff & Björk 2003.
168
to forget  oneself,  however,  one must  first  have had the chance to
find oneself, Beauvoir admits. One possible interpretation of this
idea is that the self-forgetfulness Beauvoir has in mind depends on
one’s having first “become subjective” in the Kierkegaardian sense
outlined earlier: in order to realise herself objectively or inter-
subjectively, woman must have had a chance to experience the
“inner transformation” or “actualization of inwardness” character-
istic of existence (cf. CUP, 51, 68 [57, 73]). As we will see concretely
in the two last sections of this chapter, however, Beauvoir’s novel
She Came to Stay, interestingly suggests that this radical, meta-
physical, experience of subjectivity cannot come about in isolation
from others.
 As  I  argued  in  Chapter  4,  Beauvoir’s  understanding  of  meta-
physical experience as the existential realisation of subjectivity is
close to Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of metaphysical conscious-
ness as the rediscovery of how the world appears in subjective life.
Both these definitions of metaphysics echoes and presupposes the
shift  of  attitude  that  is  conceptualised  and  described  in  the
phenomenological  or  transcendental  reduction.  As  we  saw  in
Chapter 3, Beauvoir welcomes the reduction, since it strives to
account for a level of subjective experience and constitution prior
to everyday, empirical existence. Embodied being and, by
implication, intersubjectivity is crucial for this phenomenological
notion of subjective constitution. It is philosophically and
historically striking that Françoise’s metaphysical discovery of
individuality is conditioned by a complex erotic and emotional
intersubjective situation, and that this literary articulation of
subjective becoming was written and published before Beauvoir’s
explicit elaborations of phenomenological and existential concepts.
 Whereas becoming in Pyrrhus and Cineas and  in Ethics is
primarily discussed with reference to the freedom of the singular
individual––even if this freedom is impossible without
intersubjective recognition––becoming in The Second Sex has  a
concrete  historical  resonance  that  is  lacking  in  the  earlier  essays.
Beauvoir’s use of the concept of becoming in order to understand
what women have historically become does not mean that her
study is sociopsychological or historical in any factual sense. As
Heinämaa (2003a) argues, such an interpretation of Beauvoir’s
work conflicts with her radical statements about our way of being.
These statements testify to the phenomenological understanding of
the  subject  as  a  unity  of  body  and  consciousness  that  expresses
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itself  in  the  mode  of  a  style,  rather  than  a  substance  with  fixed
attributes or traits of character. Human existence, in this
perspective, “cannot be closed or fixed, not even temporarily; it is
essentially open” (Heinämaa 2003a, 84). The dynamic dimension of
femininity and masculinity means that women are not historical
beings, that is, entities, but “two different ways of relating to
entities” (Heinämaa 2003a, 84).
 Even in the chapter entitled “History” [Histoire] in the first part
of The Second Sex, Beauvoir’s primary aim is not to describe a
history of women and men as individuals or beings in the world,
but to view the data of historical research “in the light of existential
philosophy [la philosophie existentielle]” and, more specifically, in
the light  of  the paradox of  the feminine condition (cf.  SS,  93;  DSI,
111).  As  embodied  modes  or  styles  of  relating  to  the  world,
however, femininity and masculinity are historical, in the sense
that they belong to traditions. In the introduction to the first book
of The Second Sex,  Beauvoir  remarks that  she uses  the verb ‘to be’
not  as  a  static  value,  but  “in  the  dynamic  Hegelian  sense  of  ‘to
have become’” (SS, 24).193
 In my reading, this Hegelian reference echoes Beauvoir’s
phenomenological and existential understanding of embodied
being as historical, and even prehistorical. As we saw in Chapter 3,
the temporality of subjectivity is one of the themes that Beauvoir
explicitly mentions in her review of Phenomenology of Perception.
Time explains not only the opacity of the world, but also that of the
self: as subjective, I am not an impersonal and timeless conscious-
ness, but concrete and historical (PPMPE, 163; PPMP, 366).
Beauvoir’s study of sexual difference is an original elaboration of
this view of subjectivity, as her use of the concepts ‘feminine’ and
‘woman’ makes evident.194 These terms are historical in the sense
that they should be understood with reference to “the present state
of education and custom”, and refer to a level of pre-personal
meaning, in the sense of a “common basis from which every
193 “a le sens dynamique hégélien : être c’est être devenu” (DSI, 27).
194 Heinämaa (2003a) discusses Beauvoir’s use of the attribute ‘feminine’
[féminine], instead of ‘woman’, and understands ‘femininity’ as an
intermediary between the idea of an eternal changeless essence, on the one
hand, and particularity and nominalism, on the other hand. Femininity or
feminine existence, in Heinämaa’s interpretation, is a dynamic generality
in which individual feminine existences take part (Heinämaa 2003, 85).
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singular feminine existence arises” (SS, 31, translation modified).195
It is primarily with regard to the potentiality of this common
feminine basis or situation for the actual subjective becoming of
“singular feminine existences”––the beings we take as women––
that Beauvoir undertakes her investigation of real and symbolic or
imaginary femininity in the first part of The Second Sex.196
5.2 Real and imaginary femininity
The ethical arguments raised in The Second Sex concerning the
becoming of individual feminine existences rest on Beauvoir’s
description of individual and intersubjective freedom in Pyrrhus
and Cineas and Ethics. What complicates woman’s situation––in
comparison,  for  instance,  to  the  situation  of  the  slave  in  Hegel’s
discussion––is that the bond that unites woman to her “master” is
not just economic, but fundamentally emotional, and founded in
affectivity and instinctual needs (SS, 19-21; DSI, 21-22). Considered
from the perspective of affectivity, becoming subjective is a process
that  involves  the  whole  of  existence,  and  it  begins  already  in
prehistory,  or  in  the  individual’s  anonymous  and  affective  de-
pendence on others. This existential condition motivates Beauvoir
to study the total situation of the embodied being of the sexes. The
phenomenological perspective is crucial here, since both subject-
ivity and intersubjectivity, in this view, are constituted in per-
ceptual experience.
 The references to phenomenology in The Second Sex are not
unambiguous, but are explicit and convincing, appearing through-
195 “Quand  j’emploie  les  mots  ‘femme’  ou  ‘feminin’  je  ne  me  réfère
évidemment à aucun archétype, à aucune immuable essence ; après la
plupart de mes affirmations il faut sous-entendre ‘dans l’état actuel de
l’éducation et des moeurs’. [. . .] le fond commun sur lequel s’enlève tout
existence féminine singulière” (DSII, 9).
196 Beauvoir’s  use  of  these  concepts  should  be  distinguished  from  the
specific meaning Jacques Lacan later gives to the real, the symbolic and
the imaginary in his psychoanalytical theory. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note that Beauvoir stresses the importance of Lacan’s theory of identity
formation in her discussion of feminine experiences in childhood (SS, 296).
For Lacan too, the imaginary is crucial for the development and structure
of sexual identity and difference (see, e.g., Lacan 2002 [1949], 3-9).
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out Beauvoir’s analysis of the feminine condition.197 Beauvoir
consistently refers to the subjectively lived body, as distinguished
from the body considered an object. To give just one example,
when describing the relation between the sexes as viewed from the
perspective of biological science, Beauvoir is very specific about
her own perspective, which is not scientific. She writes:
Nevertheless, it will be said that if the body is not a thing, it is a situa-
tion, as viewed in the perspective I am adopting––that of Heidegger,
Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty: it is the instrument of our grasp upon the
world, a limiting factor for our projects (SS, 66).198
 Beauvoir’s studies of biology, psychoanalysis and historical
materialism in The Second Sex lead  her  to  conclude  that  none  of
these theoretical frameworks, taken by themselves, can explain
how the hierarchy between the sexes has been established. Rather,
the facts provided by the sciences need to be understood from the
perspective of the individual’s total existential situation (cf. SS, 69,
83, 91, 93; DSI, 79, 97, 107, 111). For Beauvoir, this implies studying
the meaning of sexual difference objectively, both from the
perspectives of science, history and what she considers an andro-
centric  imaginary,  and  from  the  perspective  of  women’s  lived
experience (expérience vécu). Beauvoir explains the correlation
between these perspectives:
197 For  detailed  explications  of  the  phenomenological  background  to  the
concept of the lived body in the light of Beauvoir’s conception of gender in
terms of embodied styles, see, e.g., Heinämaa 2003a; 2003b.
198 “Cependant, dira-t-on, dans la perspective que j’adopte –– celle de
Heidegger, de Sartre, de Merleau-Ponty –– si le corps n’est pas une chose, il
est une situation: c’est notre pris sur le monde et l’esquisse de nos projets”
(DSI, 72). Contrary to what Beauvoir claims, Heinämaa (2003b) argues that
the concept of the lived body in Beauvoir’s ethical essays and in The Second
Sex is  closer  to  Merleau-Ponty’s  understanding  of  the  body  as  an
expressive, stylistic unity, than to Sartre’s and Heidegger’s basically
practical understanding of the human body. Cf. Langer (2003), who
opposes Sartre’s and Merelau-Ponty’s notions of ambiguity, and reads
Beauvoir with Merelau-Ponty. Although Beauvoir’s explicit discussions of
expressivity primarily concern linguistic expression, my analysis of pain
and suffering in Chapter 4 provides a literary example of the existential
significance of the expressive body for her understanding of subjectivity.
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Underlying each individual drama, as it underlies the economic
history of mankind, there is an existential infrastructure that alone
enables us to understand in its unity that singular form which a life is
(SS, 91, translation modified).199
She also insists that the theoretical understandings of the “facts” of
the sexes and their relations, provided by the sciences of biology,
psychology  and  the  history  of  economics,  must  be  understood
from the point of view of how the facts are singularised and
concretely lived by particular individuals:
In  our  attempt  to  discover  woman  we  shall  not  reject  certain
contributions of biology, of psychoanalysis, and of historical
materialism;  but  we  shall  hold  that  the  body,  the  sexual  life  and  the
resources  of  technology  exist  concretely  for  man  only  in  so  far  as  he
grasps them in the total perspective of his existence (SS, 91).200
Beauvoir’s subsequent study of the historical changes of the
feminine condition shows that it is neither an independent, nor a
continuous  process,  but  follows  the  stages  of  progress  and
destruction of human culture and civilisation as a whole. What is
constant in these movements of history, however, is that women
are, for the most part, in a state of subjection (SS, 169; DSI, 234-235).
Again, this subjection is at once economic and imaginary: because
of the privileged place traditionally held by men in economic life,
and the related prestige and value of masculinity, women tend to
subordinate themselves to the real and imaginary needs and
interests of men (cf. SS, 169; DSI, 234-235).
 For this reason, Beauvoir sets forth to study what one could call
an androcentric imaginary: woman “such as men have defined
199 “Sous-tendant les drames individuels comme l’histoire économique de
l’humanité il y a une infrastructure existentielle qui permet seule de
comprendre dans son unité cette forme singulière qu’est une vie” (DSI,
107).
200 “Pour  découvrir  la  femme,  nous  ne  refuserons  pas  certaines  con-
tributions de la biologie, de la psychanalyse, du matérialisme historique :
mais nous considérerons que le corps, la vie sexuelle, les techniques
n’existent  concrètement  pour  l’homme  qu’en  tant  qu’il  les  saisit  dans  la
perspective globale de son existence” (DSI, 107).
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her”  [telle que l’homme la définit] (SS, 169; DSI, 234).201 This
imaginary, or woman’s “being-for-men” [être-pour-les-hommes], is
studied as on of the essential factors in her concrete situation (SS,
169; DSI, 235). Beauvoir summarises the androcentric imaginary in
the  concept  and  myth  of  ‘the  eternal  feminine’  [l’Éternel Féminin]
(SS, 282-292; DSI, 395-408). The myth of the eternal feminine
initially seems contradictory and so overdetermined that it could
imply almost anything:
Delilah and Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora and Athena––
woman is at once Eve and the Virgin Mary. She is an idol,  a servant,
the source of life, a power of darkness; she is the elemental silence of
truth, she is artifice, gossip, and falsehood; she is healing presence and
sorceress;  she is man’s pray, his downfall,  she is everything that he is
not and that he longs for, his negation and his raison d’être. (SS, 175,
italics in original)202
But the ambiguity and flexibility of the myth is precisely its (open)
secret.  One  of  the  crucial  definitions  of  a  myth  [mythos] in early
Greek understanding is that it is something said, that is, a word or
a speech [logos], without the distinction of truth and falsity (Liddell
& Scott 1968, 1151). As a rumour, the “talk of men”, a tale or a
story that never comes to an end, a myth cannot be categorised as
either true or false. This conception illuminates Beauvoir’s
characterisation  of  the  myth  of  the  eternal  feminine:  living  a  life
201 What I here call an ‘androcentric imaginary’ functions in a similar way
to what Le Doeuff (1989 [1980]) has labelled ‘the philosophical imaginary’,
in that it  creates that which it  subordinates,  represses or excludes.  In the
borderland between rhetoric, philosophy and psychoanalysis, the
philosophical imaginary refers simultaneously to the explicit figurative
language of philosophical discourse, to its imaginary world and to a
textual unconscious. According to Le Doeuff, there is not only an
imaginary region within philosophy, but philosophy inscribes itself as a
discipline by distinguishing itself from fields like the mythical, poetical,
and metaphorical (Le Doeuff 1989 [1980], 114-115).
202 “Dalila et Judith, Aspasie et Lucrèce, Pandore et Athéné, la femme est à
la fois Ève et la Vierge Marie. Elle est une idole, une servante, la source de
la vie, une puissance des ténèbres ; elle est le silence élémentaire de la
vérité, elle est artifice, bavardage et mensonge ; elle est la guérisseuse et la
sorcière ; elle est la proie de l’homme, elle est sa perte, elle est tout ce qu’il
n’est pas et qu’il veut avoir, sa négation et sa raison d’être” (DSI, 244).
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beyond truth and falsity, the myth “haunts consciousness without
ever appearing before it as a fixed object” (SS, 175, translation
modified).203
 Instability and overdetermination also belong to the definition
of ‘the truly feminine’ according to the content of the myth: the
ideal  ‘woman’ is  the incarnation of  man’s impossible  dream of  at
once possessing being and recognising himself  as  a  free  and self-
determining consciousness. Metaphorically, woman incarnates the
dream  of  “quiet  in  disquiet”  and  “an  opaque  plenitude  that
nevertheless would be endowed with consciousness” (SS, 172).204
As such, Beauvoir concludes, woman is for man the wished-for
“intermediary” [l’intermédiaire] between nature, which remains
strange and foreign to him, and his equal, who is too identical with
him (SS, 172; DSI, 241). In woman, as this intermediary between
nature  and  existence,  man  hopes  to  attain  being  by  carnally
making another being his own, while at the same time confirming
his sense of freedom through the submission of another self-
consciousness (cf. SS, 173; DSI, 242).
 One of Beauvoir’s main conclusions in her extensive study of
how femininity is constituted objectively and subjectively, that is,
in the common cultural world and in women’s lived experiences, is
that the meaning of feminine independence is an intersubjective
matter. This means first that human freedom, as we saw in the first
chapter, requires the concrete recognition of one’s fundamental
dependence on others: my individual existence is realised when I
actively take up the possibilities created by others, through their
actions,  and  when  they  also  recognise  my  projects  by  their  free
engagement.
 The specific paradox of the feminine condition that Beauvoir
explicates throughout The Second Sex,  however,  implies  that
women do not view themselves as fully intersubjective beings. First
of all, having traditionally been denied the opportunity to take an
active part in the public creation of values, women do not identify
themselves with ‘humanity’, and––therefore––do not consider
themselves  responsible  for  the  world  and  its  future  in  the  way
individual men do (cf. SS, 611, 614, 618-619, 622; DSII, 686-687, 491,
203 “il hante les consciences sans jamais être posé en face d’elles comme un
objet figé” (DSI, 244).
204 “il rêve de quiétude dans l’inquiétude et d’une plénitude opaque
qu’habiterait cependant la conscience” (DSI, 240-241).
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496-497, 501). But neither do women, in general, authentically
assume  a  subjective  attitude  by  identifying  with  each  other.  As
Beauvoir writes in the introduction to the first book, women do not
authentically say “we”, which would imply a common past or a
solidarity of work and interest (SS, 19; DSI, 21). This is explained
by the unity that the couple constitutes for women: through love
and desire, but also through economic and material dependency,
women are attached to certain men more firmly than to other
women; fathers, husbands and other men of their own class (SS, 19;
DSI, 21).205 To realise one’s individual existence, Beauvoir seems to
suggest, would not only allow for, but also require, a plurality of
intersubjective identifications and relations, individually and
collectively.
 As I claimed earlier in this chapter, the story of Françoise’s
becoming in She Came to Stay is an original literary description of
how the metaphysical discovery of individuality––which Beauvoir
finds necessary for authentic subjective transcendence in The
Second Sex––can only come about through concrete encounters
with others. The primary context of Françoise’s subjective
becoming is her relation with the two other main characters in the
novel: Pierre and Xavière. In his early analysis of Beauvoir’s novel,
Merleau-Ponty draws attention to the fact that Françoise
experiences her concrete individuality for the first time through
the painful experience of the other, initially represented by Xavière
(SNS, 32-33). The frame of this dramatic experience, however,
presupposes a situation of several others and their ambiguous
relations: Françoise’s subjective becoming is conditioned by ‘the
couple’,  but  also  by  ‘the  trio’,  as  a  different  form  of  inter-
subjectivity.
 In my analysis of She Came to Stay in the two last sections of this
chapter,  I  will  draw  attention  to  another  aspect  of  Françoise’s
becoming, which concerns her failure to become authentically
subjective, and must be understood in the light of sexually
205 Beauvoir introduces the Heideggarian concept Mitsein in  order  to
describe the primordial unity and significance of the couple for woman’s
otherness. Through the couple, woman is other in a totality founded on a
biological necessity: procreation (SS, 19; DSI, 20). From the viewpoint of
biology, the man-woman unity is considered a fundamental mode of
intersubjective existence, and a crucial element in a collectivity (SS, 68-69;
DSI, 78-79).
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differentiated relations. As mentioned, Beauvoir ends her study of
feminine becoming in The Second Sex by discussing different
feminine modes of justifying one’s existence: ‘the narcissist’, ‘the
woman in love’, ‘the mystic’ and ‘the independent woman’. While
all four attitudes are conditioned by the traditional destiny of
woman, according to which woman is identified with passivity
and immanence more than activity and transcendence, Beauvoir
views the attitude of the independent woman as a potential
authentic feminine subjectivity, the actualisation of which depends
on her living in a plurality of intersubjective relations.206
 In order to see the operative-thematic relation between the
novel and The Second Sex,  one needs to be familiar with the frame
of Françoise’s becoming: the metaphysical drama between
Françoise, Pierre and Xavière.
5.3 Françoise’s becoming in She Came to Stay
She Came to Stay is the story of Françoise, a seemingly independent
woman  in  her  30s,  living  in  Paris,  and  of  the  so-called  trio:  the
intimate triangle between Françoise, Pierre, a successful director
and actor, also in his 30s, and the ten-year-younger Xavière, who
enters  Françoise’s and Pierre’s common life  in  the first  chapter  of
the novel  and is  finally  murdered by Françoise  by the end of  the
novel. The central events of She Came to Stay are Pierre’s
infatuation with Xavière; Françoise’s falling ill because of this
affair; the forming of the trio after Françoise’s recovery; the break
up of the trio, caused by Xavière’s relationship with a young man,
Gerbert; Françoise’s deception of Xavière, by spending a night
with Gerbert, and finally Françoise’s expiation of her guilt by
killing Xavière.
 The psychological motive for the murder is Françoise’s betrayal
of Xavière, as Beauvoir also explains: “I introduced Gerbert;
tempted by his youth and charm, Françoise renounced them. Later,
when she had won Xavière’s love, she fell into his arms, and it was
206 Beauvoir is indefinite concerning the extent to which authentic
feminine subjectivity would resemble masculine subjectivity as we know
it;  while the emancipated woman will  need to attain man’s situation, she
claims, it is impossible to know in advance whether her “ideational
worlds” [mondes d’idées] would remain different (SS, 724; DSII, 641).
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this  betrayal  that  she  expunged  by  murder”  (PL,  407,  translation
modified).207 The metaphysical motives behind the murder,
however, begin already when Françoise realises that Xavière is not
a being that she can dominate or even possess, but a separate
existence who has  a  will  and desires  of  her  own.  Xavière’s initial
reluctance to come and live in Paris, for instance, is an unpleasant
surprise  to  Françoise:  “Why  had  she  refused  to  take  the  offer
seriously? Françoise was irritated to feel this small, hostile,
stubborn mind beside her” (SCS, 34).208
She Came to Stay is  Françoise’s story in  two senses.  Firstly,  the
development of the intrigue is primarily viewed from her
perspective: the story is told from Françoise’s viewpoint in almost
all  chapters.  The  two  other  points  of  view  are  represented  by
Elisabeth, Pierre’s sister, an unsuccessful artist who is involved
with a married man, and Gerbert, an actor of the same age as
Xavière. The reason for making Elisabeth the focal point in two of
the  chapters,  Beauvoir  further  explains,  is  to  make  visible  the
ambiguity of human emotions, depending on the perspective from
which they are viewed. In comparison with Françoise’s first person
experience of the trio, Elisabeth’s third-person perspective
“reduced the adventures of the trio to those derisory properties
which human passion normally attains in the eyes of a third party”
(PL, 411).209 What Françoise experiences as tragic, for instance,
could also be comic from an outsider’s point of view (PL, 411; FA,
388). Gerbert’s perspective, Beauvoir furthermore explains, is
meant to balance Elisabeth’s: “In order to offset Elisabeth’s view of
the  trio  by  a  more  charitable  opinion,  which  still  came  from  an
outsider, I let Gerbert take over the narrative for one chapter” (PL,
412).210 However different they may be otherwise, Françoise,
207 “J’introduisis Gerbert ; tentée par sa jeunesse, son charme, Françoise
renonçait à lui. Plus tard, alors qu’il avait gagné l’amour de Xavière, elle
tombait dans ses bras : c’est cette trahison qu’elle effaçait par un meurtre”
(FA, 385).
208 “Pourquoi refusait-elle de prendre au sérieux l’offre de Françoise ?
C’était irritant de sentir à côté de soi cette petite pensée hostile et obstinée”
(I, 40).
209 “ramenait l’aventure du trio aux proportions dérisoires que les passions
ont, d’ordinaire aux yeux d’un tiers” (FA, 388).
210 “Pour  corriger  la  vision  qu’Élisabeth  a  du  trio  par  un  jugement,
également extérieur, mais bienveillant, j’ai donné, dans un chapitre, la
parole à Gerbert” (FA, 389).
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Elisabeth and Gerbert are unified by the inner monologue in which
they reflect on their own and others’ appearance, motives, feelings
and actions. The two main characters that lack a narrative voice are
Xavière and Pierre. Their silence reinforces the impression that
neither of them is particularly interested in the world about them:
while Xavière’s being is sheer immanence, Pierre gives himself
over unreservedly to his desire, of which the objects are either his
own plays or women.211
 The  story  is  also  Françoise’s  in  the  second  sense  that  the
“metaphysical drama” of She Came to Stay can be considered her
passage from the solipsist experience of being the one unique
subject among things and other human beings, whom she
experiences  as  objects  in  her  world,  to  experiencing  herself  as
merely one among all others, and finally back again to a different,
yet self-deceptive or inauthentic, experience of being one with
herself.
 The original solipsism of Françoise means, concretely, that she
experiences others as belonging to her and even that things do not
exist unless perceived by her: only her life is real, as Beauvoir has
her say (SCS, 13; I, 13). Françoise is aware of this attitude of hers, as
in the following inner monologue, at the beginning of the novel,
when alone in the empty theatre, a place where she and Gerbert
work together late at night:
She  went  out  of  the  office.  Not  that  she  had any  particular  desire  for
whisky, but the dark corridors attracted her. When she was not there,
the  smell  of  dust,  the  half-light,  the  forlorn  solitude,  all  this  did  not
exist for anyone; it did not exist at all. Now that she was here, the red
of the carpet gleamed through the darkness like a timid night-light.
She exercised this power: her presence revived things from their
inanimateness; she gave them their color, their smell. (SCS, 12)212
211 In  its  particular  solipsism,  the  attitude  of  Pierre  resembles  that  of  the
adventurer in Ethics, who “throws himself into his undertakings”––
exploration, conquest, war, speculation, love, politics––but never attaches
himself to the ends of these undertakings, only to his own conquest (EA,
58; MA, 74).
212 “Elle sortit du bureau. Elle n’avait pas tant envie de whisky : c’étaient
ces corridors noirs qui l’attiraient. Quand elle n’etait pas là, cette odeur de
poussière, cette pénombre, cette solitude désolée, tout ça n’existait pour
personne, ça n’existait pas du tout. Et maintenant elle était là, le rouge du
tapis perçait l’obscurité comme une veilleuse timide. Elle avait ce pouvoir :
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In  a  conversation  with  Gerbert  a  little  while  later,  Françoise
expresses how she generally experiences other people:
“It’s almost impossible to believe that other people are conscious
beings, aware of their own inward feelings, as we ourselves are aware
of ours,” said Françoise. “To me, it’s terrifying, especially when you
begin to feel that you’re nothing more than a figment of someone else’s
mind. But that hardly ever happens, and never completely.” (SCS,
16)213
In particular, Xavière ‘belongs’ to Françoise in her solipsist world,
as illustrated in a passage describing a situation in a dance café, to
which Françoise has invited Xavière. Françoise observes Xavière,
who is absorbed by a dancer and does not notice:
Xavière’s gestures, her face, her very life depended on Françoise for
their existence. For herself, at that moment, Xavière was no more than
a  flavor  of  coffee,  a  throbbing  music,  a  dance,  a  vague  sense  of  well-
being; but for Françoise, Xavière’s childhood, her days of stagnation,
her distastes were a romantic story as real as the delicate contour of
her cheeks. And it was right here in this café, among the varicolored
hangings, that the story ended, this precise moment in Françoise’s life
when she turned to look at Xavière and study her. (SCS, 20)214
sa présence arrachait les choses à leur inconscience, elle leur donnait leur
couleur, leur odeur” (I, 12).
213 “On ne peut pas réaliser que les autres gens sont des consciences qui se
sentent du dedans comme on se sent soi-même, dit Françoise. Quand on
entrevoit ça, je trouve que c’est terrifiant : on a l’impression de ne plus être
qu’une image dans la tête de quelqu’un d’autre. Mais ça n’arrive presque
jamais, et jamais tout à fait” (I, 18).
214 “les gestes de Xavière, sa figure, sa vie même avaient besoin de
Françoise pour exister. En cet instant, pour elle-même, Xavière n’était rien
d’autre qu’un goût de café, une musique lancinante, une danse, un léger
bien-être ; mais pour Françoise l’enfance de Xavière, ses journées
stagnantes, ses dégoûts composaient une histoire romanesque aussi réelle
que le tendre modelé de ses joues ; et cette histoire aboutissait précisément
ici, parmi les tentures bigarrées, en cette minute exacte de la vie de
Françoise où Françoise se tournait vers Xavière et la contemplait” (I, 23).
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The price for this solipsism, however, is that Françoise’s
individuality is not clearly defined (cf. PL, 408; FA, 386). Beauvoir
views Françoise’s discovery of this lack of a real, individual self as
the first of two subjective transformations: “from a position of
absolute and all-embracing authority she was suddenly reduced to
an infinitely tiny particle in the external universe” (PL, 408).215
Another dancing scene, where Elisabeth is also present, illustrates
the initial stages of this change:
Elisabeth had left the table. She was dancing, her eyes red, her mouth
set. For a moment, Françoise envied her. Elisabeth’s feelings might
well be false, she thought, her objective false, and her whole life false,
but her present suffering was violent and real. Françoise looked at
Xavière who was dancing; her head thrown back, her face ecstatic. [. . .]
For this young girl, for this heavy-hearted woman, the moment had a
sharp and unforgettable taste. And I, thought, Françoise, just a spectator.
(SCS, 31, italics in original)216
Françoise’s second transformation is not only the experience that
she exists as a singular individual among all others, but that others
can “invade her personality and bewitch it” (PL, 408).217 Having
recovered from the illness by which she tried to retain her original
and sovereign solitude, according to the metaphysical
interpretation, and finally accepted the trio, the roles are now
changed. It is now Françoise who is “possessed” by Xavière:
[.  .  .]  Françoise  felt  painfully  at  the  mercy  of  that  passionate,  touchy
soul. She seemed to exist only through Xavière’s capricious feelings for
215 “sujet  absolu,  embrassant  tout,  soudain  elle  se  réduisait  à  une  infime
parcelle de l’univers ; la maladie achevait de l’en convaincre comme elle
m’en avait persuadée : elle était un individu parmi d’autres, n’importe
qui” (FA, 386).
216 “Élisabeth avait quitté la table, elle dansait les yeux gonflés et la bouche
crispée. Françoise fut traversée d’une espèce d’envie. Les sentiments
d’Élisabeth  pouvaient  bien  être  faux,  et  sa  vocation  fausse,  et  fausse
l’ensemble de sa vie : sa souffrance présente était violente et vraie.
Françoise regarda Xavière. Xavière dansait, la tête un peu rejetée en
arrière, le visage extatique [. . .] Pour cette jeune fille, pour cette femme au
coeur  lourd,  ce  moment  avait  une  saveur  âpre  et  inoubliable.  Et  moi  ?
pensa Françoise. Spectatrice” (I, 36-37).
217 “s’emparer de son être et l’ensorceler” (FA, 386).
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her.  It  was  as  if  a  voodoo  sorceress  had  taken  possession  of  her
through the medium of a waxen image and was subjecting her to the
most horrible tortures. At that moment, Françoise was an untouchable,
a  wasted  and  shrivelled  up  soul.  She  had  to  wait  for  a  smile  from
Xavière before she could hope to regain some self-respect. [. . .] it was
true agony to feel that her happiness and even her intrinsic being was
dependent  to  such  an  extent  on  this  strange,  rebellious  spirit.  (SCS,
238-239)218
 In the end, Françoise’s self-image becomes unbearable to
herself, and she finds herself faced with two alternatives: “a
lifetime of self-disgust, or to shatter the spell by destroying her
who cast it” (PL, 409).219 By choosing to kill Xavière, it seems that
Françoise can only retain her former self by annihilating what she
experiences as the inaccessible presence of the other:
Face to face with her solitude, beyond space,  beyond time, stood this
alien presence that had for so long crushed her with her blind shadow:
Xavière was there, existing only for herself, entirely self-centred,
reducing to nothingness everything for which she had no use; she
encompassed the whole world within her own triumphant solitude,
boundlessly extending her influence, infinite and unique; everything
that she was, she drew from within herself,  she barred all  dominance
over her, she was absolute separateness. And yet it was only necessary
to pull down this lever to annihilate her. (SCS, 403-404)220
218 “Françoise se sentait douloureusement à la merci de ce coeur passionné
et ombrageux, elle n’existait plus qu’à travers les sentiments capricieux
que Xavière lui portait ; cette sorcière s’était emparé de son image et lui
faisait  subir  à  son  gré  les  pires  envoûtements.  En  ce  moment,  Françoise
était une indésirable, une âme mesquine et desséchée ; il lui fallait attendre
un sourire de Xavière pour retrouver quelque approbation de soi-même”
(I, 298).
219 “ou se détester à jamais,  ou briser le sortilège en supprimant celle qui
l’exerçait” (FA, 386).
220 “En face de sa solitude, hors de l’espace, hors du temps, il y avait cette
présence ennemie qui depuis si longtemps l’écrasait de son ombre
aveugle ; elle était là, n’existant que pour soi, tout entière réfléchie en elle-
même, réduisant au néant tout ce qu’elle excluait ; elle enfermait le monde
entier  dans  sa  propre  solitude  thriomphante,  elle  s’épanouissait  sans
limites, infinie, unique ; tout ce qu’elle était, elle le tirait d’elle-même, elle
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From a metaphysical point of view, the drama in which Françoise,
Pierre and Xavière take part has been read in a Hegelian manner,
and as  an illustration of  the struggle  for  recognition between two
self-consciousnesses. This interpretation is partly influenced by the
novel’s initial epigraph, which is a reference to Phenomenology of
Spirit: “Each consciousness seeks the death of the other” (SCS, 7).221
The  conflictual  theme  is  there  throughout  the  novel,  and  parti-
cularly explicit in Françoise’s inner monologue in the murder
scene:
Annihilate a consciousness! How can I? Françoise thought. But how was
it possible for a consciousness not her own to exist? In that case, it was
she who did not exist. She repeated, She  or  I,  and  pulled  down  the
lever. (SCS, 404, italics in original)222
But as Beauvoir remarks, she had conceived of the general problem
of her novel before she had actually read Hegel. In Prime of Life, she
comments on the connections between the themes of the other and
death, explaining that the consciousness of the other, when she
came to realise it in actuality, was “as shocking and unacceptable a
fact as death” (PL, 381).223 In She Came to Stay the two themes are
combined: once Xavière is deprived of life, she loses all power over
the world and over Françoise (PL, 381; FA, 360, cf. SCS 386, 402,
404; I, 480, 501, 503).
 In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological and existential inter-
pretation already discussed, the emphasis is not on the conflictual
relations between the self and the other, but rather on the
ambiguity of all human relations and actions. A literature of
existence will necessarily be amoral, Merleau-Ponty claims, which
is  not  the  same  as  immoral,  since  there  is  no  longer  any  human
nature or  essence to  rely  on (SNS,  28).  From this  perspective, She
se refusait  à toute emprise,  elle était  l’absolue séparation. Et cependant il
suffisait d’abaisser ce levier pour l’anéantir” (I, 502-503).
221 “Chaque conscience poursuit la mort de l’autre” (I, 8).
222 “Anéantir  une  conscience.  Comment  puis-je  ?  pensa  Françoise.  Mais
comment se pouvait-il qu’une conscience existât qui ne fût pas la sienne ?
Alors, c’était elle qui n’existait pas. Elle répéta: ‘Elle ou moi.’ Elle abaissa le
levier” (I, 503).
223 “un scandale du même ordre que la mort” (FA, 360).
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Came to Stay illustrates the impossibility of knowing in advance
whether our actions will be morally justifiable or not (SNS, 4). This
is because the novel describes human existence between two
temporal limits: on the one hand the immediate (Xavière), which is
“closed tightly upon itself”, beyond language and commitment,
and  on  the  other  hand  the  infinite,  characterised  by  “absolute
confidence in language and rational decision” (Françoise), and a
position that becomes empty in its attempt to completely transcend
itself (cf. SNS, 39).224
 The ambiguity of existence is also a central theme in Beauvoir’s
autobiographical discussion of She Came to Stay.  In  the  most
successful  parts  of  the  novel  she  recognises  an  “ambiguity  of
significations corresponding to the ambiguity one meets in reality”
is achieved (PL, 415, translation modified).225 Her  goal  was  to
describe events as “simultaneously comprehensible and con-
tingent”, she explains, and gives as an example the night Françoise
spends with Gerbert:
Françoise sleeps with Gerbert to revenge herself on Xavière, but also
because she has desired him since long, because her moral scruples
have collapsed, because she feels old, because she feels young, for a
number of reasons beyond those that could be pointed to (PL, 415,
translation modified).226
In line with the phenomenological and existential stress on
ambiguity, I argue that the very core of the novel––the motivation
for Françoise to “annihilate” the presence of Xavière––is ambi-
224 In Merleau-Ponty’s article, She Came to Stay is considered an example of
metaphysical literature, and as sharing the aim of phenomenological and
existential philosophy to formulate “an experience of the world, a contact
with the world, which precedes all thought about the world” (SNS, 28). Cf.
Fullbrook & Fullbrook (1999), who provide an early analysis of Merleau-
Ponty’s article (which was originally published in 1945) in dialogue with
Beauvoir’s 1946 essay on metaphysics and literature.
225 “une ambiguïté de significations qui correspond à celle qu’on rencontre
dans la réalité” (FA, 391).
226 “Françoise couche avec Gerbert pour se venger de Xavière,  mais aussi
parce qu’elle le désire depuis longtemps, parce que ses consignes morales
ne jouent plus, parce qu’elle se sent vieille, parce qu’elle se sent jeune,
pour  un  tas  de  raisons  qui  débordent  toutes  celles  qu’on  pourrait
indiquer” (FA, 392).
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guous in a way that calls for an interpretation of She Came to Stay
from  the  perspective  of  sexual  difference.  Erotic  love  is  a  central
theme  throughout  the  novel,  and  is  already  present  in  the  first
chapter; furthermore, Françoise’s desire for Gerbert in the theatre
is  confirmed in a  dialogue between them in a  later  chapter.  Love
even seems to motivate Françoise’s murder of Xavière. When
retrospectively discussing the ending of She Came to Stay, Beauvoir
is  very  clear  on  the  point  that  Xavière’s  egotism  or  self-love  was
not sufficient for the “obsessive proportions” of Françoise’s hatred:
“[c]hildish and capricious as she [Xavière] was, she could never
pierce Françoise’s inner defenses and turn her into a monster” (PL,
409).227 Only  one  character  possessed  this  strength,  Beauvoir
concludes, and that was Pierre. Françoise’s attitude to Xavière, in
other  words,  depends  not  only  on  the  trio  Françoise–Xaviere–
Gerbert, but also on her bond to Pierre.228
 One of the places in which Beauvoir has Françoise describe her
relation  to  Pierre  is  through  an  inner  monologue  she  engages  in
while watching him performing on stage:
It’s true that we are really one,  she thought with a burst of love. It  was
Pierre who was speaking and his hand that was raised. Yet his
gestures, his tones, were as much a part of Françoise’s life as they were
of his.  Or rather,  there was but one life between them and at its core
one entity, which could be termed neither he nor she, but they. (SCS,
51, italics in original)229
227 “puérile, capricieuse, elle ne peut pas atteindre Françoise jusque dans
sa moelle et la changer en monstre ; une seule personne, d’ailleurs,
posséderait la force nécessaire : Pierre” (FA, 387).
228 Moi (1994) provides an alternative interpretation of the triangular
relations in She Came to Stay when reading Françoise’s crime as the murder
of a fantasmatic mother figure (Moi 1994, 118). Underlying the seeming
Oedipal father-mother-daughter structure between Pierre-Françoise-
Xavière, Moi claims, is another configuration: from the metaphors used in
the descriptions of Xavière from Françoise’s perspective, she finds it hard
not to conclude that “the timeless, suffocating monster that leaves no
space in the world for Françoise is the very image of the omnipotent and
malevolent archaic mother threatening to devour her daughter” (Moi
1994, 118).
229 “C’est  vrai  que  nous  ne  faisons  qu’un,  pensa-t-elle  avec  un  élan
d’amour. C’était Pierre qui parlait, c’était sa main qui se levait, mais ses
attitudes, ses accents faisaient partie de la vie de Françoise autant que de
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This  description  is  not  only  representative  of  the  way  in  which
Françoise views herself in relation to Pierre early in the novel, but
it  also  resonates  in  Beauvoir’s  more  schematic  description  of  the
attitude of ‘the woman in love’ in The Second Sex.  As  Beauvoir
writes, the woman in love is one expression of the attempt to
achieve existential “salvation” [salut] in solitude (SS, 639).230
 The religious connotation here is not accidental. The modes of
solitary justification presented near the end of The Second Sex
describe three interrelated attitudes of devotion: the devotion to
the image of one’s own person (the narcissist), to a particular man
(the  woman  in  love)  and  to  a  male  God  (the  mystic).  In  order  to
understand  the  attitude  of  ‘the  woman  in  love’,  it  is  helpful  to
contrast it with Beauvoir’s description of feminine narcissism, on
the one hand, and the love of the independent woman, on the
other. Whereas Beauvoir conceptualises ‘the narcissist’ and ‘the
woman in love’ as inauthentic modes of feminine justification, the
independent woman––whose becoming can only be imagined––is
her prime example of authentic existence.
5.4 Love and  independence
The significance of fantasy and a shared imaginary for feminine
identity already suggests that Beauvoir’s way of conceptualising
sexual difference in The Second Sex cannot be adequately
understood without reference to psychoanalysis. As noted, Beau-
voir’s attitude towards psychoanalysis is ambivalent. In addition
to her general scepticism towards the determinist and yet ambi-
la sienne ; ou plutôt il n’y avait qu’une vie, et au centre un être dont on ne
pouvait dire ni lui, ni moi, mais seulement nous” (I, 61).
230 In  the  light  of  the  tradition  of  existential  thought,  it  is  important  to
distinguish solitude [solitude]  from  singularity  [singularité]: whereas
singularity is an existential condition that does not depend on being or not
being with others––although this condition can be revealed in concrete
experiences of separation––the meaning of solitude is close to the isolation
of  Kierkegaard’s  subjective  thinker,  who  cannot  express  the  truth  of
existence in direct or objective terms. In Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of
Françoise’s illness in She  Came  to  Stay, solitude has an even stronger
meaning, indicating the finitude of human existence: at the hospital,
Françoise has withdrawn from the human world into “the natural world
where she finds a frozen peace” (SNS, 34).
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guous meaning of sexuality within psychoanalysis as a science,
which she shares with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, she finds Freud’s
theory of feminine sexuality and eroticism defective (see, e.g., SS,
70, 300-307; DSI, 81; DSII, 20-29). However, Beauvoir also
reinterprets and supplements Freud’s descriptions from the
perspective of existential phenomenology. Her celebrated phrase
on feminine becoming, for instance––“One is  not  born,  but  rather
becomes, a woman”––appears  in  the  opening  to  the  chapter  on
childhood [enfance], and introduces her reinterpretation of the
Oedipal drama (SS, 295).231 This  does  not  suggest  that  the
becoming [devenir] Beauvoir has in mind is psychological, but that
subjectivity  is  founded in and must  be  understood with reference
to experiences of affectivity and desire, and that these experiences
are sexually differentiated.232 More  interesting  for  my  purposes
here is Beauvoir’s existential reinterpretation of the concept of
narcissism,  appearing at  the end of  the second part  of The Second
Sex.
 Beauvoir  generally  understands  narcissism  as  a  “process  of
alienation”:  the  ego  is  posited  as  an  absolute  end,  in  which  the
subject takes refuge (SS, 641).233 It is important to distinguish
Beauvoir’s existential use  of  the  concept  of  narcissism,  which
accounts for the ‘logic’ behind the feminine attitudes that she
describes in The Second Sex,  from narcissism as  a  clinical  concept.
While Beauvoir seems to hold that women are more vulnerable to
pathological forms of narcissism, she is also sensitive to the general
existential conditioning of the lives of individual women. This
conditioning is the result of experiential, mythological, historical
and  scientific  constitution.  There  are  at  the  same  time  striking
similarities between Beauvoir’s existential use of narcissism and
231 “On ne naît pas femme: on le devient” (DSII, 13).
232 For a study of Beauvoir’s description of feminine desire in The Second
Sex, see Heinämaa (2003a, 2006).
233 “En fait, le narcissisme est un processus d’aliénation bien défini : le moi
est posé comme une fin absolue et le sujet se fuit en lui” (DSII, 525). In the
French text, Beauvoir immediately refers to Helene Deutsch’s work The
Psychology of Woman: A Psychoanalytic interpretation from 1944-45 when she
introduces narcissism. This reference is omitted in the English translation.
Deutsch’s chapter on feminine eroticism, in the first volume of her work, is
a critical interpretation of Freud’s definition of narcissism from 1914
(Deutsch, 1973 [1944], 191).
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Freud’s (1957 [1914]) classical definition of this concept, which
motivates a brief explication of the latter.
 Freud takes his starting point in a traditional understanding of
narcissism  as  a  kind  of  concrete  self-love  characterised  by  sexual
pleasure: narcissism is “the attitude of a person who treats his own
body [Leib] in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is
ordinarily treated––who  looks  at  it,  that  is  to  say,  strokes  it  and
fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these
activities” (Freud 1957, 73 [41]). From this definition, Freud goes
on to distinguish a primary and normal narcissism from various
secondary, pathological, forms. Narcissism in the primary sense is
not a perversion, but the libidinal complement, in the
psychoanalytical conceptual framework––or the complement in
the life of the drives––,  to  the instinct  of  self-preservation,  and as
such  may  be  attributed  to  all  living  creatures.  Whereas  in  the
normal  case,  the  sexual  drive  is  divided  between  the  ego  and  an
external object, in pathological forms of narcissism, this drive is
withdrawn from the external world and directed towards the ego.
 What is particularly interesting from the perspective of
Beauvoir’s existential description of feminine attitudes is that
Freud developed his concept of narcissism partly by studying “the
erotic life of the sexes” (Freud 1957, 82, 87-90 [49, 53-56]). In brief,
he here distinguishes between an ‘anaclitic’ or ‘attachment’ type,
whose  choice  of  love-object  is  based  on  the  attachment  to  the
person  who  first  fed,  cared  for  and  protected  him  or  her,  and  a
‘narcissist type’, who has taken as the model for the object-choice
his or her own self. While these types do not divide human beings
into two sharply differentiated groups, and while a human being
has originally two sexual objects; “himself and the woman who
nurses him”, clinical comparisons between the sexes show,
according to Freud, that “complete object-love of the attachment
type”  is  more  often  characteristic  of  the  male,  and  object-love  of
the narcissist  type is  more common in the female  (Freud 1957,  88
[54-55]). Freud specifically comments on the narcissist object-
choice and sexual difference:
Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain
self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions
that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking,
it  is  only  themselves  that  such  women  love  with  an  intensity
comparable to that of the man’s love for them. Nor does their need lie
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in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfils
this condition is the one who finds favour with them. (Freud 1957, 88-
89 [55])
The charm of the narcissist, Freud also notes, lies in the general
attraction of inaccessibility, and in the consistency with which he
or  she  manages  to  keep  away  from  the  ego  [Ich] “anything that
would diminish it” (Freud 1957, 89 [55]). It is as if we would envy
the  narcissist,  he  suggests,  for  “maintaining  a  blissful  state  of
mind––an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have
since abandoned” (1957, 89 [55]).
 While many attitudes are met with in woman, Beauvoir seems
to  agree  with  Freud  in  claiming  that the situation of woman
conditions her more than man “to turn towards herself and devote
her love to herself” (SS, 641).234 One of Beauvoir’s few explicit
reflections on femininity in Ethics in fact echoes Freud’s remark on
the charm of the narcissist. When describing the metaphysically
privileged, but infantile, situation of children––who have not yet
discovered  their  subjectivity,  and  for  whom  the  world  and  its
values therefore appear as given––Beauvoir makes a comparison
with  the  women  who  have  been  kept  in  states  of  ignorance  and
servitude. Their adoption of the opinions and values of their
husbands or lovers allows them to develop childish qualities that
are often charming and genuinely moving, she writes, because
they manifest an innocent and gratuitous taste for existence, and
the absence of adult subjectivity (cf. EA, 37-39; MA, 49-53).
 One crucial difference between Beauvoir’s description of
existential innocence in Ethics and feminine narcissism in The
Second Sex is that the body has a crucial role for the latter:
Ineffective, isolated, woman can neither find her place nor take her
own measure; she gives herself supreme importance because no object
of  importance  is  accessible  to  her.  If  she  can  thus  offer herself to  her
own  desires,  it  is  because  she  has  felt  herself  to  be  an  object  since
childhood. Her education has prompted her to identify herself with
her whole body, puberty has revealed this body as passive and
234 “à se tourner vers soi et à se vouer son amour” (DSII, 525).
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desirable;  it  is  something  she  can  touch,  like  satin  or  velvet,  and can
contemplate with a lover’s eye. (SS, 641-642, translation modified)235
It  is  also  due  to  woman’s  total  situation,  in  Beauvoir’s  view,  that
the image of one’s own body has a particular meaning in feminine
identity  as  compared  to  masculine  identity,  in  the  sense  that  it  is
more often identified with the passive sides of subjectivity:
whereas male beauty [beauté mâle] indicates transcendence, female
beauty expresses “the passivity of immanence” [la passivité de
l’immanence] (SS, 642-643; DSII, 527). While man, in other words,
does not see himself in his fixed image, since his body generally
does not seem to him an object of desire, woman believes she sees
herself in her own mirror image. Furthermore, and again because
of  the  restraints  of  her  situation,  this  image  becomes  her  own
object of desire:
A passive and given fact, the reflection is, like herself, a thing; and as
she  does  covet  female  flesh,  her  flesh,  she  gives  life  through  her
admiration and desire to the imaged qualities she sees. (SS, 643)236
The consequences for subjective becoming of the narcissist woman
is that the world and other people will not genuinely interest her;
infatuated with her own ego, she “loses all hold on the concrete
world,  she  has  no  concern  to  establish  any  real  relation  with
others” (SS, 650, translation modified).237
 The  attitudes  of  the  narcissist  and  the  woman  in  love  can  be
articulated in terms of two reverse paradoxes. The paradox of the
narcissist,  according  to  Beauvoir,  is  that  “she  claims  to  be  given
235 “Inefficace,  séparée,  la  femme  ne  peut  ni  se  situer  ni  prendre  sa
mesure  ;  elle  se  donne  une  souveraine  importance  parce  qu’aucun  objet
important ne lui est accessible. Si elle peut ainsi se proposer à ses propres
désirs, c’est que depuis l’enfance elle s’est apparue comme un objet. Son
éducation l’a encouragée à s’aliéner dans son corps tout entier, la puberté
lui a révélé ce corps comme passif et désirable ; c’est une chose vers
laquelle elle peut tourner ses mains qu’émeut le satin, le velours, et qu’elle
peut contempler avec un regard d’amant” (DSII, 526).
236 “passif  et  donné,  le  reflet  est  comme elle-même une  chose  ;  et  comme
elle convoite la chair féminine, sa chair,  elle anime de son admiration, de
son désir, les vertus inertes qu’elle aperçoit” (DSII, 527).
237 “perd toute prise sur le monde concret, elle ne se soucie d’établir avec
autrui aucun rapport réel” (DSII, 542).
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values  by  a  world  that  she  must  consider  valueless”,  since  she  is
the only one that counts in this world (SS, 652).238 The paradox of
the woman in love, on the contrary, is that becoming subjective, for
her, means abandoning her whole subjectivity to another: the
woman in love “abandons herself to love first of all to save herself;
but the paradox of idolatrous love is that in trying to save herself
she denies herself utterly  in  the end” (SS,  660,  italics  in  original).239
This denial of self is not masochism, where there is also enjoyment
of  one’s  own  humiliation,  but  rather  a  dream  of  “ecstatic  union”
(SS, 660).240 In this union, the woman in love transcends the
limitations of her self, and reaches infinity through a subjectivity
superior to her own.
 In contrast to the schematic description in The Second Sex, where
the attitudes or  types  of  the narcissist  and the woman in love are
rather clearly distinguished from one another, and described in
static terms, the characters in She Came to Stay incarnate these
attitudes in a changing and ambiguous plurality of human
relations. The couple in its different variations is constitutive of
this plurality, but so is the trio. By describing the alternative unity
of  the  trio,  Beauvoir  not  only  questions  the  naturalness  of  the
couple, as Merleau-Ponty remarks, but also investigates the
conditions and limitations of the couple, and its significance for
individual becoming (cf. SNS, 35).
 In  addition,  the women characters  in She Came to Stay express
narcissism in degrees, or move between the attitude of the
narcissist and other existential attitudes. In this sense, the relation
between the two descriptions in The Second Sex and in She Came to
Stay resembles the relation between Beauvoir’s abstract description
of inauthentic attitudes in Ethics and their concrete mode of
appearing. In the existential anguish one feels before oneself as a
singular  possibility,  one  may  hesitate  to  “make  oneself  a  lack  of
being” [se faire manque d’être], in existential terms, which is the very
238 “qu’elle réclame d’être valorisée par un monde auquel elle dénie toute
valeur” (DSII, 544).
239 “s’abandonne d’abord à l’amour pour se sauver ; mais le paradoxe de
l’amour idolâtre, c’est qu’afin de se sauver elle finit par se renier
totalement” (DSII, 556, italics in original).
240 This  attitude  is  also  present  in  the  mystic’s  love  of  the  (imaginary)
person  of  “God Himself” [Dieu meme], rather than the real or imaginary
person of a particular human man (cf. SS, 679-687; DSII, 582-593).
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condition for existence. But one may also withdraw from existence,
or falsely assert oneself as either being or nothingness (EA, 34; MA,
45).  Beauvoir  describes  these  different  modes  of  failing  to  live
one’s personal freedom with the examples of the ‘sub-man’, the
‘serious man’, the ‘nihilist’, the ‘adventurer’, the ‘passionate man’
and the ‘aesthetic attitude’ (EA, 42-78; MA, 56-98). Whereas these
attitudes can be distinguished conceptually, concretely, humans
slide incoherently between them (EA, 34; MA, 45).
 The  woman  characters  in  the  novel  do  not  slide  quite  so
incoherently between the attitudes of feminine justification, but no
attitude can be found in one character only, and several characters
express different attitudes at the same time. While the attitude of
the  narcissist  woman  is  manifested  in  its  extreme  form  in  the
character of Xavière, for instance, who represents a narcissist “limit
case”, Elisabeth explicitly expresses one crucial aspect of this
attitude; the experienced irreality of the external world:
This she had understood, during these three gloomy days; nothing that
happened to her was ever real. Sometimes, through the fog, it was
possible to catch a glimpse of something which faintly resembled an
event or an act; people could be taken in by it, yet it was nothing but a
crude optical illusion. (SCS, 215)241
Françoise, in her lifestyle, represents the opposite of this attitude,
in  Beauvoir’s  own  interpretation,  and  is  thus  the  counterpoint  in
the novel to the character of Elisabeth:242
Françoise  very  seldom  bothered  herself  about  the  void  that  lurks  in
every human creature’s heart; she loved Pierre, she took an active
interest in ideas and the world at large, and people, and her work.
Elisabeth’s misfortune, which I connected with her childhood, was that
241 “Elle avait compris pendant ces trois sombres journées : rien de ce qui
lui arrivait n’était jamais vrai. Parfois, en regardant au loin dans le
brouillard, on apercevait quelque chose qui ressemblait à un événement
ou à un acte ; les gens pouvaient s’y laisser prendre : mais ce n’étaient que
des trompe-l’oeil grossiers” (DSII, 269).
242 In most of her novels,  Beauvoir explains,  there is a foil  or relief to the
main heroine; in the case of Françoise and Elisabeth, the latter stands as a
“disturbing challenge” [inquiétante contestation] to the former (PL, 412; FA,
389). Françoise, furthermore, balances the asymmetrical relation between
Xavière and Pierre (PL, 413; FA, 390).
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no person or event could make a warm, living impression on her: she
took nothing for granted, and masked this inner indifference with
feigned enthusiasms for things like politics or painting which in fact
left her quite unmoved. (PL, 411-412).243
Considering the central place of the body and of the image in
Beauvoir’s description of female narcissism, Françoise’s attitude is
the least narcissist in She Came to Stay. For one thing, she is hardly
present in her body at all,  and when she catches a glimpse of her
face in the mirror she is surprised, since normally her face does not
exist  for  her  (see,  e.g.  SCS,  40;  I,  47  cf.  SNS,  29).  What  is  most
important  to  Françoise  as  a  writer,  moreover,  is  creating  beauty,
rather than incarnating beauty. This is, at least, the conviction on
which she and Pierre have founded their life together: “It was
Pierre who had convinced her that the greatest thing in the world
was the creation of beauty. Their whole life together had been built
on this belief” (SCS, 55).244
 In  her  love  for  Pierre,  and  the  sense  of  self  and  reality  he
inspires  in  her  throughout  the  novel,  Françoise’s  attitude  in  fact
has more in common with the attitude of the woman in love in The
Second Sex than with the narcissist. For the woman in love, as
Beauvoir  writes,  to  love  means  to  lose  oneself,  “body  and  soul”
[corps et âme],  in  a  particular  man,  representing  the  absolute,  the
essential (SS, 653; DSII, 547). Because she is integrated with her
lover’s existence, the woman in love feels herself necessary, and
therefore justified (SS, 660; DSII, 557).
 Yet  in  contrast  with  the  attitude  of  the  loving  woman,
Françoise’s crime at the end of She Came to Stay might appear as an
individual,  and thus more subjective,  mode of  justifying her  own
existence, since not even Pierre will ever know of her action:
243 “Il  était  rare  que  Françoise  s’inquiétât  de  ce  vide  installé  au  coeur  de
toute créature humaine : elle aimait Pierre, elle s’intéressait au monde, à
des idées, à des gens, à son travail. Le malheur d’Élisabeth, que j’imputais
à son enfance, c’est que rien ni personne ne s’imposait à elle avec évidence
et chaleur ; elle masquait cette indifférence par des apparences de passion
–– pour la politique, pour la peinture –– dont elle n’était  pas dupe” (FA,
389).
244 “c’était Pierre qui l’avait convaincue qu’on n’avait rien de mieux à faire
sur  terre  que  de  créer  de  belles  choses  ;  toute  leur  vie  était  bâtie  sur  ce
credo” (I, 67).
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Alone. She had acted alone. As alone as in death. One day Pierre
would know. But even he would only know her act from the outside.
No  one  could  condemn  or  absolve  her.  Her  act  was  her  very  own. I
have done it of my free will. It was her own will which was being
fulfilled, now nothing separated her from herself. She had chosen at
last. She had chosen herself. (SCS, 404, italics in original)245
 If  one  considers  Beauvoir’s  development  of  the  idea  of
becoming in The Second Sex, however, according to which feminine
becoming is not merely the solitary becoming of singular
individuals, but is also an intersubjective and historical trans-
formation, Françoise’s becoming is still ‘solipsist’ rather than
subjective. In order to become subjective, Françoise would have
had  to  act  in  response  to  the  changing  intersubjective  situation
created by herself, Pierre, Xavière and Gerbert. This might not only
have transformed her own self, but also her relations with others,
including  that  with  Xavière  and  Pierre.  As  the  novel  now  ends,
Françoise is still locked into an imaginary where love is inauthentic
and therefore resists subjectivity as well as intersubjectivity.
According to Beauvoir’s analysis of feminine becoming in The
Second Sex, inauthentic love “destroys the possibility of friendship
because the woman in love is shut off in her lover’s universe;
jealousy increases her isolation and thereby narrows her
dependence” (SS, 674, translation modified).246 Inauthentic love,
however, is not only contrasted to self-love, but also to authentic
love: what is hardly imaginable to the dependent women in She
Came to Say is conceptualised as a possibility for the independent
woman in The Second Sex.
 What primarily distinguishes the independent woman from the
other attitudes in The Second Sex is  her  economic  and  social
autonomy (cf. SS 691; DSII, 600). That the independent woman is
245 “Seule. Elle avait agi seule. Aussi seule que dans la mort. Un jour Pierre
saurait. Mais même lui ne connaîtrait de cet acte que des dehors. Personne
ne  pourrait  la  condamner  ni  l’absoudre.  Son  acte  n’appartenait  qu’à elle.
‘C’est moi qui le veux.’ C’êtait sa volonté qui était en train de s’accomplir,
plus rien ne la séparait d’elle-même. Elle avait enfin choisi. Elle s’était
choisie.” (I, 503)
246 “L’amour tue l’amitié du fait que l’amoureuse s’enferme dans l’univers
de l’homme aimé ; la jalousie exaspère sa solitude et, par là, rend encore sa
dépendance plus étroite” (DSII, 574).
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emancipated  through  education  and  work,  however,  does  not
imply that her situation is morally, socially and psychologically
equal or identical to man’s, as the cases of Françoise and Elisabeth
illustrate.  Both  are  torn  between  their  professional  awareness  of
themselves as subjects, and the androcentric expectations of
“feminine submission” in erotic situations. The emancipated
woman, in other words, cannot independently reshape the concept
of femininity. Rather, her way of living the condition that she
shares with all other feminine individuals constitutes a specific
variation of the feminine paradox: she experiences the division
between immanence and transcendence, necessity and possibility,
determination and freedom in its extremity.
 Independence in The Second Sex,  however,  should  not  be
understood  in  static  terms,  but  as  a  becoming  that  concerns
feminine subjectivity in its totality: its layers of affective and
emotional  passivity  as  well  as  its  higher  levels  of  concrete  and
spiritual activity.247 While presupposing economic and political
liberation, independence also concerns women’s and men’s
intimate experiences and conceptions of love and eroticism (cf. SS,
639, 696, 704-705; DSII, 522, 606, 616-617). Beauvoir expresses this
view clearly in a lecture on women and creativity, given in Japan
in  1966.  In  the  opening  of  this  lecture,  she  rearticulates  Virginia
Woolf’s famous claim in A Room of One’s Own regarding the
absence of women writers in English literature. In order to be able
to write, Beauvoir (1987 [1979]) argues, it is necessary to have a
room of one’s own, where one can think, write, reread and criticise
what one has written, and be left to oneself (Beauvoir 1987, 17 [458-
459]; cf. SS, 138; DSI, 182). The room, here, is to be taken both as a
reality and a symbol, since feminine independence concerns
women’s material and imaginary conditions.
 In a traditional androcentric imaginary, self-love and love of the
other correlate with one another; the attitudes of the narcissist
woman and of the woman in love circulate between idealisation (of
the self) and identification (with the other). Beauvoir distinguishes
these  two  expressions  of  inauthentic  love  from  authentic  love
[amour authentique], which she understands as the concrete
247 Cf. Heinämaa (2003), who argues that the woman-man division, for
Beauvoir, is not just one aspect of human experience, but even the
dominating distinction, structuring our bodily sensations and feelings, as
well as our spiritual achievements (Heinämaa 2003, xii, 70-75).
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affirmation of difference, and as the acceptance of the contingence
and limitations of the other.248 Authentic love is “an interhuman
relation” [relation inter-humain],  and  an  assumption  of  one’s  finite
human condition, rather than a mode of infinite salvation (SS, 664;
DSII, 562, translation modified). In Beauvoir’s study of femininity,
this love is already operative as the hope for a new imaginary:
On  the  day  when  it  will  be  possible  for  woman  to  love  not  in  her
weakness but in her strength, not to escape herself but to find herself,
not to abase herself but to assert herself––on that day love will become
for  her,  as  for  man,  a  source  of  life  and not  of  mortal  danger.  In  the
meantime, love represents in its most touching form the curse that lies
heavily upon woman confined in the feminine universe, woman
mutilated, insufficient unto herself. (SS, 679)249
 In  relation  to  the  question  posed  in  the  beginning  of  this
chapter, which concerned the meaning of subjective becoming in
the context of sexual difference, my analysis of the thematic-
operative relation between The Second Sex and She Came to Stay has
above all shown that Beauvoir’s description of feminine becoming
deepens her existential and phenomenological understanding of
subjectivity into an analysis of the transcendental meaning of
historical becoming. In order to understand how woman can
become independent, in other words, it is necessary to understand
what she has become through a historical situation that constitutes
a common condition for individual feminine existents. One crucial
element of this condition is the myth of the eternal feminine, which
has its origin in an androcentric imaginary, but also contributes to
women’s images of themselves.
248 Cf. Beauvoir’s description of happy [heureux] feminine eroticism in The
Second Sex (pp. 421-423). See also Bergoffen (1997). For an interpretation of
Beauvoir’s idea of ‘authentic love’ that differs slightly from the one I
provide here, see Rosalyn Diprose (1998).
249 “Le jour où il sera possible à la femme d’aimer dans sa force, non dans
sa faiblesse, non pour se fuir, mais pour se trouver, non pour se démettre,
mais pour s’affirmer, alors l’amour deviendra pour elle comme pour
l’homme source de vie et non mortel danger. En attendant, il résume sous
sa figure la plus pathétique la malédiction qui pèse sur la femme enfermée
dans l’univers féminin, la femme mutilée, incapable de se suffire à soi-
même” (DSII, 581).
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 Women’s concrete modes of becoming subjective are partly
shaped by this myth. The narcissist, the woman in love, and the
independent woman are all bound to a traditional feminine
destiny. In the case of the two former attitudes, love is the means
to become subjective. In the case of the latter attitude, the
experienced conflict between independency through education
and  work,  on  the  one  hand,  and  feminine  love  and  eroticism,  on
the other, constitutes one specific example of the paradox of the
feminine condition. According to this paradox, woman’s subject-
ivity is not the ambiguous becoming reality that characterises
human being in Beauvoir’s early existential descriptions, but
divided between immanence and transcendence, finiteness and
infiniteness, the self and the other, and between fixed conceptions
of femininity and masculinity.
She Came to Stay interestingly anticipates Beauvoir’s schematic
descriptions of types or attitudes in The Second Sex and,  in
retrospect, contributes to a deepened understanding of subjective
becoming. The novel makes manifest how the abstract feminine
attitudes are lived in a concrete situation. It also anticipates
Beauvoir’s explicit claim that authentic subjective becoming would
require a plurality of sexed intersubjective relations, between
singular and universal existence.
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Conclusions
In this work I have investigated the systematic relation between
Simone de Beauvoir’s understanding of human existence and her
modes of expressing existence. My two principal aims have been to
explicate the central concepts of Beauvoir’s philosophy of
existence, in particular the concepts ‘existence’ and ‘subjectivity’,
and  her  reasons  for  studying  human  existence  in  the  form  of
novels  and  autobiography.  A  third  aim  has  been  to  show  how
certain of Beauvoir’s literary works contribute to the
understanding of subjectivity that she expresses explicitly in her
essays. The basic structure of the thesis mirrors the connection
between the two principal aims: Beauvoir’s conceptual explications
of  existence  and  subjectivity,  on  which  I  concentrated  in  the  first
three  chapters,  are  fundamental  for  understanding  the  role  of
literature in her philosophy, which I have studied in the two last
chapters. Achieving the two main goals has required the
accomplishment of four subordinate tasks. Firstly, and most
fundamentally, I have engaged in a close reading of Beauvoir’s
essays and commentaries, in which she articulates her
understanding of existence and subjectivity conceptually.
Secondly, I have clarified the philosophical background and
starting points of Beauvoir’s understanding of existence,
subjectivity and expressivity in the tradition of existential and
phenomenological philosophy. Thirdly, I have studied the
methodological texts where Beauvoir explains the reasons and
motivations for expressing the subjective aspects of existence in
literary forms. Finally, I have interpreted selected literary works
and passages where the topics of subjectivity and expressivity are
revealed. My analysis of Beauvoir’s novel She Came to Stay has here
functioned as a case study.
 The strategy of reading Beauvoir’s essays in dialogue with her
literary works has enabled me to provide evidence for the claim
made in the introduction: literature is central to Beauvoir’s
philosophy, because it makes possible an understanding of the
paradoxicality of the human condition, that is, our condition of
having  to  exist  as  both  singular  and  universal,  as  concrete  and
spiritual, as finite and infinite and as separate from and bound to
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other  human  beings.  According  to  what  I  have  called  Beauvoir’s
‘poetics of subjectivity’, the expressive possibilities of the novel
and the autobiography enable them to reveal these fundamental
ambiguities of human existence in a way that conceptual language
cannot, because of the limits of its expressive means. Conceptual
explications are necessary, in Beauvoir’s view, as they articulate
the  universal  structures  of  existence,  but  they  do  not  suffice  for
giving a full account of the temporality and concreteness of lived
experience. Beauvoir’s understanding of conceptual language
combines elements from Kierkegaard’s critique of the philo-
sophical system, and from the phenomenological distinction
between subjective, lived experience and scientific, objective
abstractions from this experience.
 Evoking a tradition of philosophical reflections on literature,
the term ‘poetics’ captures better than ‘method’ Beauvoir’s
conceptions of the systematic relation between her existential and
phenomenological understanding of subjectivity and her own
literary  works,  as  well  as  her  articulations  of  creative  modes  of
using language meant to reveal subjectivity. Moreover, method––
as I have shown––already  has  a  very  specific  meaning  in  the
phenomenological tradition to which Beauvoir’s philosophy
subscribes; it refers to a radical shift of attitude from our natural or
empirical life to the founding experiences in which empirical life is
constituted. Whereas Beauvoir’s philosophy of existence generally
concerns this primary and subjective level of experience, which she
calls ‘metaphysical experience’, her ‘poetics of subjectivity’
specifically concerns the potential to communicate this level of
experience.
The  most  significant  result  of  my  study  is  the  explication  of
how the reasons and motivations for Beauvoir’s use of literature as
a philosophical mode of expression are to be understood against
the background of existential and phenomenological conceptions
human existence and subjectivity as ambiguous and paradoxical.
More precisely, I have shown that Beauvoir’s notion and use of the
concepts of ambiguity and paradox is ultimately indebted to the
thought of Kierkegaard and Husserl, and their existentialist
interpreters,  Sartre  and  Merleau-Ponty.  In  my  explication  of  the
fundamental philosophical role of literature, I have specifically
concentrated on how Beauvoir’s autobiography and her novel She
Came to Stay illuminate the ambiguities and paradoxes of temporal
and intersubjective existence.
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 The second main result of my study, growing out of the first, is
the explication of Beauvoir’s understanding of the philosophical
aim  of  literature:  that  of  making  the  universal  problems  and
structures  of  existence manifest  in  non-conceptual  descriptions of
the  singular,  concrete,  temporal  and  contingent  courses  and
relations of human life. In addition to explicating this basic idea, I
have shown that Beauvoir’s own literary works function as
mediators between the singular and the universal aspects of
human existence in  her  philosophy as  a  whole.  Thus,  I  have both
explained what technical means Beauvoir viewed as crucial for the
existential writer, and contributed to the interpretation of her
literary works.
 In the discussion of Beauvoir’s autobiography, the problem of
temporality intersects with that of expressivity. In reflections and
recollected examples, Beauvoir articulates a general paradox of
verbal expression: language––conceptual as well as literary––
reduces the living, temporal aspects of experience to stable and
static forms, but also preserves and gives new expression to what
would  otherwise  be  lost  in  the  flow  of  time  and  forgetting.  My
reading of the novel She Came to Stay shows how temporality
intersects with intersubjectivity in Beauvoir’s description of the
‘subjective  becoming’  of  the  main  character,  Françoise.  Her
transformations from metaphysical solipsism to authentic
subjectivity are dependent on the internal relations of the trio, that
is, on the relations between Françoise, Pierre and Xavière. In
addition, by connecting the topics of the novel to Beauvoir’s study
of feminine becoming in The Second Sex,  I  have  been  able  to
explicate the gendered aspects of Françoise’s subjective becoming
in She Came to Stay. This has allowed me to argue that Beauvoir did
not restrict her investigations of feminine becoming to conceptual
clarifications, but she also studied this becoming through literary
descriptions.  As  I  also  show,  knowledge  of  Beauvoir’s  existential
and phenomenological conceptions of subjectivity makes visible
the  operative  metaphysical  dimension  of  her  literary  works.  My
analysis of She Came to Stay offers an example for further similar
studies of Beauvoir’s novels from the perspective of her poetics of
subjectivity.
 My main claim concerning subjectivity and sexual difference is
that Beauvoir’s explicit discussions of femininity in terms of
existential narcissism, love and independency are operative
already in She Came to Stay. In the novel, Beauvoir varies these
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attitudes between the main woman characters and describes limit
cases of the attitudes. She also shows that personal life always
combines several attitudes, and that it is thus impossible to
separate them in concrete situations. In The Second Sex, to the
contrary, Beauvoir conceptualises the different attitudes in
distinction from one another, and explicates their logic in the
context of ‘femininity’ as an existentially conditioned, historical
becoming.
 While the general frame of The Second Sex is existential and
phenomenological, Beauvoir relies on the Hegelian notion of
historical becoming and the psychoanalytical concept of narcissism
in order to illuminate the specific existential paradoxes of feminine
experience, as one expression of the ambiguous human condition.
That feminine experience is paradoxical does not mean that male
experience is not non-paradoxical, but that masculine becoming
and men’s modes of  living the paradoxes  of  existence differ  from
feminine ones. My discussion of feminine becoming illustrates
Beauvoir’s fundamental claim about her two different modes of
writing. In comparison to the essays, where Beauvoir expresses her
ethical and intellectual certainties conceptually and schematically,
her literary works offer nuanced descriptions of the complexity of
the lived experiences of temporality and intersubjectivity, and of
their implied metaphysical problems
 In  order  to  reach  a  deeper  understanding  of  why  Beauvoir
turns  to  literature  in  order  to  express  and  illuminate  the
ambiguities of temporality and intersubjectivity, however, it has
been  necessary  to  undertake  a  study  of  the  meaning  of  the
concepts existence and subjectivity, which underlie Beauvoir’s
very notion of ambiguity. The historical orientation of this study is
motivated by Beauvoir’s claim in Ethics that existentialism is a
philosophy of ambiguity in the tradition of Kierkegaard. My study
shows that Beauvoir’s notion of ambiguity is based on
Kierkegaard’s Christian interpretation of the paradox, which is the
concept he uses. By paradox, Kierkegaard understands the human
mode of  incarnating the eternal,  and of  existing outwardly in  the
eyes  of  others,  while  also  experiencing  the  inwardness  of  one’s
subjectivity. Beauvoir distances herself from the religious frame of
Kierkegaard,  but  operates  with  his  notion  of  inwardness  or
subjective transformation.
 Yet a more precise understanding of the meaning of
temporality and intersubjectivity in Beauvoir’s philosophy must
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take into account other concepts beyond the Kierkegaardian
existential framework. I claim that Bergson’s concept élan vital is
significant for Beauvoir’s notion of consciousness as an original
spontaneity, and that Heidegger’s understanding of the human
mode of being as projecting, or as being one’s own possibility to be,
is echoed in her description of freedom. In addition to this, I argue
that  the  explicit  Cartesian  elements  of  Beauvoir’s  philosophy  of
existence must be taken seriously. I have done this in two senses.
Firstly, I have recalled and explicated Beauvoir’s own references to
Descartes’ notion of subjectivity when she stresses the singularity
of existence, and secondly, I have studied Beauvoir’s notion of
subjectivity from the perspective of the French phenomenological
reinterpretations and articulations of Cartesian radicalism. These
articulations owe their basic concepts to Husserl’s phenomenology.
 Starting off from an equivocal autobiographical passage in
which Beauvoir seems to affirm the Husserlian ‘transcendental
ego’, I claim that it is not clear that Beauvoir follows Sartre in his
critique  of  Husserl’s  notion  of  the  transcendental  ego.  I  base  this
claim  on  a  comparative  reading  of  Sartre’s  early  theory  of
consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego, and of Beauvoir’s
interpretation of Sartre’s mature ontology in “Merleau-Ponty and
Pseudo-Sartreanism”.  In  the  latter  text,  Beauvoir  downplays  the
dualist  aspects  of  Sartre’s  ontology,  and  stresses  the  notion  of  an
‘interworld’,  which  accounts  for  a  shared  passivity  of  embodied
consciousnesses. My interpretation shows above all that Beauvoir’s
reading  of  Sartre  is  more  initiated  and  nuanced  than  often
assumed.
 Part of the interpretative difficulty when it comes to Beauvoir’s
position on the transcendental ego concerns the limited systematic
textual evidence we have. Therefore, it is impossible to provide a
final answer to the question concerning Beauvoir’s position on the
ego. I still claim that Beauvoir’s thought is clearly oriented towards
an understanding of transcendental subjectivity where the most
primordial  level  of  selfhood is  a  sensuous,  affective and temporal
network of intentional experiences, rather than a transparent, self-
transcending consciousness. This means that her notion of
transcendental subjectivity owes more to Merleau-Ponty’s inter-
pretation of Husserl than to Sartre’s, and to Merleau-Ponty’s
genetic phenomenological approach, than to Sartre’s static. I have
founded the latter claim in my own interpretations of systematic as
well as non-systematic sources.
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 In  her  short  but  highly  significant  review  of Phenomenology of
Perception, Beauvoir welcomes several of the central phenomeno-
logical ideas: the reduction, intentionality, subjectivity and
temporality. As I have shown, the particular intentionality
Beauvoir  draws attention to  is  not  the intentionality  of  acts,  but  a
more primary notion of so-called operative intentionality, which is
crucial for Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of transcendental
subjectivity as a pre-personal cogito on the level of sensuous
experience. In her review, Beauvoir thematises this passively lived
subjectivity in connection with the spatiality and temporality of
embodied experience.
 The phenomenological distinction between subjective and
objective time underlies Beauvoir’s reflections on different
meanings of the concept future in Ethics,  but as I have shown, she
testifies even more strongly to the adequacy of the phenomeno-
logical insights concerning time in her autobiographical reflections
on the past.  The  Husserlian  idea  of  a living present is operative in
Beauvoir’s autobiographical reflections on how to express her
experience of the teleological development of her life––her
experience of living towards a future goal––while also expressing
the threefold temporal horizon of each moment of her life.
 In summary, the most crucial topics that bind Beauvoir to
Husserlian phenomenology are the methodological shift of attitude
characteristic of the phenomenological reduction and temporality
(which  she  studied  in  Husserl’s  own  works),  and  the  notions  of
operative intentionality and transcendental subjectivity (which
Beauvoir became familiar with via Merleau-Ponty’s works). These
Husserlian topics account for Beauvoir’s conception of subjectivity
as layered, embodied and passively becoming. The topics that bind
Beauvoir to Kierkegaard are more directly connected to her ‘poetics
of  subjectivity’,  that  is,  to  the  problem  of  how  to  communicate
experience.
 In  my  discussion  of  Beauvoir’s  notion  of  the  expressivity  and
inexpressivity of experience, I have shown that already
Kierkegaard raised the problem of expressing subjectivity in
language. In the essays where Beauvoir explicates her view on the
relation between literature and philosophy, she repeatedly refers
to Kierkegaard as an example of a metaphysical writer.
Metaphysics and metaphysical experience, as I have outlined, is to
be understood in line with the phenomenological notion of
experience as an intentional and temporal directedness to the
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world and to others. For Beauvoir, this directedness is total, in the
sense  that  it  concerns  the  whole  of  individual  existence,  and
detotalised, in the sense that subjectivity is constantly becoming
and open to unexpected experiences and events.
 Beauvoir explicitly takes up Kierkegaard’s distinction between
direct and indirect communication in  order  to  account  for  the
difference between conceptual and non-conceptual philosophy,
and  for  her  own  use  of  the  novel  and  the  autobiography  as
mediators of the singular and universal aspects of existence. In
Kierkegaard, direct and indirect communication respectively refer
to  the  mode  of  expression  of  objective  thought,  which  is
characterised by exactness, certainty and transparency, and
subjective thought, characterised by the subjective thinker’s
paradoxical wish to communicate his or her experience of inward
becoming objectively. In order to preserve the paradox and fluidity
of the subjective truth, Kierkegaard holds, its expressions must
necessarily be indirect.
 In Beauvoir’s re-articulation of this distinction, direct language
“speaks”, or expresses its meaning explicitly and conceptually,
while indirect language “shows” or makes meaning manifest by
the presence of contingent and ambiguous details, and by the use
of different narrative voices. I claim that Merleau-Ponty’s
distinctions between authentic first- and inauthentic second-order
expression, and between the gestural and the conceptual meaning
of speech, further illuminate Beauvoir’s understanding of the
difference between indirect and direct language. Whereas
authentic expression is creative and formulates meaning “as for the
first time”, second-order expression refers to already established
meaning. As related to this first distinction, Merleau-Ponty’s
second distinction articulates the difference between the sensuous
and pre-predicative level of indirect or gestural meaning, present
in all speech, and the level of predicative meaning. The creative
writer reorganises already established modes of expression by
means of the gestural or indirect meaning of language, such as its
sounds and silences.
 Beauvoir does not provide a systematic philosophy of
language, but indirect expression and the gestural meaning of
language  are  crucial  keys  to  her  understanding  of  the  different
philosophical aims and functions of the novel and the
autobiography. The task of the existential writer, in her account, is
to arrange the world in a personal pattern, which requires that he
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or  she  grasps  the  “meaning  of  things”  and  expresses  them  in
language. This meaning is not merely thought, but initially
revealed through the objects of sensations, feelings and actions.
The goal of what Beauvoir calls the metaphysical novel is to let the
reader undergo imaginary experiences that imitate the form of real
experiences, but that also reach beyond and widen our conception
of reality, through imaginary creations.
 The contingent and non-significant details of life are crucial in
this recreation: the concrete, intimate and singularly lived details
of life are, in fact, constitutive for the meaning expressed through
the novel and the autobiography. These details are the “nonsense”
in and by which the “sense” of existence can at all appear. Again
put in Kierkegaardian terms, the novel and the autobiography
communicate through non-knowledge or subjectivity, rather than
through knowledge or objectivity. For this reason, Beauvoir views
the novel and the autobiography themselves as ‘singular
universals’, and as enabling communication between subjectivities
through time.
 The main difference between the novel and the autobiography
concern their mode of representing lived experience, and the role
of  detail  in  these  representations.  Beauvoir  understands  autobio-
graphical writing as the recreation of actually lived-through
experiences under the form of memory. Contingency has a
particular significance in this recreation, because the primary aim
of autobiography is to reveal the facticity of human existence. The
primary aim of the novelist, in comparison, is to recreate
experiences under the form of imagination, or as possible,
regardless of whether they are actually lived through or not.
Contingent details are needed in the novel too, but only those that
are crucial to the creation of the imaginary object, that is, the story
and its implicit metaphysical problems.
 I  maintain,  after  this  study,  that  Beauvoir’s  thought  must  be
located in the traditions of existential philosophy and phenomeno-
logy,  and  that  any  interpretation  of  her  literary  works  must  take
this  frame  into  account.  I  wish  to  underline,  however,  that
Beauvoir’s concern to study the ambiguity of existence invites
different theoretical interpretations. Because of their indirectness,
there remain constitutively unthought elements in Beauvoir’s
literary works. As I have shown in my analysis of She Came to Stay,
this ‘unthought’ can be retrospectively explicated. The fact, finally,
that Beauvoir herself relies on psychoanalytical concepts in order
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to illuminate human existence, as in the case with narcissism, does
not undermine the general existential and phenomenological
orientation of her thought. It only confirms the insight that
Beauvoir explicates on their ground: that subjective life is
essentially ambiguous.
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